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Abstract 
As recently as 1970 a large majority of the labor force employed in Colombia's 
manufacturing sector was found in 11 cottage-shop" establishments, defined here as 
haVing less than 5 workers and less than 24,000 pesos output. The share of _the 
labor force found in plants of 100 or more workers was only 20-25 percent. These 
facts by themselves make it of obvious importance that a policy for the indus­
trial sector take into account the limitations'."'-employmentw:lse--of the "factorylf 
sector and the gr=a:.ar importance of the cottage-shop sector in this respect. 
This is especially true given that there appears to have been no significant change 
in the relative importance of the two subsectors over the last 20 years. It is 
of particular interest to note that during the 60s, a period of heavy emphasis 
of investment in highly capital intensive sectors like chemicals and petro­
chemicals, the share of all manufacturing employment in the factory subsector 
appears to have decreased--at least this is true for the post 1964 period. 
As of.the mid 60s labor productivity was an increasing function of plant 
size, being 8 or 9 times as high in the largest firms as for independent 
workers, and over 3 times as high in the largest plants as in ones of 5 to 9 
workers. Output (value added) per horsepower is not related in any simple way 
to size; the highest ratio is found for firms in the 50-200 worker range with 
both the large st and the smallest plants ranking low. Horsepower is not, 
however, a good proxy for total capital stock; total capital per horsepower 
appears to be 2 or 3 times higher for the largest plants as for all other plants, 
implying (together with the output/horsepower figures) lower output/capital ratio 
for the largest plants (over 200 workers) than for all others taken together; 
though it is not possible to draw very solid conclusions as to how the value 
added/capital ratio varies among plants up to 200 workers, it seems reasonably 
ii 
probable that this is a monotonically decreasing relationship, especially in 
the light of information from other countries, where such a negative relation 
seems invariably to be present. 
,
Over time the composition of the cottage-shop and small firm sector has 
varied substantially; clothing is the industry where the most dramatic decline 
in relative importance of cottage-shop has occurred over time; it is the only 
sector which clearly had less cottage-shop workers in 1964 than in 1938. 
Relatively stagnant cases were tobacco, textiles, leather, non-metallic minerals. 
In a number of others there has been rapid increase, i.e., food, wood and 
products,metal_ and products--in ?articular transportation equipment manufacture 
and repair. These three branches, along with clothing and footwear~are the 
major cottage-shop employers at present; in 1964 they accounted for over 
three quarters of all employment of this type. -
Trends in wages and :abor pxoducttvity can.only be traced out over the 
period 1953 and on; there appears to be jO relationship between size of plant 
and change in labor productivity (although uncertainty is introduced by certain 
statistical problems in the post 1962 data for the small plants) but wages have 
clearly risen fastest in plants above 50 workers, an overall increase of perhaps 
60 to 80 percent over 1953-66 as compared with an increase of probably 20 to 
40 percent for plants of less than 50 workers. 
More detailed attempts to measure relative social efficiency by plant size 
have been carried out by John Todd, and tend to indicate that the largest plants 
are either as inefficient as any other group or the least efficient of all; his 
estimates suggest that the most efficient plants are in the medium size range 
(50-200 workers) although it is possible that the smallest ones would emerge 
i:!.i 
on top if adequate measures of ctpital could be used. 
There is little question that the large plants, corresponding to high capital 
intensity, g~uerate an unequal income distribution; in petrochemicals, for example, 
the blue collar share is only about 9 percent and in chemicals about 15 percent. 
compared to an industry-wide average of about 30 percent and-at the other extreme­
to such industries as wooden furniture {51 percent) r,on-metallic minerals (46 
percent), transportation equipment (53 percent) and so on. The distributional 
characteristics of such industries are worriesome. 
It is not clear whether large or small firms have a greater tendency to 
grow; the difference is in any case not dramatic; the percent of small firms 
which appear to be liquidated is, however, much higher than for large firms. 
Given the pieces of evidence which suggest considerable efficiency on the 
part of small firms relative to large ones, coupled with similar evidence from 
other countries, it is suggested that firm size and plant size be taken seriously 
into considerati.on in policymaking; further analysis is clearly warranted with 
respect to the source of the particular inefficiency of the very largest plants 
(200 workers and up) and in general with the explanation of the differences 
observed. It is important to isolate the variables whose relation with ·plant 
size generates the dramati~ally varying factor proportions (even in the same 
industry) across plant size. 
The Relevance and Prospects of Small Scale Industry 
in Colombia 
R. Albert Berry 
This stud~ reviews some of the evidence available relating to the possible 
contribution which small scale industry can make in Colombia, discusses some of 
the factors which appear to have affected its growth (or stagnation), and takes 
a few tentative steps towards suggesting policies for fostering desirable growth 
in this area. The first part of the discussion below presents a brief descrip­
tion of small scale industry in Colombia and how it appears to have developed 
over the last years., The second section focusses on its performance in terms of
I
(a) actu~ and potential "statica efficiency, i.e., the efficiency with which it 
. converts resources into output at a given point in time and (b) employment and 
income distribution impact. The third section deals with its growth potential 
relative to larger scale industry (including a discussion of pertinent informa­
tion on several other countries), and the fourth with possible strategies for 
its development. 
The concept of ;rscale" is an ambiguous one; it seems natural to define "small 
scale" as corresponding to different absolute levels of firm size in different 
countries; further, since a complete spectrum of firm sizes exists in any coun­
try, any definition must be rather arbitrary. Cut-off points should be located, 
if possible, so as to distinguish firms which differ markedly in their efficiency 
of resource utilization, employment impact or income distribution impact; of 
course all these variables may be related smoothly rather than discretely to 
size. In this study some of the discussion will treat size as a continuous 
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variable; 01::1,.:::r F:'t"ts ·;v~.11 u.:c :::. classification into (a) "cottage shop" industry 
defined as ~s~~blishments (plants) with less than 24,000 pesos of output and less 
than 5 worker,;;1 (b) ~.;null ::icale :.'.ndustry, witn lower limit of 5 workers or 
24,000 pesos output and. upper llmit of 19 workers; (c) medium scale industries 
of 20-99 workers; 2 ai.1d (d) large sc~J.c industry of 100 or more workers. While 
this division is in part forced by DANE'3 classific~ticn sche:ne, it does appear 
to aggregate groups oE !Subst~ntially differing characteristics. Before consider-
ing the <letaL.s of overtime change, factor pt'oportions, etc. it is useful 
., 
to summarize some~ of the me.Jo.:· differc71ces across plant size• ..J 
DANE dc.tLl bring out sow.Loi the distinguish:(ng cha.:-acteristics of those plants with 
4five or more worltcrs ::..i.1d/or 24, 00G pauo,: ·or more of gross output per year; 'more 
limited data is .:..vailc.olo for :,mc1.ller ones; Table 1 summarizes the author's best 
estima·tes for l96e:. _ As ,,bs:;;:crzd :.n, other. co1intrie::. average labor productivity 
rises rapidly with plar::t .,:'._z 0i; 5 thl.:. :-.s :; .:n:t:'..y (at leaf't) due to s. higher capital/ 
1nAUE cor.ceptt.al::y i.nc1.ude; ill -tts sur.reys of the manufacturing sector all 
firms i:ith a rslrd.~1;,'l of 5 worker& amiio-.: '..?4~000 pesos 'Jf output,.. This category 
is therefo:-a ·.:h~ pe:-t of 7:he msnuf.-!.cl:ur.i.ng S$0.ctor on wM.ch DANE does not collect 
statistics. 
2Planenclon, in ito study of c~all and medium industry (El Desarrollo de la 
Peguenr:i. z i:Iedj.ana Indcstr:;_a e craves del Credito y Mcdidas Complementarias, 
Bogota, Novie;:ib,:e, 1970) ciri,ply used th~ range 5-J.OO workers to describe small 
and mediu..i itldur;;::ry and ::.:ubd.1.vid.::?d this range into several categories. 
3In ma.ny re::rp~cts it wc,uld be more ue;eful to havP. data by firm rather than 
by plm:1t. To n:.te nuch information Inn not been produced by DANE. Some large 
firms in Colombia hc:.nrc. 10 or more medium sized plants, so whatever firm size effects 
exist co1.:ld be diatorted or lost iu. the existing data. 
4These dP..tc ht:.w1 c.. nv:nber of deficien~ies, especially with respect to the. 
smaller f:!.r:.:s, wi1e;.:.:: sarnpling ~-s less complete than for the large firms and 
where accvr~c7 iG als0 probably le8n; these problems are referred to in detail 
later. Ne·ve"."i:h~less th.;; general outline.a of size group characteristics may be 
gleaned frow th:L; data. · 
5 .
That l~r.-gc plc.ntsh::ve greater a-verage pro<luctivity per worker is not sur-
prising; it ~ecus to ~h,1racterize ~11 or ~lmost all countries and would be 
expected 0"!.1 the basfo of what ::.n kr..o,.:in about factor market imperfections, the 
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Footnotes for Table 1
1Adjusted down from DANE's figures (see Table A-1) to take account of theassumption that firms unreported by DANE had lower average value added perperson than those included.
2Applying Todd's adjustment factors--and assuming that DANE's arrastre baseddownward bias was distributed among the years 1963-66 proportionally to theinflation in each year of that period. (Todd presents figures for 1962 and 1966)_in order to convert those adjustment factors to 64 terms--value added/workerratios of 14.31 and 15.93 were found for these two categories respectively. Butit was assumed that the selection bias of DANE (referred to in the previousfootnote) was greater with respect to the lower category so a greater downward.adjustment was made in that case to take account of it.
3Todd' s adjustment factor implied a value:· added/worker ratio of 16. 3 hereand was not al~ered.·.
4A salary of 2,600 pesos was assumed to make this calculation.
5uorse-power was reestimated for the smaller size categories9 usually onthe assumption that its true productivity was underestimated by DANE by aboutthe same extent as was labor's. 
Sources and Methodology - Table 1 
Mv adjustments and attempted reconciliations of published figures take intoaccount the following problems with the two official sources, the populationcensus information on people workine in the manufacturing sector, and DANE'sindustrial survey information published in the Anuario General de Estadistica. 
1. I assume some under-enumeration of the labor. force in manufacturing in thecensus (about 2 percent), somewhat less than the probable average underenlli:Ilera­tion for the urban population of 10 and over, and well below the average under­enumeration for the total population. 
2. I assume an average rate of unemployment in the manufacturing sector of 6.4percent, based on an overall unemployment rate reported in the 1964 populationcensus of 6.8 percent for cabaceras (municipal seats) and 2.9 percent for otherlocalities, and on the relationship-observed in Bogota in 1964 and in 8 citiesin 1967 by CEDE's surveys between unemployment in manufacturing and unemploymentin all urban activities. (CEDE, Empleo y Desempleo en Colombia,EdicionesUniversidad de Los Andes, Bogota, 1968, and International Labor Office, TowardsFull Employment, Geneva, 1970, p. 366). The figures listed for workers invarious size categories therefore add up to the sum of the "employed" workers;depending on whether one believes this estimate of unemployment is too small ortoo great, the number of people in the residual category "less than 5 workersexcluding independent workers" would have to be lowered or raised. The assump­tion that: none of the unemployment falls in the "independent worker" categoryis arbitrary; 1967 CEDE information does not provide a breakdown of the un­employed by form of occupation. Only the occupied population is classified in_·this way. If in fact some iudependent workers are unemployed, then the residualcategory is underestimated. · 
. -5-
3. Evidence from v.:ri.ous sources p·oints consistently to the conclusion that
DANE's statistics on number of establ::.shments, workers, etc., are underestimated
for the smaller size cate6ories. This is very plausible since updated informa­
tion on these is much harder to obtai11 than for th~ larger firms; it is con­
sistent with the fact that in general the number of firms reported in these
categories varies over time according to the completeness with which samples are
taken, and is supported also by a check provided between sample and census infor­
mation. Table A-1, presenting unadjusted DANE data for 1964, would imply 6.3
employees per emplcye1: for the manufacturing subsector not reported in DANE's
"factory" data, assuming that the unemployment rate is the same for employers.
and employees, and that all of the people reported as 11 unpaid proprietors or
partners" in DAl"llE's factory data are assumed to be counted as "employers" in the
population census data. If all unemployment were of employees, these figures
would imply an employee/employer ratio of 4.65. Thus, not even with this rather
extreme set of assumptions could the figures be internally consistent (since
adding the employers to the employees would imply a minimum of 5.65 workers
per establishment). 
Table 1 includes a nome~.rhat arbit!'ary upward adjustment of the number of
establishments and workerr: in the s:tze categories for 5-24 workers, with a
greater adjustment t:1e smaller theplant size category. For full consistency
between the c.ensus and sample infonnation (as I ·understand it) these categories
would have to be further upwarri adjusted, since the present figures, used in .
conjunction with the popuJ.ativn censu3 figures, indicate a ratio "paid workers"
to "employers" of at leaHt :=... 5 for t:1e f inns falling below DANE' s size cutoff-­
much higher than the ratio of 1,. 87 for the firms reported by DANE and having
less than 5 worke:rs :i.:i 1964. 'l'his suggeets that too few firms may have been
reclassified to :l'i.ght::r size categorj_es.. Tc is possible, however, that there
may be some small seal~ ,uanufacturing £inns whose emp~oyers are not classified
as being in the manuf:acturiag sector in the population census (if, for example,
their main source of incore.e is from scme other sector). Unfortunately, the
extent of this phenomenon is completely unknown to me. 
Another consistency test involves relating the implied number of paid workers
to total workers for this category; the ratio of about 0.60 is a little below
that reported for the fi~ms· of less than 5 workers caught by DANE (0.638). It
augers rather strongly in the same direction as the employee/employer ratio since
in 1953 when DAi.'\lE did sample a large subset of theplantsnot corresponding to
its definition of "five er -:-,iore workers or 24,000 or more pesos of gross out­
put," this subset had a paid worker/total worker ratio of only 0.28. Thus suf­
ficient confidence in the occupational category breakdown of the population
census would lead us to the conclusion that more firms are in the small DANE
categories than indicated here, and less firms and people are in the 2-4 range. 
There is little other inde.pendent evidence of interest to this issue; in
1953 there wer.e a few illore independent workers than workers in the category
"24,000 output and <5worl>:ers" and tile figures here indicate, (if we assume, as
is plausible 0 a part:-:.cu:i.arly heauy unciar-reporting in DANE' s smallest size
category) a similar relati.onship~ or perhaps even more independent workers
relative to the nex:: ,.:.ategury,. Overz:i.11 these figures represent a compromise 
-6-
between putting more confidence in the census breakdown of people by form ofoccupation, and putting more confidence in DANE's completeness of reporting forthe small firm categories. 
4. In general, value added per worker figures for the lower size categoriesreported on by DANE were based on Todd's upward adjustments to take account ofthe "arrastre" problem; Todd's figures were adjusted down a little. (For spe­cifics, see footnotes.) 
Data of assistance in calculation of value added and salary levels for thevery small firms not co•,ered in DAJ."'\!E' s surveys is very limited. The most de­tailed analysis to date is that of Urrutia and Villalba (Miguel Urrutia Montoyaand Clara Elsa Villalba, "El Sector Artesenal en el Desarollo Colombiano,"Revista de Planeacion y Desarrollo, .Volu.ue 1, Octobre 1969, Numero 3). Some ofthe relevant information is the folJ •.>wing. The 1953 Industrial Census presenteddata on a sizeable number of establishments below the size qualifications fit­ting DAl.~E's industrial sur<:~y. These firms had an average persons/establishmentratio of 1.788 whereas DANE's smallest category (less than five workers; valueof product~ 24,000 pesos) usually had an average of a little below 3 personsper establishment. Average ~.'alue add.~d per worker for this category relativeto the category u5_g workers =.md/or ~ 24,000 pesos value of product" was 0.467and average remunerati-:m per ps::.d worker relctive: to the same group was 0.641.(Data is not available separatel~ for DANE 1 s :.:wo smallest categories in 1953; ·but both in 1956 and in 1...958 value added per person varied little between thesmallest industr.ia.i sut,rey c.?.tegory [less t::ian 5 -workers, > 24,000 pesos .. valueof product] and the second s1ralle~:: [5-9 workers]). It seems plausible, there­fore, to assume that the ret:io cf '~alue added/p,'rson f.:r these "cottage-shop"firms surveyed in 1953 to that o~ ~he smallest DAf'E category would have beenabout 0.47. Even ap3rt ::ro:.n any ·~ei:orting problems (likely in such small-scaleoperations), this rati0 cou:.d not bs used to represent. all the cottage-shopworkers in 1953, since only about one-hRlf of the number probably employed inthat subsector were surveyed. If value added/worker were indeed a monotoni­cally increasing function of firm size throughout 1 these ratios would probablyover-estimate the relative value added of all cottage-shop personnel comparedto DANE's smallest category, since the production units not surveyed wereprobably smaller than the surveyed ones. 
The second major piece of information comes from a comparison of incomesreported for workers in the manufacturing sector in 1967 by CEDE's unemploymentsurveys in 8 cities and the DANE factory sector data for those same cities.(See Rafael Isaza y Francisco Ortega, Encuestas Urbanas de Empleo-Desernpleo,Apendice Estadistico, CEDE, July 1968). Urrutia-Villalba (op. cit.) used thisinformation finding (seep. 66) that on average for the 8 cities the valueadded/capita for independent workers was 0.71 of the value added/capita infirms of the smallest D.Al.~E category in the same department as the given city.(The ratio varied markedly from one city to another [p. 78] but the same ratioheld for Bogota [with respect to Cundinamarca] as for the other 7 cities takentogether [with respect to their departments]). If lcrge city urban independentworkers earned mor.e than smaller city ones, this would constitute an upward 
!-
bias on thin cc;ef.i:'lcieut ,:::; an indicator of the true. "V .A. per cottage-shop.
worker/V.A. per worker in DANE's smallest category" ratio. Presumably Urrutia­
Villalba included only le.bo:i: income ·from the job in calculating value added--
this m.:.y h::ivc leci to a downward bias since value added is, even for very small
workers, ~Gmatir:.~~ gr\;nter than income. Their methodology also restricted them
only to i11.depe1:..den~ worke:ca--the smallest size category of the cottage-shop
personnel; whether this constituted an upward or downward bias is difficult to
ascertain--the ludependen~ worker is likely to have a certain amount of entre­
preneurial and other skills so it is by no means clear that his average income
would be below the average for the whole cottage-shop setl even though in gen­
eral valu~ added par ,·m:cker is an increasing function of firm size. Finally,
of course~ tterc is the unknown and usually downward bias of people's under-·
reporting th~ir in.comeH in something like the CEDE surveys. Some further evidence
(especi.ally on the cottage-shop workers who are not "independents11 ) might be
obtained by C•Jttparing the income distribution,. (according to· CEDE info·rmation),
of people 11orkiug in the manufacturing sector in some of the cities, and the
DANE data. 2 For Jogota (where in 1967 probably about 40-45 percent of the
occupied labor fo=ce in manufacturin3 was in the non-factory subsector) the CEDE
study showed the r..·rerage income of roughly the bottom 45 percent of the popula­
tion engaged in manufacturing to be about 62 percent of the estimated wage of
workers in DANE's smaJ.lest size category. The latter figure was calculated
by applying the national ratio of "average wage of category zero/average blue
collar wagP for all categori~s" to Bogota' s ave:t·age blue collar wage, which was
available.) Since som.:: true "artisans" -would clearly have incomes above some or
most of the blu,.; collra: employ~es in the £actory sector, this figure does not
suggest thilt th:-. Urrutia-VilJ.alba calculation of cottage-shop income and output
was upward biaced; it ;,1ight more J.ikely suggest the opposite. 3 As a result we
accept the ".vert'.ge artisan iucome figure :.mplicit in the Urrutia-Villalba study,
(sec their Table 5B) which puts the average value addecl per artisan at 6.336
thousand 1964 pesos.4,5 
1
Inforr.1atio1~-:·-:ther countries would be relevant in this context.
2DAlm data :i..s available only by department but recently Bogota D.E. has been
treated as .: department; and Ba!'ra.1q11illa constitutes almost the whole of urban
Atlantico. 
~ ~ . .ow~v~r, .:i,e incomes reported in the CEDE study may include non-labor income;
on the oth~r hand they could be downward biased if the month in which the sample
was taken d:;d not involv,2 th.;; representative amount of prima, etc., or if the usual
downw.1rd bt.::s :£.}.l such sample figures were present. Although further comparisons
are clearl:,1 ncc,~nsary, the initial impression of this data is that it tends to
·Support the Urrutia-Villalba coefficient, or perhaps imply that it was a little low. 
/ 4Thi.s is !."Jnly about 53 percent of our adjuste<l estimate of average value addedin DANE'D snall~ot cate3ory--just a little above the ratio holding in 1953 for asubset of the ,::ottage·-shop workers.
5 i .Urru·;: a-VHl~lbu made a series of alternative calculations of value addedin the cottage-sliop sn0sector for 1953 atid 1964, corresponding to different
methcdologj - ~= C 11,,i.x- :: ·,SJ estimates rang,::,d from 2~ to almost 100 percent above that 
S. Still less ~nformatio.1 is available wit:1 which to guess at the salaries ofpeople in the smallest :;ize '.::ategories. In 1953,_as noted above, the industrialcensus figures indicat~ that remuner~tion per person was about 64 percent asmuch in the cottage·-shop sector ati in the sector "5-9 workers and/or output> 24,000 peso~". In 1956, the first year for which we have separate wage figuresfor the ''below 5"and 11 5-9 workers;' categories of the DANE survey, the latter regis­tered a wage about 10 percent apove the former, and this relationship seems tohave hel_q fair!J''.~yst;emati:e.!itff thereafter (though it had widened substantially·__ by 1968·,- in 1964'fit:'S'-ti).l~efcl)'.i./l.f one could take the sample captured by DANEin' 1953 as tepresan:~iiie~. 'aftd'.;if :ohe believes that the relative remuneration of· _the c9ttage-shop p-al:d' io:~1<~~4~:(p.ai.d workers in DANE' s category "less than 5·workers" has been- const:aii'i:\ov.er.\'.'ifime, then a coefficient of close to O. 7 would 
·. 
. appear to be in ordeif:her~: , This" implies an annual wage of 3,400 pesos. In 1953the· average .wage. irl tt•:e. surveyed cottage-shop subsector was 60 percent of valueadded per_person; _if. t~;is ct;,e::fficient had remained constant, and the estimate of 1 ·6,336 is· accurate ·for .:value. atl'ded per person, average annual wage would be 3,800. 
Footnote .5 conUnued· 
used by the Banco de la Repubi~ca in the national accounts, and their 1964 esti­mates range from ab_out 20 to something over 100 percent higher. The estimatewe use here f6r 19:64 corr-es.?6nds to their second lowest. According to whichestimate is used, their estimated share of total value added in .cottage-shop.is between 28.5 and 37 •..5 percent in 1953 and between 18.3 percent and 28.2percent in 1964~ :Tn-e>estimate of value added we use here implies only about16 percent ·of total output., as 'We assume a smaller number of artisans thanUrrutia-Villalba, and.a higher factory output--see the discussion above. 
1Both with respect: t0 value added and wages, more accurate estimatescould be achieved if i_t were possible to dis2.ggregate the information to theindustry level,·and chacl<. its plausibility by ascertaining which industriesappear to have small finn-~ize differentials for remuneration and value addedand which have large ones. 
labor ratio in the la~13e-:~ firms; whether other factors (e.g., a better production 
function, economies of scale) also play a role is more difficult to ascertain 
since it requires more precise measurement of the variable "capital" than is 
possible with the data at hand. Value added per horsepower shows an erratic 
relation to plant size; up to plants of 50 workers it is rather stable, those with 
50-200 workers have the highest ratio observed,and those of over 200 workers a 
slightly below average one. (~ discussed below, however, horsepower does not 
appear to be a good proxy for total capital.) The question of how overall pro­
ductiyity of factors varies with plant size1 and how relative social producti­
vity as between large and small plants is moving over time is similarly diffi­
cult to judge. (See the discussion below.) 
Io Recent Development and Structure of Small Scale Industry 
The relative importance of small scale industry has, as might be anticipat~d• 
decreased over tim::'!--see Table 2. Changes in its relative importance do vary 
substantially by region, and probably also by industry; not enough information 
is available by industry to give a good picture. In general rural cottage-
shop workers have decreased even in a.bsolute numbers {see Table A-2) while urban 
cottage-shop appears to have risen a litt!e faster than urban factory employment. 2 
l.rhis is discussed in detail by John Todd in "Size of Firm and Efficiency in
Colombian Manufacturingi' Research Memorandum f/41, Center for Development Economics,
Williams College, Williamstown, Hass., October 1971.
2unadjusted figures indicate that urban cottage-shop has grown about 60 percentover 1953-64 and factory employment about 40 percent, but there are probably
biases in the figures; in particular there may be a downward bias in the 1951
estimate of people employed in manufacturing related to (a) substantial under­remuneration in the census of that year, which would probably be more severe for
persons in rural and smaller town settings, and (b) the increase in the share of
actually unemployed persons in the residual used to measure employment in the
cottage-shop sector. 
Table 2 
Industrial Employment Over Time; "Factories" and Cottage-Shop" 
TQtal Facton 
Percent of I As Share of 
Percent Non-Agricul- AB Share Non-Agricul- As Share of 
Total of Labor tural Labor of Labor tural Labor All Manufac-
~!ear Employmeuc rorce Force Total Men WomEIB_ Force Force turing 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
:;.93a 449.0 13.91 37.75 80-1003 50-64 30-36 2.48-3.10 6.73-8.41 17.82-22.27 
0'..944/45 464.0 12.91 31.66 148.5
1 99.81 48.71 4.066 10.13 32.00 
1.951 474.7 11.82 26.36 185.5
2 . 127.1 58.4 4.62 10.30 39.08 
:_953 199.1 126.5 62.6 4.77 10.14 · 44.84 
_'_964 669.1 12.54 23.58 300-3204 219.7-234.4 31.3-3.85 5.62-5.99 10.57-11.28 0 I-' 
I 
:'_97(1 "840-900 13.4-14.4 23.4-25.1 330-3506 5.28-5.60 9.21-9.77 36.6-41.2 
I 
[953] [15.30] (25.0) 
"Cottage-Shop" Sector (Including Unemployed)--- -, 
:~938 340.0-369.0 116.2-130.2 232.8-248.8 10.84-11.43 29.34-31.02 77.73-32.39 
1944/45 315.5 8.64 21.53 68~00 
::..951 289.2 185.7 103.5 1.20 J.6.05 60.925
:964 349.1-369.1 251.3-266.5 97.3-102.6 12.30-lJ~Ol 52.16-55.16 
!.970 490-570 · 7.84-9.12 13~68-15.91 58.3-63.3 
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11n estimating the. total employment in the factory sector in 1945 (and attempt­
ing to use the same definition as in 1953, we essantially treated the 1953 manu­
facturing census as a standard of completeness) one must be concerned with. (a) the_
failure of the 1945 figures to include unpaid workers, (b) the possible failure ot-,·,
that census to include all of the small firms which it should have, given the 
coverage attempted and (c) the possible non-equivalence of the two sets of condi­
tions for inclusion of a firm; with respect to (c), note that the minimum of 6,000 
pe$OS output in 1944/45 was substantially lower than the 24,000 minimum output in
1953; the blue collar cost of living index was at a value of 2.23 in 1953 relative 
to the earlier period, and the G.D.P. deflator at ~bout 2.43. The minima in termsof numbers of workers were a total of five in 1953 and five paid workers in 1944-
45. Since the output minimum was lower in 1944-45 and the employment minimum higher,·
it is unclear whether in fact the combined minimum condition was higher or lower. 
The output criterion was probably excluding more firms t.han the "number of. workers" 
one and so the 1945 coverage was probably conceptually .greater than that in 1953;·
possibly, however, this was just .about offset by the effect of a better coverage
in 1953 (i.e., a better actual/conceptual ratio). Comparison of the relative 
number of firms apparently in given size categories is not of too much help, though
it is not inconsistent with similar coverage in the two years. We have opted for 
simply adjusting the 1945 figure to include unpaid members of the work force. In 
1953 the reported number was 17,826 or about 1..5 per firm. The paid/total worker 
ratio is highly firm size specific and rather constant over time, for a given firm 
size. Using 1953 coefficients for "unpaid workers/firm" by size groups inl945 
yields an estimate of 13.3 thousand workers in this category. Since these ratios 
fell substantially between 1953 and 1956, one m~ght posit that a similar fall oc­
curred between 1945 and 1953; on the other. hand the fall is so substantial in 
1953-56 that one might gu~ss that it included a random component--this would argue
against assuming even higher coefficients in 1945. Though 13.1 is probably more 
likely to be below the true figure than above it, it seems unlikely to be off by 
more than say 2,000 people. The sex distribution of unpaid workers is based on 
that for 1953 (see Boletin Mensual No. 72, page 27): i.e., 73.6 percent are men. 
2
The rate of growth of total factory sector employment, if we assume 148.5 
thousand for 1944-45 and about 315,000 for 1964, is an almost identical 3.6 per­
cent both over 1944-1953 and over 1953-1964. We therefore interpolated in the . 
period 1944/45-1953 at that rate. Since growth over 1945-53 was a little faster 
for men, this difference was also assumed with respect to 1951-53. 
3The estimate of modern sector factory employment in 1938 was based on 
information in the 1945 census as to the year of founding of the various firms,
plausibility tests with respect to the rate of growth of firms existing in both 
years, and the information in the 1938 Anuario General de Estadistica with respect
to certain of the presumably larger firms. Even the lower estimate of 80,000
would be upward biased if the 1,375 firms for which data (on workers, output,
etc.) is available in 1938 were really the largest. My upper limit, however,
remains well below the figure calculated by ECLA in its 1957 study. 
4
The difficulty of making a factory sector estimate for 1964 is based on 
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the probability, supported by some recent evidence, that DANE has increasingly
missed some of the small firms. One might take as contrary evidence the sub­
stantial number of new firms included each year, and.the fairly satisfactory
looking procedures for becomine aware of new firms. Still, it seems difficult 
(see the discussion with Table), at least pending more detailed work by indi­
vidual sector, to believe that tqe population employed in the smaller categories
has not been underestimated; the very high estimate from DANE's family household 
1970 sample for total manufacturing employment also argues in this direction. 
More detailed work may alter this conclusion. 
5This figure is higher than that presented in Table 1, since no subtraction 
bas been made to allow for unemployed persons. (See Sources and Methodology of 
this table.) 
6Based crudely on the assumption that DANE will report about 315 thousand 
factory workers in 1970 (or would if its inclusion criteria ·remained the same)
and that this will be underestimated by about as much as we assumed it was in 1964. 
Sources and Methodology: Table 2 
The data of Column 1 are based on population census information for 1938,
1951? and 1964,with slight upward adjustments of 3 percent, 3 percent, and 2 per­
cent respectively to allow for census underenumeration. The 1944-45 figure is 
essentially interpolated between 1938 and 1951, and the 1970 figure in paren~
theses is a crude guess by the autnor based on an adjustment to the figure
(953,000) from DAL~E 1 s 1970 household sample survey; that figure would imply that 
the total number of people in manufacturing rose dramatically betw.een 1964 and 
1970. The surface implausibility of such a ra.pid growth is supported by the 
fact that the sample seems to have suffered difficulties with respect to the rural 
areas. The sample was apparently biased towards rural areas near towns rather 
than more isolated areas. As a result it shows a much higher figure for the 
rural industrial population than did the 1964 census; between 1951 (
and 1964 ( the trend in this variable was downward, and it seems unlikely
that it changed direction dramati~ally in the last years. If the urban manu­
facturing figure is taken as accurate, and the overestimation in the rural area~ 
is assumed to be 
Note that the range 840-900 thousand implies a growth rate of between a little 
under 4 percent to a little over 5 percent, much more rap~d than the 1951-1964 
growth of about 2.8 percent. 
The calculations of Columns 2 and 3 are based on total and non-agricultural
labor force estimates which take into account census underenumeration. There 
may, however, have been some assymmetry with respect tc the agriculture and non­
agricultural figures; the agricultucal labor force data are from the author's 
study on agriculture, and the total labor force from figures calculated in­
dependently. The 1938 total labor force waE basec the ECLA statisticson 
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(United Nations, The Economic Development of Colombia, Statistical Annex, U.N., 
Geneva 1957) adjusted upward by the per,.-:ent · difference between their estimate and 
mine for 1945. 
Since the estimate of people in the cottage-shop sector is a residual (total 
minus factory) it also capturas the open unemployed (as of the population census 
date) who consider themselves to be "usually" working in that sector. Since aver­
age urban unemployment appears to have risen, at least between 1951 (say 2.5 per­
cent) and 1964 (say 6.8 percent), this implies that these figures overstate the 
rise in cottage-shop workers over that period. No attempt was made to try to 
remove the unemployed in this table (as was done in Table 1) since it would not 
be possible to do so for the earlier years, leaving au asymmetry of treatment. 
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Meanwhile, small scale factories decreased in importance with respect to both 
2large scale factories1 and to cottage-shop sector. In 1953 about 28 percent 
of fac~ory workers were in plants of less than 15 workers and 36 percent in 
plants of less than 25; in 1964 the comparable figures appear to have been about· 
23-25 percent and about 27-29 percent. 3 Although cottage-shop is important in 
all the major facto~7 manufacturing departments (Cundinamarca, Antioquia, Valle 
and Atlantico) 4 its relative importance is greatest where factory manufacturing 
is unimportant, and, correspondingly, where per capita productivity in industry 
. i B 1 • M d 1 "'J 1-· . "' li C ld Si s 1ow, as n o 1.var) £ ag a ena, 1.ar no, .,_o ma, a as. Diagram 1 shows this 
negative relationship between the share of total labor force in factory manufac­
turing and the share in cottage-shop. In 1964 only Antioquia, Cundinamarca:, and 
Atlantico had more reople in factory industry th3n in artisan industry, with 
Valle being about 50/50, 
Departments with an above average percent increase in the number of factory 
1Note that this is not to say that small firms grew less rapidly; the more 
such firms tend ~o grow the more they graduate from the small size categories. 
2This conclusion is subject to the possible underestimation of the number 
ofplants and Korkers in the small size categories.even after the upward adjust­
ments refle~ted in Table 1, and the corresponding overestimate for the cottage­
shop subsector. 
3There is much less precision in the 1964 figures; see the methodology of 
Table 1. The official data on number of firms in the various size categories 
is presented.in Table A-2a. 
4Cundinamarca and Valle alone have over one-third of all the urban people 
employed in this subsector. 
5But, as Urrutia aud Villalba (.2£.. cit., p. 50} note, where cottage-shop is 
relatively important it has tended to grow least. The substantial absolute 
decrease in Narifio appears to be related to the serious deficiency of electrical 
energy and the unreso}ved transportation problems. These authors assume that it 
is a factory-cottage-shop complementarity which explains the relatively fast 
growth of the latter whzre factory industry also gr~w fast:, and which presumably 
also plays a role in its demise in places like Uarino. Such complementarity can 
be observed in some ir.dustr::...es. The discussion of complementarity-competition 
must be carried on in greater detail at the industry leve: to clarify the deter­
minants of the observed changes. 
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workers between 1953 and 1964 had also abcve average increases in the number of 
cottage-shop worke::s~ T~1us, the four leac.ing manufacturing departments showed a 
percent increase of 56.7 in factory employment versus 1.4 for the other depart­
ments, and an increase of 36.S percent in cottage-shop employment as contrasted 
with 21.6 percent for the other departments. While far from conclusive, this is 
at least suggestive that the factory and cottage-shop subsectors may be more com~ 
plementary than competitive. 1 
In the majority of departments which appear to have suffered sharp decreases
2 
in the number of rural cottage-shop workers between 1951-53 and 1964 (Valle, Tolima, 
Huila, Boliva1;, Caldas, Cundinamarca) there was a rapid increase in the absolute 
number of urban cottage-shop workers (Table A-2); only in Nariiio--where there is 
a decrease for both rural and urban categories--was this not the case. Thus the 
data is consistent witn the hypothesis that there has been some transfer of 
cottage-shop production from the rural to the urban setting~
3 possibly because of 
1complementarity might be di.c-ect or indirect, with the latter type of 
- relationship possibly working though an increased demand for cottage-shop goods 
associated with the high incomes due in part to the productivity of the factor 
sector. 
2Note that the decrease in rural cottage-shop may be slower than indicated 
by the Urrutia-Villalba figures; their 1951 figure was 115.2 thousand. They as­
sumed cottage-shop was the same percent of total for 1953 as for 1951 but since 
1951-53 was a period of very rapid urbanization; perhaps spurred by the violencia, 
the ratio may well have fallen during these years. On the other hand it is quite 
probable that, since rural population in general was underestimated in 1951, the 
figure 115.2 is too low for 1951. 
3It is not possible to demonstrate this, however, until there is information 
on which industries characterize the rural and urban settings and on the size of 
the migration process. As noted above the reasons for the different behavior of 
the number of cottage-shop workers and the share of all manufacturing workers in 
this subsector by rural-urban and by iepartment can only be understood in conjunc­
tion with a view of developments in each industrial sector, in terms of competition 
or complementarity between 1arge and small scale producers, elasticity of demand 
for the products in question, etc. 
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the better facilities in the latter. 
Urban cottage-shop iudustry appears to be more market oriented than the rural 
counterpart; in a SENA study in liedellin (including surrounding municipios) 66 per­
cent .of the respondents had this activity as their exclusive source of income; 
1
for the rest of the munic::i.pios in Antioquia the figure was 46 percent. The same 
study showed that the first group of artisans tended to have more expansion plans 
than the latter group. 
A study of the Ubate Valley2 indicates that in that region the great majority 
of the rural artisans a.::-e women, and that an important part of their production 
is for household consumption, with relatively few being full-time. The inain prod:­
ucts of this rural indu~try are textiless woolen goods, ceramics, and leather and 
skin goods. Quite primitive systems ere sometimes used. Urrutia and Villalba 
estimated that the annu~l value added per capita in the Rio Suarez area would be 
60 percent of the sala·~· of a rural agriculturcl worker. (One factor in this low 
figure is the part-tin.a nature of the work.) 
The Antioquia st~dy also indicated that the urban cottage-shop worker has a 
much higher income~ than the rural one, due to more advanced techniques, better 
distribution channels, and a bigger market. (Still the average income is below 
that of workers in small factory indust1-y.) Urrutia-Villalba concluded that the 
average urban cottage-shop income is more than twice that of the rural one, and 
that there is more growth potential in the cities. Cheap and sure electrical 
energy, better marketing conditions, the possibility of technical assistance, 
cheaper and safer supply of raw materials, and better credit conditions appear to 
1SENA, Artesania en el Departamento de Antioquia, Medellin, SENA, 1968. 
2aafael Prieto~ Marco ReyesCarmona, and Bill _Hanneson, Estudio Agro-Economico 
de la Hoya del Rio Suarez, Bogota, CEDE 1965. 
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be important factors. 
In understandi.ng the extent to which changes in the number of cottage-shop 
producers are the result of '1push" or "pull" factors, it is particularly instruc­
tive to have data on employment and income and their changes in each two-digit 
sector. Table 3 presents evidence on the distribution ,by two digit industry of 
both factory and cottage-shop subsectors. As indicated there, over three quar­
ters of all the cottage-shop workers in 1964 were in textiles, clothing and 
1footwear, wooden furniture, transportation materials, and food and beverages. 
According to CEDE data which permits distinguishing of independent workers 
(though not of other members of the cottage-shop category), incomes of these own 
account workers va"'=Y w:dely by sector; the lowest are those of women working in 
confecciones and the Lighest those of mec.hanics in automobile repair shops. 2 
Primitive techniques are us2d in clothin~ and furniture, and value added per per­
son is low, so their growth po~ential might seem limited; 3 in food and auto­
mechanic technologies a.re r'.=latively 0 modern. 11 
. Urrutia-Villalba present estimates of the change in average cottage-shop 
worker incomes between 1953 and 1964, by depa~tments. In some departments where 
the factory industry grew least the Urrutia-Villalba figures indicate that the 
income of the artisans decreased, as in Calcas, Cauca, Tolima, and Norte de 
Santander. One would have to analyze the composition of both factory and artisan 
industry to know whether and how these relations 
1Since there was some evidence of an asymmetry in classification as between 
the population census and DP.NE's Industrial surveys for (a) textiles versus clothing
and footwear and (b) food versus beverages, these groups are frequently aggregated 
here; beverages are noL inipor::ant, though textiles are, in the cottage-shop sector.) 
4rhough other evidence st•.ggests the opposite for furniture. 
2-rhese resultn are reported in Urrutia-Villalba,·.££_. cit. 
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Sources and ?·tethodolor,y - Table 3 
'nte employr.,ent for cater,ories 25 and up was taken, without ad_1ustl"ent, 
from published DANE statistics (~unrio C:ener::il de F.st::irlistica,t). Fi~nres 
for the ran~e 5-24 took into account the upward adjustnents to the official 
. e,r•nniJ.
fip;ures ~hown in Table 1. Unfortunately, althou~h the evidence w;1.s strong 
that underreporting prevailed in the catep.ories 5-9 workers and to a lesser 
deE?ree in the larger ones, little evidence was available with which to 
allocate this underreporting b~, industry. Broadly, the fipures presented 
here reflect the same percent upward adjustr,ent for the size cater.cries 
5-9, 10-14, and 15-19 for all industries. This procedure, however, led 
to ne~ative figures in the 2-4 ranpe for paper and products, ruhher and 
products (sectors 27 and 30 respectiqely), so further adjustments were r.,ade. 
Unfortunately misclassification in the population census between certain 
similar categories (like printing as opposed to paper and products; ror,sibly 
rubber and products with transportation equipr.ient) n:akes it unclear whether 
in fact these further adjustr,ents are appro!'-riate or not. The t~.hle r.-ust 
be still taken as substantially speculative with respect to the hy-i.n,fostry 
distribution of the e~ployees in fims of less than 5 worl~eri:i, and probably 
even to some extent for the independent worker. 
Since so~e unemployed people are recorded in the rorulation 
census, some of these are probablv captured in our esti.r1ate of the 2-4 
categorv (and possibly also some of the 5-24) due to the re~i<lwtl t"'ethorloJop.y. 
As estiri.atcct in Table 1, there were probably in the neip.hhorhoorl of 41,000 
unemployed in 1964 in r.anufacturinp; since it seened orobable thnt the 
apr,roximately 6. 5 thousand who did not report an occupational cate):!or~, ,-,ere 
larp.ely unet'1ployed, we excluded them from the cnlculntions, but this still 
must have left about 35,000 unemployed. 
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reflect causality. On a crnss··departmental basis 'there appeared to be little 
relationship between the percent increasa in real factory wage and real artisan 
1income, but this is not surprising. 
At present it is only possible to guess at the factory versus cottage-shop 
breakdown at the two-digit level in 1951, so conclusions as to which industries 
have shown the most rapid increases in employri1ent in the cotta3e-shop sector over 
the 1951-1964 period must be somewhat speculative; the same goes for average 
incomes by sector. Table 4? presenting data from the 3 population censuses and 
the two industrial censuses is? however, suggestive with respect to employment. 
Table A-3 presents data for 3 of the 4 most industrialized departments (Antioquia, 
Atlantico, and Cundinamarca) for 1951 and 1964 and Tables A-4, A-5 and A-6 give 
detailed statistics for the food, clothing and footwear and wood products-wooden 
furniture sectors. The tables indicate that in general the cottage-shop indus­
tries of prime importance in 1964 (in tenns of employment) were sectors of sig­
ficant growth in cottage-shop employment, at least during the post 1945 period 
as a whole. In fooc and wood-furniture, cottage-shop employment grew markedly 
faster than factory employment during that period. 2 In metal and metal products 
both factory and cottage-shop grew very rapidly. Only in clothing-footwear was 
cottage-shop employment en the decline--an important factor of course since it 
was the largest single cottage-shop sector. Total employment had declined secu­
larly since 1938~ and factory employment was rising dramatically up to the early 
!Real wages in factory indust:ry rose by 66 percent in 1953-1964, while 
those of cottage-shop rose 'by only 24 percent, on average. 
2Probably such products as bakery, candy, panela, etc., were very impor-
tant in food; wooden furniture was ·che "growth" part of the wood industries. 
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Sources and Hethodolo__;v for Table 4. 
The 1964 figures and the factory-artisan b.reakdown are those of Table 
A-2b; they are una<ljL~ste<l fii:;ure;3 from the 1964 population census (the two 
digit totals) and Anuario General de Estadistica (the factory employment). 
No adjustments of the type used for Table 1 were made to the published data, 
partly as it was unclear whether greater or smaller adjustments would have 
been necessary in the other years. 
The 1953 factory employment data are from the official DANE statistics 
correspondinf; to the Industrial Census of that year and published in various 
issues of Boletin Hensual de Estadistica. 
The 1944/5 factory employment data are from the Industrial Census of 
that year, with an upward adjustment to allow for unpaid workers. 
The 1938 total employrnent figures are from the population census of that 
year. The factory figures (lower limits, as indicated) are based on a survey 
reported in the Anuario General de istadistica, and designed only to give 
a feel for the possible magnitudes. · 
1951 proved a difficult year for which to make estimates at the two digit
level since the national population census figures gave only the grand total 
in manufacturing. For 9 departments, that breakdown was available, for the 
other 6 estimates were ma<le by interpolation betwee11 1951 and 1964; a given 
inaustry was assumed to account for a percentage of tae total manufacturing 
labor force in 1951 equal to the unweighted average of its percentages in 
1938 and 1964. Total error introduced by this methodology would appear to be 
small. 
Factory employment in 1951 was interpolated between the 1944/5 and 1953 
values, assuming a linear growth path. The 1951 cottage estimates were then 




Observation indicates tha.t there is diract and vigorous competition between 
small and large scale p:ants both in this sector and in wooden furniture and other 
wood products, leather, and probably a few other industries. The aggregate fig­
ures indicate that except for clothing-footwear ·the small scale producer is not 
'1being "competed out, though conceivably his income may have been reduced over 
time in some cases--an empirical question much in need of study--and in other 
cases he may have had to 11 ·::ra11sform" himself, change production techniques, etc., 
in order to remain in business. The aggreg~te figures do not pick up whether any 
such processes in fact lead to a particular typ~ of small scale producer going 
out of business and :1Ping repla~ec!, b:: a110 t~;~:r.,,~ i5'r ·whether~ on the contrary, the 
process is a relati~.;,ely s~ooth c,1.e. ri; as the aggregate figures seem to sug­
gest, the share· of manufacturing worker~ in cottage.:...shcp rose between 1964 and 
1970 it seems unlikely that larger scale indust~y is driving small scale out in 
many cases; if so, the·g:::-owth of cottage-shop must have been extremely rapid in 
some other instances. 
As of 1964 peraaps 110,000 peopl~ were engaged in the clothing-footwear sec­
tor, down from as many as 150,000 in 1938. There have always been many inde­
pendent producers, primarily men in the case of footwear and primarily women in 
the case of clothing~ about one-half (i.e.~ 80,000) of the total factory and 
cottage-shop employment in the sector in 1964 fell in this group. Overall employ­
ment of women in the cottage-shop sub-sector probably fell from about 115,000 in 
1938 to 70,000 in 1964. The geographic distribution of the subsector (see Table 5) 
shows considerable numbers in some of the poorer departments (especially Narino), 







·ceogra1>hic Distributiori of Cottacc-Sbop Productton of 
Clothing and Footwear: 1964 




Total Factory (Rough Share of Non-
Employnent: Er.1ployr.1ent Estimate) Agricultural 
1964 1967 (3) = (J) - (2.) Population 
Deoartnent (1) (2.) (3) (4)
a 
Antioquia 18,146 7,611 13.5 3.40 
Atlantico 9,781 3,726 6.0 - 5.45 
Bolivar 8,339 49]. 7.8 5.03 
Boyaca 4,654 238 ---~ 4 .. 4 1.94 
Caldas 9,565 ·J,390 6.2 2.56 
Cauca 1,851 60 - . 1.8 2.14 
Cordoba 4,033 36 4.0 7-.4 
Bogota 25,532 7,103 18.4 11.64 
Cundinamarca 146. 
Huila 3,003 43 3.0 4.69 
Magdalena 109 
'-
Meta 900 68 o.s 8.89 
Narino 14,263 266 14.0 10.77. 
Norte de 395
Santander 
Santander 4,633 1,341 3.3 1.86 
Tolima 140 
Valle 20,754 3,847 16.9 · · 7.97 
Total 153,265 29,037 
Sources: Ucpartracntal population ce:isuses for 1964; DA1:E, Industria :-~,1nuf<lc turcra 
?:acion:il: 1%7, fer the factory enployr:ent in 1967. _ Ihc lo.i:ter statistic___ _ 
was not avai.i.aule £or 1964 so this hybrid residual has considerable error 
in it. 1-"or tl~e factory sector, D,\~;r:: fibures indicate that total employment 
fell froo 31,510 in 19&4 to 29,037 in 1967. Uur cstioatcs of cottage-shop 
must therefore be upw.ard biased in some (or. all) departr.1cnts. 
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absolute nuillbers, and Bogota and Valle-are well above average in terms of the share 
of non-agricultural la"!)or force found in this cottage-shop s~ctor. 
It might be hypo';he:sizf'd in view of the secular decline in absolute number of 
workers, th.:it the. age di.::,trH,uticn of persons in clc-th:!:i.ig an.d footwear would re-
1fleet 1'old£;.:" 1-~ople, c:>I"'pa1:i~d for example, to that of persons in all manufacturing. 
But this is not noticeably ·,he case; only 17.5 perce.nt of the women in the clothing 
subsector were ..-5 or o:: der in. 1964 compar~d to 16. 3.': perce...:,t for women in all manu­
facturing. For ri1:m in :foct..·..~!a:- th2 percent was 18.53 compared with 17. 99 in all 
manufacturing. lt is pcssih)e th,:..t the probabJ.y fairly gradual decrease of the 
crease of perha·~•s 35 ,,,.. 40 ·::i.cY:.s;, i wor!{t::?r.e oc.:urrbi ½etwePt. 1938 ~.nd 1964, it would 
seem plausible ;-:,.at ~- :.argr~ najo:-:.:-.'.:y of t::tef:c: cou.~.d ·\;..,Ve redrefl; others might have 
been incort:ork1tr.:c int.~ ·.;h~ "•::a~to~:~ 7 secto7~ E.c. ~mall nc.ale firms moved up the size 
ladder, and otht-;l'S may :1ave bc"'~n fo,.:ce:c:i. to j onk fc,r other oc;cupat~ons. 
Vy;ng for ,.eco:ie: among th~ :h:1porta·,1t sma.1.I seal~ industries (defined by em­
ployment} .::1rc rrc,oden furrd-::r1re E-.Llrl transportation equipment and repairs. As can 
be seen in Ta'!-,lG A-4 it appears t!1at the;~e has been a gre.dual increase in the share 
of employment l!;, amalJ. scaJ.e unit;; in the production of wooden furniture, unlike 
clothing and footwear. Emplc,yment in the factory sector was probably a 
!Although .:ige dis•:1~ibut:ton is not gj_ven by two-digit sectors in the popula­
tion censuses, l~. is g:i.ven by occ•1patior1s, and the category a tailors, sewers, 
and other peopie related to i:he manufacture of products based on cloth and 
leather" plus as~iuen,akers, repairers, and pe~csous related to the production of 
leather produr:ts11 incJ.1_ded l"/7 ,000 peop!E: ln 1964 ar.d their age distribution 
was given. Thare we:,~e 156,000 in the clothi•,g and :.?cotwam: sector. 
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little but not much below 5,000 workers in 1945, (conceivably as low as 4,000), 
and only around 5,000 in 1964; this would imply that the cottage-shop labor force, 
probably rose from somewhere around 30,000-35,000 in 1938 to ~round 55,000 'd.u 1964. 
While the factory sector may have grown rather rapidly ove~ the 1938-45 period, 
since then it has probably uot grown any faster than the cgttage-shop subsector. 
Over the 1958-64 period thera a~>?eared within the factory sector to be an increas­
ing concentration in the largest plant size, though it is unclear whether this 
was a "passing over" phenomenon or really repreiiented more rapid growth on the 
part of the largest plants. In any case, the historical evidence strongly sug­
gests that this sector shou?.d be one of continued strength· in the cottage-shop 
subsector. 
The transportation equipment and re~air subsector, appears to reflect sub­
stantial complimentarity between the small shop, which effects repairs and manu­
factures parts, and the large scale sector (whetb~r ~t be abroad or dome$tic). 
The rapid historical growth of the use of a.utomotive vehicles and the high income 
1 
elasticity of demand in this sector suggests very high growth potential here. 
. Within the manufactu~ing sector it is clear that firms of over 50 workers have an 
· unusually large share of t.:>tal factory employment compared with the other sectors 
1It is not possibl!.! to =~sol::ite tr.is aecto:c in the 1938 census; the grand 
total of employment :i.n the two ca~~e.gori.es "shops for mechanical and electrical 
repairs". and nm·~tallu::-gy, mcnufacture of machiuas and other products of common 
metalsn was 25,426; J.951 popu1.ccio:1 census figures are· al~o riot yet available 
to give a fe~l for c-·.rc~:all 1(}51-64 gr-owth. There seemed to be little growth 
of the factory sect--r fo::- cny,-:bincd 11 cor.st1.·uctio1~ of transportation equipment" 
and "construction of .nacl~inety, 3nd ,?iectric appa-ratur:i and. articles' between 
1945, when there we1·c.~ 5,668 cmrloyed pcr;;;onnal; and 1953 when there were 6,666 
employed personri.91. In :!.953 :1bout hnlf of the employment was in repairs to auto­
motive vehicles. •· 'I11 1953 i..!le ::.r:J.uap:-j_al ceri'sus listed 2 9 300 people in firms 
below its cutoff ca-;:cr,o::-y ~- · Information for the c1.ep.a:i:t:ments of Antioquia, Atlan­
tico, and Cundinmr.arca ::-:ug::e,:; t: cnly a smali empl9yment in this sector in 1951. 
It suggests a gr_q1-ith. fo:: tho:(! th:r6·£'dt,ipar~tne:11ts in tht:: per:..od 1951-64 of 15 fold. 
Like wooden fl\rn::. ~.:iit~, . th:L::, is ~n. ov~fw:n'elinihgly. . -~. '!Lale industry. . . . . .• ' 
1 
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in which cottage-shop is very important. 
Finally, the food industry has considerable importance within the cottage-
shop subsector. Total employment has increased by almost 150 percent since 1938. 
At the moment, it seems safe to assume that the employment trends in these 
four industries will at least in the short run determine the overall trend of P..m-
. ployment in cottage-shop industry. At the same time, it is of interest to observe 
the trends in the ~-ther s1,1b'se_.ctors, to see if any significant developments can be 
iden·tified. Some of the other less important small scale lines, such as textile 
materials (1.8 thousands) construction and repair of machinery, (19.5) and non­
metallic mineral products °(11. 2) could be of increasing importance. Here, unfor­
tunately, information is insufficient to ascertain what developments have occurred 
over the last 10 or 20 years--both dramatic growth and dramatic decline can be 
•- •r 
' . 
· ruied out~ ho~ever. Among smaller industries--tobacco, leather, printing, chemi-
cals--there appeared to have been an increase in cottage-shop employment since 
1945 in tobacco (where factory employment dropped dramatically) as well as in 
printing and chemicals (where factory employment rose substantially); in leather 
(where total employment rose slowly), cottage-shop employment was about constant. 
,__,·,'Small .scale. industry (defined fpr the moment as firms of 5-24 workers, tends to 
be important in the same industries as cottage-shop production, ~nth a few inter-
1rhe 1938 Anuario General reported firms in animal and vegetable oils and 
fats, chocolates, cookies and candy, sugar refineries_. (the largest category with 
almost 4,000 workers) grain milling, and other food products. The high figure, 
reported in the 1945 industrial census suggests that many firms were probably 
missed in 1938 and that this sector already had a relatively high share of the 
·•· ...labor force in the total ;ifactori' sector at that time. One might plausibly 
assume that the c;ottage-shop sector in 1938 had about 12,000-20,000 workers; by 
1964 the number was:~round 25-30,000. The picture here, as in some other cases, 
is confused over the 1945-64 period. Data for the three departments of Atlantico, 
•·. Antioquia and Cundinamarca suggest moderate growth of cottage-shop in the 1951-
64 period. 
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eating exceptions. In 1964 the major employers in this firm size range were food 
(19.0 thousand), clothing and footwear (14.0 thousand), nonmetallic minerals (7.7), 
metal products, excluding machinery (5.4), and transportation equipment (5.1). 
Wooden furniture--so important in cottage-shop production--is relatively unimpor­
tant in small scale industry (only 3.0 thousand in this size range).
1 For the size 
range 25-99 workers, food (9.6) and clothing and footwear (9.1) remain the most 
important sectors followed by metal products except machinery (6.9) nonmetallic 
minerals (5.6) and chemicals (5.5). For the whole range 5-99 workers, food comes 
first with 23.2 thousand, clothing and footwear (19.2) nonmetallic minerals (11.1), 
metal products except machinery (11.2), chemicals (8.0), and transportation equip­
ment (6.9), and textiles {6.4). It is interesting to note that two industries 
arewith expanding cottage-shop sectors, transport equipment and wooden furniture, 
not characterized by importance of small scale factories; this is especially true 
of wooden furniture, but rather marked for transport equipment as well. This may 
suggest that the growth process in these subsectors will, at least if it continues 
its historical route, involve horizontal expansion of the number of firms rather 
than the growth of cottage-shop firms into small scale factories. This seems very 
plausible in the transport equipment sector where much of the production involves 
repairs to automotive vehicles and in furniture as well, where there is little 
evidence of important economies of scale. The other two major cottage-shop 
subsectors--clothing and footwear and food are at the opposite end of the spec­
trum; small scale industry is important both in absolute terms and relative to 
the total factory employment in those sectors. This suggests that the gradual 
1The figures used for the 5-24 worker category are those of Table 3, ad­
justed up from the DANE figures, as explained in that table. 
-28-
decrease of cottage-shop employment in textiles may have been associated with the 
transfer of workers to larger firms or with the growth of cottage-shop firms into 
the larger categories, and that the apparent stagnation of cottage-shop employment 
in the food sector may at least be associated with similar relative ease of 
transfer. 1 
Differences in Labor Productivity and Wages by Firm Size 
One frequently commented on difference distinguishing firms of different sizes 
is their labor productivity and wage levels when no allowance is made for possible 
differences in labor quality or mix; in 1964 l~bor productivity tended to increase 
fairly consistently with plant size up to the category 100-199 workers, then fell 
for firms over 200; labor productivity was probably about 4 ~i,nes ,·a.s" high at its 
peak (for the group 100-199) as for firms with less than 5 workers but more than 
24,000 pesos output. The wage rate was a positive function of firm size throughout, 
with inconsequential exceptions, and was probably a little over 3 times as high 
in the largest firm size category as in the smallest. 2 
1The above is not to suggest that there have not been cases of extreme compe­
tition between large and small scale production; the most dramatic of these in 
Colombia_' s 20th century history is of ten alleged to have occurred within the tobacco 
industry; in 1938, 10,167 people were engaged in the sector--of whom 5,000 or a 
little more were already in the factory sector as reported in the 1938 Anuario 
General de Estadistica. By 1964 our estimate is that there were 4.7 thousand cot­
tage-shop employees in this sector. This does not indicate a particularly rapid 
demise though other evidence indicates that, in certain regions and processe~ the 
displacement effect was great. 
~ote that the DA.iE figures (see Table A-1) indicate even wider differentials 
than those presented in Table 1; the explanation for the upward adjustments to labor 
productivity and wage rates to the smaller size category are explained in the 
methodology of Table 1. 
It is possible that the figures of Table 1 may underestimate the wage rate 
differential across plant sizes and at the same time overestimate the labor pro­
ductivity differential. DANE's definition of labor remuneration is rather narrow 
and appears not to include labor costs not paid at time accrued, in particular 
severance pay, provision for vacation, etc. These payments are particularly 
important for the large size firms, and a comparison between DANE information on 
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(Footnote 2 continued from page 28.) 
the sociedades anonimas (corporations) and information published by the Superin­
tendft»cia de Sociedades Anonimos suggests that the lattervs definition of labor 
renumeration implies & level about 15-25 percent higher than DANE's. (Compari~ 
sons between DANE and Super:!.ntendencia data are· dangerous since (as John:· Todd ~ 
has pointed out to me) the lattc:r's reporting for the manufacturing fims includes 
outputt etc., in nonmanufactur:tng parts of a sociedad. In this case the value . · 
added data matched almost perfectly, _though, so it appeared that the bases were· 
comparable. The Superiutendencia reported wages plus paid fringe benefits about 
equal to DANE, but also included in labor remuneration "provisions for.severance 
pay, vacations, •~tc.i1 DM'E's questionnaire which refers to "fringe benefits 
caused during the year 11 sugges::s that these are not included in its figures. 
Here the issue is partly oJe o= how one prefers to define deferred vages. 
Sociedades Anonimas gene~.1lly tend to be larga firms; these particular fringe 
benefits would be subs;:a.nt:i.ally smeller for small firms (and in many cases non­
existent). Inclus:tJn of this factor could therefore imply that the more broadly 
defined labor remuneration averaged close to 4 times as high in those firms of 
over 200 workers as to those of less than 5 (and over 24j000 pesos output). 
Value added may be cver.;stimated zor the relatively large fi'IlllS as compared 
to the smaller ones d11e to D.'i.L~E' s failure to subtract out (as·.. intermediate 
consumption) certain e:qenses such as e.dvertising, contracted professional 
services, and a se:::ies of oth~r items~ most of wh:f.ch are probably more charac­
teristic of the larger firm sizes than the smaller ones • The Banco de la 
Republica adjusted DANE value added figures down by about 13 percent in 1964 
for its national accounts calculation. Probably, the downward adjustment would 
be 15 percent or more for the large f.irms and not more than half that for the 
smaller ones. This would increase the ratio of labo.: productivity for the 
smallest to the largest group from the approximately .27 of Table 1 to about 
.30. If the distribution of these expenditures were even more concentrated on 
the large firms, the ratio could be as high as .32. 
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A number of hypotheses have been put forward in interpretation of these firm 
size differentials. Perhaps the most obvious is the different mix of labor be­
tween small and large firms; it is clear that the very small firms (perhaps those 
with less than 10 workers) have almost no white collar labor--whose average wage, 
at any firm size, is presumably above the blue collar average-and it seems plausi­
ble to assume that many of the larger firms with more advanced technology actually 
need higher skiJ.led workers. So a substantial "wage differential" could emerge, 
even in the presence of perfect labor markets, as a simple reflection of the 
greater scarcity of the typa of laborers needed by the larg~r firms. And even if 
the technological processes were not much more complicated, in the presence of 
labor market impsrfections--in particular union power--large firms which must 
in any case pay higher wages ~-1ould naturally choose the cream of the workers. 
So, via one mechanism er another, lt seems almost assured that the human capital 
in the paid labor force of Lbe lar~er £inns is greater per person than that of 
the smaller firms, and that th£ wage differential is therefore partly explained 
in terms of quality of rasources involvetl. 1 Uith respect to the unpaid workers, 
while the mechanism just referred to may not be the relevant one, it seems plausi­
ble that on balance the managers of large establishments embody more human 
capital than the managers (or unpaid family ~orkers) of small firms. 
Other possible factors :f.nclude the corabination of greater efficiency on the 
part of the larger firms (either through economies of scale or through "better" 
technology) which makes it possible to pay higher wages, coupled with either sub­
stantial union pressure or ether reasons why, given the capability of paying high 
¾1ore details 3re presented on differences in the labor mix by firm size in 
the next section. 
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1 wages, the firms actually do so. Some observers focus on the imperfections of 
products markets and the ma~ket for other factors such as capital in explaining 
the ability of the large firms to pay higher wages; in an economy like the Colom­
bian one, a high percent of the large firms have substantial monopolistic or 
oligopolistic power (and heavy tariff protection) which would permit them· to pay 
high wages, and have high labor productivity (measured in tems of the local 
currency) even though their overall level of efficiency may not be high. 
All of these explanations have moderate to high plausibility in the Colom­
bian context, but lack of both data and analysis leave their relative importance 
as explanatory factors an open question. 
Over time changes in labor productivity and wage rates are presented in 
Table 6; while revealing no systematic changes in labor productivity differen­
tials, they tend to suggest that, if anything, these narrowed in the 1956-66 
2
period for which the most detailed information was available; for 1953-66 no 
general trend is ascertainable.~ 
~ 
Over 1953-66 as a whole wages of the large 
plants (the top two categories) rose more rapidly than those of all other plant 
sizes; it is unclear whether the small or intermediate sizes showed the greater 
increase in this variable. As noted earlier (p. 19) wages may be underestimated 
1 (Richard Nelson, A Study of Industrialization in Colombia, RAND Corporation, 
Santa Monica, 1968) emphasi~es the technological advantages of the modern £inns 
which tend, on balance, !:o be the large firms. Slighton (Robert L. Slighton, 
Relative Wages, Skill Shortages, and Changes in Income Distribution in Colombia, 
RAND Corporation,Sant2 Mon~ca~ November 1968) emphasizes the imperfections in the 
labor market as an important factor in why different wage levels are actually paid. 
-Miguel Urrutia focusses also on this point, suggesting that the monopoly component 
,of wages paid by large ~mionized firms may be subtracted. (See Miguel Urrutia, 
The Development of the Colombiar1 Labor Movement, New Haven, Yale University Press, 
1969 , p. .1.64 • ) . 
. . 2 : .., . 
If all. the appropt:J.. ::,te ~orrections ,·rere made to the value added figures, 
(see p. 19)° this result wo~ld p,rcibably emerge more clearly.
3 . 
As indicat1~d iri Tabl~ E, t:he changes in these two variables for the smaller 
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10-14 1.35-1.85 1.33-1.82 1.14-1.57 
15-19 1.31 1.16 
] 1,45 
20-24 1 1.49 1.23 
25-49 1.48 1.50 1.27 
50-74 1.31 
, ' .]-75-99 1.57 .85 1.31 
100-199 1.66- 1.57 
1.57]-> 200 1.25 1.54 
Sources and ~-rethodolo~v - Table 6 
The b.:i.sic sources of infon1ation are the public.:i.tions of DANE, the Ann;i_rio 
General de Fstadis ticc1. and the Rol .etfn '.'!cnsrn1.l de Es tndistica. Fat>;e statis tics 
are defl"ted by the national blue collar cost of livinf; series, and value added 
by the Central Bank's i,:anufacturinr. value added nricc series. 
_Since inforr..ation w.:is not available senarately for all ten size catei::ories 
in 1953, broader cate~ories are used for the 1953-56 calculations. Calcul~ticns 
for 1956-66 ~ere possible for all size catc~ories, but for the period 1966-68 
only for the top 7, since Todd's adjust1:1ents for the "arrastre prohlen" are 
available 0:11~, for 1966, and the pu~lished fi~ures for the Sn-!allest 3 catehodes 
are not too helpful. 
Todd's correcticnc:, dc:=.crihcd elsewher~, are the 'frn.sis of the e5 tirates 
for the bott0"'l 3 size f'.t"ou:,s; he rmde 2 estir•;ites, in ctn attemot to rcr,ove t.,c 
bii:lsing effect of inclusion in DA::E' s fip.urcs of non-rer-ortinl; fjrri=:, and the 
2 estir:iates provided r,_ive us the lower and ,.1pper linits here. (Thj_s is not to 
imply that these nur.bcrs re::illv r.ive linits, but onlv to give a s;encral feel 
for ranr,e.) · 
.. 
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and average productivity overestimated for the larger firms in the latter years; 
these biases are probably greater than in the earlier years, therefore suggesting 
a more rapid increase in wages in the larger firms than actually shown here and 
a slower increase in labor productivity. 
As noted earlier, the extent to which these changes in average labor remunera­
tion correspond to increases in the wage of given occupations (given skill levels), 
to changes in the occupational structure, to changing composition as between white 
and blue collar, etc., has not been analyzed• 
.,. 
II. Social Efficiency of Colombian Industry by Size of Plant 
The relationship among type of industry, size of plant, other relevant fea­
tures and the V?.riabJ.e "social efficiency"1 is, needless to say, a complex one. 
In a country like Colcmbia three major market imperfections or disequilibria 
require the use of snadow prices to evaluate (a) the reiative social efficiency 
of-plants or firms and (b) the optimal directions of government policy. Note 
that these two questions are not the same; the fact that a plant may, overall, 
be a poor resource user does not mean that it should not receive preferential 
treatment if the factor(s) whose allocation the government can control has 
1By the term "social efficiency" we here refer simply to the effect a 
given productive unit has on total national income. (We abstract from prob­
lems associated with evaluation of leisure, etc.) The term "social" is not 
used to imply the inclusion of income distribution or employment impacts of the 
plant's presence, but only its output impact. The term is used to distinguish 
"private" efficiency deaned by the profit rate (or some similar variable)
from measurement of the firm's contribution to total output. Social efficiency 
may also be thought of as total facto:. productivity, where each factor _is 
evaluated at its social opportunity cost, i.e., the productivity it would have 
in its best alternative use. In a stationary economy (with no technological 
change or net capital formation) with perfect markets. and in the absence of 
external economies, etc., social efficj'!?ncy of each economic entity is by
definition equal. 
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(have) a higher marginal productivity in it than in other plants. The analysis 
below focuses on the first of these two questions1-overall social efficiency 
defined as the ratio of productivity of the set of factors used in the plant 
compared to their productivity elsewhere. This concept must be thought of in 
both static and dyn~.mic terms, i.e., it should take into account such factors 
as the savings propensities of income recipients of different types of plants. 
Information relevant to the evaluation of relative social efficiency of 
different sized plants is summarized in table 8. As is genet:"~ly kndwn. (and as 
is the case in all countries for which such studies have been done, to my know­
ledge) average labor productivity tends to be an increasing function of size for 
all the years in question; the relationship between value added and horsepower 
is less simple, but generally tends to be an increasing function of size up to 
the second largest group, then :calls drama.tically in the largest group to a 
level below the :;;.,1erage for induHtry as a whole. Neither average labor produc­
tivity nor value acded/horsepower are very ,raluable proxies for total factor 
productivity, though the latter is presumably more relevant than the former; 2 
it would be a very interesting figure if horsepower were a good proxy for total 
capital. In the following sections we discuss sequentially additional elements 
pertinent to conclusions on relative social efficiency. 
Evidence on the "Value Added/Capital" Ratio in Relation to Plant Size (Defined 
by Number of Workers) 
As indicated in Table 8, the use of installed horsepower capacity as a 
l.nte second question--that of optimal public policy--is dealt with in the 
final section, though some reference is made to it here. 
2To the extent that labor is in relatively abundant supply and is probably 
priced in the r.iarket at a Yalue above its social opportunity cost, average labor 




'tabor and Horsepower Productivi~ies by Plant Size. Selected Years 
1953 1958 1964 
.. '"'' Fin,, Size Vnlue Mdcd Vnlue Added V11lue Mded I111l'orted '11:i,_. M11tc-rilllll V11luc. f<dc!P.d Vnlue Mde.d· 
v, ··~ ••••• 1...,. ..... Totlll v.,11., Materials i PQrker l!orscr,o..,er · { lo- l.>crll•ts) Worker llorserowcr Worker Horsci,ower Worker· Horsepower 
('000) 
49 536 12.soo 7,940 1.1 n~.•• n.a.<5 worke-rii;
>24 1000 pc11oe 
IJ,..., 
5 78~···"Value of output 
5-9 • 5,67ft 5,434 I 14,500 10,380 10.9 I n.a. n.a. 
10-14 4,398 6,725 5,027 lf,, 3'10 9,293 10.4 n.~. n,ft. 
15-19 · 5,029 20,060 q, 898 9.5 30,1()1) 12,459c•6R63·s,01s 7,428
20-24 ,33S 6,160 23,700 10,979 ]7.0 29,565 13,(.12 
25-49 6,861 101616 s, 728. 25,840 a1019 14.5 44,541 11,845 
50-74 i ./1.1. 336 7,645 33.670 14.~58 18.0 41,652 20,225l 
75-99 6 ,2fl4 31.790 14,789 24.9 61,021 19,272• 
< I· 10,036 •7 767 
51,200 15,200 . 23.2 s31n2s 24,797lM-199 ' 19,329 7,579 ... ~ (""" .. 
!'· ,!_200 • 18,883 4,042 · 46,930 9,325 26.2 79,665 15,505) ~ 
.;l . . 
-~ Source: DA.,E, various copies of Anuario General de Estadistica and Boletin Mensual de Estadistica. 1953 and 1~58 
DA.~E figures are not adjusted in any way7 which may imply that those corresponding to the small firms are slightly 
inconsistent with the 1964 figures, which are taken from Table 1. The data on imported raw materials are John 
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measure of capital would lead to the conclusion that; with the exception of firms 
of 200 workers and over, the output/capital ratio is an increasing function of 
plant size, and since average labor productivity is also an increasing function 
over that range, it would suggest that total factor productivity is higher in the 
large and medium plants, 1and they have a higher level of social efficiency regard­
less of relative social opportunity costs of the two factors. It would remain 
to analyze, of course, why output/~orsepower is so much smaller for the largest 
size category than for the others. Analyses performed to date, however, have 
not indicated such a systenatic relationship between total capital stock and 
horsepower as to war~ant its sericus use in this context. 
2 And considerable 
evidence suggests that the real capital (fixed capital plus inventories) to 
horsepower ratio is higher for large plants than for small ones. 
One piece .of evider•ce 1:0 this effect comes from an attempt to relate fixed 
investment occurring in the lar~est plants over that period to "change in 
horsepower" and compar_!ng this 
1Tbe evidence "ould not be conclusive since it is clear that labor is not 
homogeneous by firm size; the relative social cost of small firm and large firm 
labor would still have to be evaluated. 
2John Todd has indicated to ree that extensive attempts to find some sys-
tematic relationship between DANE's 11 net investment" and "change in horsepower" 
figures have not borne fruit. Attempts included lagged and unlagged regression 
equations, aggregated and disaggregated figures, etc. While lack of the sort 
of relation such regressions would pick up does not prove that there is no 
defined (or perhaps even constant) long-run relationship between changes in 
fixed capital and changes in horsepower, it adds to the doubts in. that respect. 
It remains plausible that unpredictable and varying lags between investment and 
"installed- capacity ready t.o use" (the concept DANE uses for horsepower) would 
so confuse the actual relationship as to make it unidentifiable via regression 
analysis. When the investment figures are plotted against change of capacity 
figures on an annual basis at the two-digit level, the points for some indus­
tries suggest that lags may be disturbing an otherwise fairly systematic relation­
ship. Even if a systematic relationship emerged for each two-digit sector, this 
would not, o-: course, indj_cate that there was a constancy of the ratio fixed 
capital/horsepower ~cross firm sizes. The calculation of "total net investment/ 
total change in capacity" ove·r the .::.o-year period 1956-67 at the two-digit level 
indicates that the "cost of horsep,1Wer" in terms of fixed investment does vary 
substantially from one industry tc another. But there are serious difficulties 
with such long-period ana;.ys:i::;, too. (See footnote 2, next page~) 
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ratio to that of all other fi!.:ms. A comparison between the largest 250 firms and 
all the otherc suggested a ratio of "ne·:: fixe1 investment
1 /change in horsepower 
. 2 
about three times as high for those largest firms as for all other firms. 
: ' ¾lot counting i~ventories. 
2This calculation (aud the one including inventories) is extremely crude 
and open to some obvious fo.llacie:s of methodology. .It could _only be accurate 
if in fact the 250 larg~st plants in 1967 all existed in 1956. Error could have 
been introduced through the ass·umption in the ,?arlier years, when there were 
less than 250 plants ir. the largest size category, ~hat those fou~d in the 
second largect catego:i:y had the averag~ net investment per plant and horsepower 
per plant figures of that ~ategory. Possible biases are so numerous as to make 
a complete discussion impossible, but some major considerations should be 
mentioned. 
If all 250 plantc did exist in 1956, one might argue that those not in the 
largest category (> 200 -~10rkers) were probably among the larger ones in the 
second largest cc.1:cegorv; th:.~J -would llit~an that both oar estimate of the horse­
power for those fi:cm.s ::;.nd of th,: amount of investment undertaken by them are 
downward biase~i for 1956. If this were the casG~ -che estimate of the net 
investmen·;:/ ch.:.1ng1.; iri. hDt:3epowe::: ratio for tnese firms would also be downward 
biased. In g~:ueral 9 ho;,1e-r"r, it -i:,n;st bB presumed that among the largest plants 
in 1967 there ~-;i.:lr,:: some ,-1hich W'3'!:E: r~ot partic.nlarly large in 1956; for these 
~, our estiwate of tl1e hcr3,=.powt::r in 1936 would be upwa;:d biased while our esti­
mate of the net i-.nvestm::ut undertakeu by them might have the same bias (though 
not necesserily). Only wi::h information on th~ growth paths of plants in 
terms of e,r.ployees; horsepower, und net investment would it be possible to 
resolve thi;:; question. Rough sensitivity tests suggest that a considerable 
number of ,:,lants would ha•1e had to grow to the largest category with low net 
investment/incrc"=.so L1 hm:sepotver ratios en route to bring the accumulated 
net investmen;;/ch~:mg(;! in capc::city ratio of the largest plants close to equality 
. with the others, On balance then, this evidence would seem to weigh towards 
the conclusion that the ::-..:.tic "accumulated net imTestment/change in horse­
power" in higher for the lar8e:Jt plants than for the rest lumped together. 
Another difficulty i'i1 the in te.:pretation of these ratios, however, is that 
while the UGe of a :fa:r-:1.:y loj,1g period does tend to sm0oth out problems asso­
ciated with c.r.e--or two-·yea-o: l.:•.gs between investment and change of capacity, 
it fails to r~no7e r>. problem related to depreciation of capital; DANE's invest­
ment figure fa <cssi:::ntially "r,urch:.ises of fixsd capital (including land, al­
though this in not an i.mportaut ::orn~~onent) minus sales." It. does not, as far 
as I can SE;C 1 e-c;,en -'illuw for reti"t"ements--it is not clE.ar how it could. And 
in fact, th•.? mr-nl)~t° of :.-earB ir: --1b.ich horsepower actually decreased in some of 
the two-d:!.git uecto".'s .::,!;3,ge~.--;:E tha~ t'herc must have been substantial retire­
ment. In any cas~, since reU.rement anci. depreciation may :-,e assumed to occur 
at different iat~c in diifor··.:.nt ind11fit:a:-ies, one may not get a very good feel 
for the rej_ati.011.:;hip "an.nu.al ~.-,st of f:f.'l-i.er! capit2l/hor.seµower;' across such 
categori.1:;:r. ,,.:; ir..du~:1:r:.~~~, flc.nt i,'.i.:;;i~~ etc. 
1. 
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Inclusion of inventories lowers this ratio a little but does not alter it sig­
nificantly.1 Unfortunat~ly it is not possible to use with any confidence the 
technique applied to reach this figure for subsets of the other plants; 2 thus 
the information provided by this calculation, which suggests that the largest 
category firms are even more capital intensive and have even lower output/capital 
ratios than suggested by the output/horsepower figures of Table 8, is rather 
redundant since it simply lenus more evidence to the effect that this is rela­
tively inefficient; it joes not, unfortunately, throw any new light on how the 
ratio 11output/capital1' is rclate?d to size among the lower size categories. 
It would be tlcsirabl~~ as well as having better information on fixed capi­
tal, to include all capit~lj i.~., inventorie8 and other working capital as well 
as fixed. Limited evidence, discussed in Appendix B, suggests that the total 
capital/fixed capital ratio is higher for larger firms and plants than for small 
ones. Another metho.io1-og:i.cal wee.kness involves the exclusive use of number of 
workers to measu~e firm size. Appendix C discusses the possible implications of 
the use of better measures. 
Value Added/Capital at the Two-Digit Level 
The relevance of differences in output/capital and labor/ 
capital ratios across fir.n or plant size in a country is likely to be greatera---J.f 
the di:fferenceo ·are preeent also at various levels of -disaggregation•. '(If ~t?hey 
1In 1964, the Socie<lades Anominas, a disproportionate share of which are 
large, had an inventory/horsepower ratio of 0.48 ~hile all other .firms had a 
ratio of O. 36. Possib:.y the difference across size catego:-ies per ~ would be 
considerably greater than this. 
2Since it becomes le~s plcusible in the middle of the distribution to assume 
that firms are relatively stable :tn the:'.r relative position within the size, 
and toward the bottom of the di8tribution it is clear that a number of firms are 
dropping right out aach year while oth~t"s mcve up. 
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are not, the possibility of effecting the overall labor/capital ratio by mani­
pulating size structure depends on their being sufficiently flexible in output· 
composition, i.e., if it is desired to retain composition of industrial output 
more or less constant the existence of differences in output/capital, labor/ 
capital and other ratios at disaggregated levels is key. Their presence or 
absence d~termines whether there.real.l.y is the possibility of, say, increasing 
the labor associated dir~ctly with a give~ amount of capital by working on the 
size structure of plants. As suggested by the Colombian data, and indicated 
more'·conclusively by that of some other .;ountries, it appears that these re­
lationships do hold for disaggregation at least to the two-digit level and 
possibly farther. The relationship observed in Table 8 for "value added/ 
horsepower" to be an increasing function. of plant size up to.the category 
100-199--more precisely for plants in the range 50-199 workers to have higher 
h9rsepower productivity than either the smaller or the larger ones--holds 
generally at the two-digit level as well. (See Table 9.) But no attempt has 
as yet been made to measure output/fixed capital.ratios by size for given 
industries. Undoubtedly the high fixed capital/horsepower ratio observed 
above for large firms in the aggregate would be found in some industries, but 
it remains to be seen whether the difference would be greater or smaller 
within the industry than in the aggregate. 
Total Factor Productivity (Social Efficiency) with Non-homogeneous Labor and 
Non-homogeneous Capital 
In simple labor surplus model where homogeneous labor is in excess supply 
, .. 
' ~:~· ;- 1'1 :,...• 
I .. if"" 
I t 
Table 9 
Value Added/Horsepower by Industry and (~lant Size 1964 
Number of Workers 
Industry <5 5-24 25-99 100-199 !_200 'J.'otal 
Food 5,061 7,505 11,629 lli-307 11,134 10, J()O
Beverar,es 1,378 17,4594,252 22,338 11,327 14,254
Tohacco 173 163,174 f88,973 :103, 716 131,957 123,891, ITextilM 13,"10 4,936 9,445 13,677 9,718 9,576
Clothing & ! l
I 
rfootwear . 195,360 22,362 29,305 i 30,508 47,641 '33,275 
' 
Wood & t 
Prc,rlucts. 2,504 ·l2,691 3,642 3,783 •'5,892 4,094
tfoodnn . ,,,.. .Ifurniture 5,635 8,470 9,419 17,584 14,050 10,559 !
Paper &
Protlucts- 14,055 7,82.9 18,893 19,262 4,427 5,A31 . ~-I 
PrintinP, 11,025 13,472 19,562 ~ 0I19,805 40,803 24,5fl3
Leather 4,134 7,402 9,630 7,524 7,751 7,R52
Ruhher 5,813 8,815 8,218 -- 9,370 (),257 r 
Cher"ic.als 30,589 23,350 7,743 : 44,509, 9,614 11,891
PP.troleUl'l & •Conl rroducte 684 9,777 2,710 21,460 5,216 5,li55
Non-~letnllic i
?linera ls ' n,a. · 3,170 7,844 4,604 5,'l89 5,625
J\aqic Metals 8,182 7,319 6,367 4,908 3,492 4,220 
. t 
Metnl Products
except Machinery 6,097 6,742 10,602 7,744 10,594 9,337· • l
i 
Non-Electrical
~lnchinery 46,126 6,377 9,278 12,759 14,674 9,626.._ 
\ 
.., ___ ........ -- . .,. ......... , .... 
l
Electrical ~-:• 
--·- -R•• ' 
·I·,··Unchi.ncry 10,629 12,128 24,331 11,959 27,6fi5 20,591 
Tranc;port
f.,:uiprnent 4,999 11,256 11,760 18,531 · 15,238 13,AM 
1-f~scellaneous 13,.634 12,710 19,483 19,270 18,983 lA,360 
TOTAL 7,288 8,572 10,885 15,200 9,325 10,202 
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Sources and Hethodology Table 9 
;. -
Except for- the· ·size group "less than 5 i10rkers," the figures are 
taken directly fror.1 DANE, lloletin Hensual de T:i=;tadistica, Nut:1ber 224. 
The figures for"< S" were calculated on the basis of residuals between 
DANE's totals presented in Anuario General de Estadistica and the totals 
for the firms of 5 workers· and up presented in the aforenentioned Boletin. 
In some of the two-digit sectors, the ratio of value added to horsepower · 
fluctuates rather wildly by firm size, somewhat but not dramatically 
.more so as between the firms of less than 5 workers and the others. 
The calculatiot;s for the less than 5 group, by residual, are more subject 
to error than the others, this was confiraed when the deductions indicated 
a negative number of horsepower in sector 34.• 
Note also that. due to the downward biases in the 1964 value·added 
figures in DANE's bottom three size categories (appearfng here within the 
bottom two categories), average value added in th~ bottom.category is, 
according to our estimates, about 10 percent too low in the "less than 5" 
category and 15-20 percent too low in the 5-24 category.· It must be . 
remembered that these figures are very much estimates, however, and limited 
faith· should be placed in them. 
-42-
so that its marginal social cost is zero and homogeneous capital is the only 
scarce resource, a gocd m~asure of a firm's social efficiency is its output/ 
1capital ratio. Such extreme assumptions do not fit Colombia, however. It is 
generally-plausible to assume that unskilled labor is ·rela~f:v.ilr✓-tiof"'e overpriced in the 
markeJ: than is skilled labor, although this involves oversimplification, since 
some· forms of skilled la1:lor may well be overpriced as well. 2 In the case of 
cap:lt~l:, the overvaluation of the exchange rate generally implies that imported 
ca~ital is underpriceci; on the other hand some forms of domestic capital, es­
pecially ones producible in part with surplus labor, (this holds for example, 
for some forms of construction), could well be overpriced. 
Information bearing directly on the relationship between plant size and the 
· type ~f :1abor used is not ava:f.lable, but indirect evidence suggests that the 
-share of hired labor in the white collar category is close to zero until a plant 
size probably substantially above ;; workers is reached; it may then level off 
. 3
(industry held consteat) over some ra~ge of plant size and may thereafter decline. 
1rt is not a perfect measure, however, since what one really wishes to get 
at in appraising a fi.rm :'..sits "general equilibrium" impact on total output or 
income, and unless factor ma:,:kets are perfect, different units of a homogeneous 
factor will not necessarily have the same social productivity in alternative uses. 
2At least if unemployment of people with these skills is any indication--
of course the unemployment may be due in part to the fact that the skill alleged 
to be there is in fact absent. 
3Circumstantial evidence, although problematic, can be aduced by classify-
ing plants by industry anc/or region and observing the relation between average 
size and percent of paid labor in the white collar category. In the clothing­
footwear sector, for example, the 11average plant size-share of labor in white 
collar category•.• :relationship is shown in Table A-8. The methodology of ob- . 
serving the relationship between the white collar/total paid labor ratio and ;1an-t 
size with one observation coming from each department in a given industry fails, 
of course, to nonnal~ze for a number of variables which may be the real source of 
the observed relationships. It is, for example, possible that the same factors 
which lead to the prevalance of larger plants go together with the greater supply 
of white collar help, ~tc. It is highly unlikely, tbough, that the correlation 
is entirely spurious, especially over the ~ange 0-20 workers or so. 
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If it be assumed that white collar labor is a "scarcer" resource than blue. 
(this seems plausible especially with respect to ac:hninistrators, managers, etc.), 
then the observed positive relation between labor productivity and plant size 
is partly a result of the more extensive use of white collar labor in the larger 
firms; assuming that our interest is in an "output/input of scarce resources" 
ratio,the output/capital variable could be biased in favor of large (or perhaps 
medium and large) firms through failure to treat this labor as a scarce resource. 
If it were assumed that the wage correctly measures social opportunity costs of 
the white .collar workers, then an interesting ratio is "value added minus white 
collar remuneration/capital." If it be assumed that there is no white collar 
labor for the small size category but that it constitutes 25 percent of the 
labor force and 50 percent of wages (the latter may be a little upward biased) 
for plants of 50-199 workers, then it can be seen that (using 1964 value added/ 
horsepower figures) the "value added minus white collar remuneration/horsepower" 
ratio would be only a J.i t tle higher for th ~se middle-sized firms th.an for the 
smallest ones. The value added per unit of scarce resources ratio could bell be 
substantially higher for the smallest firms than for the others. 
It may be argued, of course, that there is much scarce human resource con­
centrated in the small plants in the form of management. Whether or in what 
sense this is the case is very difficult to judge without more information on 
who small scale producers are, what their alternatives are, etc. In any case, 
the very partial nature of the above calculation must be born in mind. Since the 
equilibrium wage of white collar workers is very much. a function of the exten­
sion of larger scale industry, one could not use the existing wage rate as a 
measure of opportunity cost if a policy of extensive support to small scale (at 
the expense of large scale) industry were contemplated. 
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It is not possible, unfortunately, to present figures on the domestic and 
imported component of capital goods used at different firm sizes (nor even to 
have a good idea at the two-digit sector breakdown). The logical presumption 
is that larger scale firms, with better connections and better arg~ed cases, 
get the lion's share of the imports of capital goods and have a higher imported/ 
total ratio for capital goods purchased. Such a relationship is strongly ap­
parent with respect to intermediate goods consumed, where in 1964 the smallest 
size group imported less than 8 percent of raw materials used whereas the largest 
group imported about 26 percent. This relationship has been present throughout 
the period 1956 and on, though in somewhat varying degree. 
Thus it is not possible· ·-.'.; · , with the data at hand, to make con­
vincing overall estimates of the social efficiency of plants or firms by size 
category such as to take into account the use of scarce capital of various 
1 . 2types, the-use of scarce labor, etc. Non-normalized labor productivity is 
an increasing functio~ of firm size; it seems probable that physical capital 
productivity decreases (a judgment based partly on the discussion of this sec­
tion and partly on evidence from other countries presented in the next section); 
the ratio of output to use of imported raw materials is a decreasing function; 
and output/scarce human resources is an unknown function. It would therefore be 
conservative to say that there is no evidence that small producers ineffi­are 
cient in the economic sense; it seems almost certain that the largest plants 
(200 workers and up) are on average inefficient; as between smaller plants and 
1For as thorough an analysis as possible under the data limitations, see 
John Todd, forthcoming Yale Ph.D. dissertation. 
2I.e., with no allowance for quality differences in labor. 
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the medium size range (50-200 workers) relative social efficiency probably depend 
on the industry, but consideration of the market imperfections under which eco­
nomic activity takes plac~-fµggests that many of the factors in the small plants
. .... ·· ... ·.. '••.. > . --~- ·, •,. ~ .. -..,..~-"\.. ~ 
would no~.-.h-~ ve=ey'.::~~oductive "trl.th their alternative uses--i.e., that these firms 
ai-e eff_icien·t resource· users. 
We turn now to other measures of performance of relevance to the comparison 
at hand, in particular income distribution as a function of firm size, localiza­
tion of industry (related to distribution in part) and growth tendencies and 
potential. 
Size of f!!!!!_ and Income Distribution 
Since income distribution is an important variable in Colombia, the rela­
tive performance of different size plants in terms of their impact on the over­
all income distribution of the country (i.e., the general equilibrium effects 
of the existence of a certain type of indust~y as opposed to tha alternative) 
is of interest. Since this impact cannot be observed directly, it is necessary 
to guess at it on the basis of proxies and indicators. Although it is not a 
logical deduction, it is plausible to assume that large scale industry, which 
tends to produce a relatively small number of high wage incomes and a relatively 
small number of quite high capital incomes1 has the general equilibrium impact 
of raising the income of a relatively small number of high income people by a 
relatively large amount; correspondingly it is plausible to conclude that, since 
1A possible exception is the widely owned corporation whose stockholders 
are not too high in the income distribution. If this phenomenon exists at all 
in Colombia, its importance is miniscule. 
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small scale industry produces a large number of relatively low wage payments and 
· of relatively low capital incomes, its general equilibrium impact consists of 
·relatively small increases in income for a relatively large number of people. 
It is also highly probable that the incomes raised by small scale industry would 
in its absence be lower than would those raised by large scale industry, in its 
absence. Under these circumstances one could conclude that the income distribu­
tion impact of small scale industry is more favorable than that of large scale 
industry. The several links in this chain of "plausibility" would each have to 
be analyzed empirically before firm conclusions could be drawn, but the level of 
doubt ·appears low. 
Something can be deduced about the income distribution characteristics of 
different plant sizes by observing the wage rates, the wage share, and (to the· 
extent available) the distribution of labor and capital income. Differences 
in average labor remt!neration by plant size have already been referred to. 
Table 1 indicates that there is no systematic relation between the paid share 
of gross value added and firm size. If all desirable adjustments were made, a 
mild positive association would probably emerge. 1 Total labor share (including 
a plausible imputation for income of unpaid workers) appears to bear a mildly 
negative relationship to size, up to the middle size categories. 
A more interesting statistic (vis-a-vis the income distribution question) 
1 
The figures of Table 1 are, as noted earlier, not adjusted for the prob-
able underestimation for larger plants of labor remuneration in the form of· 
fringe benefits not paid at time of rendering of the labor services, nor the 
overestimate of value added for the larger firms. Adjustments, therefore, 
would lower gross value added in the large plants more than the small ones and 
raise labor income in the former. 
The relationship shown in Table 1 also suffers from the fact that a "gross
value added 11 figure is used when the conceptually more interesting comparison is 
between labor payments and net value added; Table 10 shows an attempt to use a 
net value added figure. In order to calculate r1et·va.lt1e added and net income, it 
is necessary to subtr~ct out ~epreciation and indirect taxes. It seems unlikely,
however, that thes~ c:!djustrnents ·,:v0uld change significantly the relationship among
plant sizes shown in Table 1. 
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Sources and Methodology: 
· The data of Cols. (1), (2), (5), (6), and (7) are directly from- DANE. Cols. 
(3) and (4) are from unpublished data of the Banco de la Republica. Col. (13) is 
based on estimates of the Banco de la Republica, along with not fully consistent 
data from the Suprenintendencia de Sociedades Anonimas. Considerable . :. : .· ··:, . 
guesswoi:k was involved in the calculations shown here.. Col. (15) is based pri­
marily on the data of the Supei;intendencia de Sociedades Anonomas, and due to the con­
ceptual differences which appear to exist between the legally admissable 
depreciation and the economic concept, may not be very accurate. 
Two estimates of imputed labor income are presented in Cols. .(19) and (20).. 
That of Col. (19) assumes that imputed labor income per unpaid person-in each 
industry was equal to the average wage of paid workers in DAl~E's smallest size 
bracket (less than 5 workers); that of Col. (2) .assumes an imputed labor income 
twice as high. 
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is the blue collar labor share (paid and imputed). It is not available directly 
by plant size though the relation between this share and average plant size across 
two digit industries suggests that the white collar share is greater in indus­
tries of high average plant size. 1 (See Diagram A-4). The figures of Table A-8, 
where an attempt is made to get at the relationship between size of firm and 
share of the labor force which is white collar, are in accord with this conclusion. 
According to both DANE and Central Bank estimates, the average paid labor 
share has been increasing over the last 15 years or so; Table A-lOa suggests 
that this has been particularly true of the larger size firms. My estimate sug­
gests an increase in total (paid and imputed) labor share for the factory sector 
from 36.6 to 39.5 over the period 1953-1966, and increases over the same period 
of 33.3 to 37.9 for the paid labor share and 22.5 to 24.0 for the paid blue collar 
share. 
It is, of course, much more difficult to say anything about the recipients 
of capital income and its distribution by plant size, but at least for the 
smaller sizes it seems plausible to assume that most of the non-labor income 
goes to the individuals appearing in DANE's statistics as "unpaid workers." 
Even for a rather small plant~ however, it seems difficult to believe that all 
the income goes to the individuals; if it did, the average income of proprie­
tors, even of plants with less than 5 workers, would be higher than the wage 
rates of workers in the largest firms.· (See Table A-11.) Based on very notional 
lNote, however~ that this is a place where the use of "number of workers" 
as the definition of finn size may create a particular distortion or bias. It 
seems probable, on the basis of somewhat impressionistic evidence, that firms 
with high capital/output ratios tend to have higher white collar/blue collar 
ratios and this in turn implies that if size were measured by amount of capital 
(not practical due to data d~fficulties), a stronger relationship between firm 
size and·the white collar/total labor share might emerge. 
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concepts of the frequency distribution of wages to recipients in a given size 
category and for capital recipients· in the small size categories, one can guess 
at the percent of people associated with firms in a given size category and whose 
annual income is below various cutoff points. It is also possible to guess 
crudely at the percent of capital income and thus of total income going to people 
below various levels. If we take 10,000 and 15,000 1964 pesos as relevant cut­
off points (the former corresponds to the average income of workers in firms of 
about 50 workers and the latter the average income of workers in the 200 and up 
category--so that the former is a relatively satisfactory income and the latter 
a quite satisfactory income in Colombian terms ) the· data suggest strongly that 
whereas for the very smallest firms most of the income generated goes to people 
with incomes below 10,000 pesos, even by the category 10-14 the majority of the 
income is going to people with incomes over 15,000 pesos. For persons involved 
in firms of 2-4 workers, it appears that perhaps 60 percent goes to people with 
incomes of less than 10,000 and 80 percent to people with less than 15,000.1 
An issue receiving considerable attention in Colombia at present is that of 
the distribution of urban population by size of city; there is a fear that the 
larger cities are growing too fast and a feeling that there would be some ad­
vantages to faster development of the intermediate sized cities. If indeed such 
a policy were to be taken. seriously, it would be necessary to study in depth 
the actual and feasible relationships between type of industry and size of city. 
At present there is a clearly observable tendency for the larger establishments 
to be located in the larger cities (see Table A-12) and for average productivity 
1
It must be emphasized again that these figures are very much guesses, but 
that the relative values are probably more valid than the absolute ones. 
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and possibly average wages also to vary substantially by city size. 
The relationship between cottage-shop and total manufacturing employment 
is not a simple function of city size, however; some of the larger cities are 
. 1notably characterized by large cottage-shop sectors. 
Small Firms and the Growth Process 
It is frequently argued that an important consideration in appraising the 
contribution which may be expected of small industries is their potential to 
grow. While the.:con~entio'Q -that ,growth potential is important must be borne out 
empirically, it is sufficierit.iy plausible to warrant a summary of the scattered 
bits of.information available on this issue for Colombia. And perhaps more 
relevant than the tendency of firms to grow or decline is their tendency to go 
out of business, with its possible implications for loss of previous investment-­
both in fixed capital and possibly in managerial talent as well. 
over th~ . period ·i9i53'-68, DA.~E"s industrial surveys indicate a marked in-._,., :.. :. -. 
crease in the numb.er of plants iii.all the size categories from 25 workers and 
. · ..., 
up (see Table A-2a) ;,'.". tJ1e s~me holds also for the period 1944-45 and on. The 
number of plants in this range increased from 1,246 in 1953 to 2,017 in 1968; 
plants of 50 workers and up increased from 612 in 1953 to 1,125 in 1968, 
1It would be useful to know the extent to which this is a response to a 
real demand for such sectors as transportation equipment, and the extent to 
which it is in part disguised unemployment. 
2Not:e, however, ·thai. if: it were true that the number of plants in the 
categories 1-9 (5. workerif-and .up) had risen, as seems likely (see the discussion 
with Table I of the underreporting problem for small firms in recent years). from 
around 6,900 :i.n 1956 to around 9,000 in 1968~ (and assuming that no plants with 
25 workers) or over had gone unrecorded in 1968) then the percent of all plants 
with 25 workers or more (and again excluding those with less than 5 workers 
.would not have.changed significantly over this period; it would have been about 
21.4 percent in 1956. and about 23 percent in 1969. · 
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i.e., almost doubling. 1 Ras most of this increase in the number of large plants 
resulted from growth of those already existing in 1953 or have there been im­
portant entrances of new ones in-::o the various size categories, along with exits 
of others? Is growth more characteristic of large plants or smaller ones? The 
evidence on all these issues remains highly fragmentary; and in this context 
the absence of information on firm size as opposed to plant size is particularly 
problematic; growth of the former may well have been more rapid than that of the 
l~~~~r,; .. it• -seems unlikely that a substantial number of firms 15 or 20 years 
ago had 5 or more plants, as a numbe~ do now. 
John'-Totld'.-~s ·analysis of 4,496 plants by size classes in 1966 and 1962 (note 
that total employ:nent rei;::>rted by D.Al~E grew by about 8. 5 percent between these 
two years and that the plants Todd identified accounted for one-half of the total 
output) saw387 (8.61) register an increase in their size category and 595 (13.23) 
.'·. ' ,• .. 
adecrease between the two years. The flante toward the lower end of the size 
scale showed a greate1 tendency to decrease in size than the larger ones. Whe­
ther these figures indicate that more plants actually decreased than increased 
2
their number of workers (as opposed to size category) is not clear. 
An analysis of a few three digit sectors3 is consistent with Todd's informa­
tion in suggesting about the same number of plants decreasing their employment 
1As indicated in ~able A-2a and elsewhere the completeness of DANE's coverage 
of the small scale planLs has probably waned since the last complete industrial 
census of 1953, so the implication of the figures in this table that the percent 
of firms iu the smaller bra,;kets have decreaseC: rapidly, and even that the abso­
lute numbers have decrease~, 3hould not be taken seriously; it is probably not true. 
Certainly, however" there was an increasing share of value added, employees, etc., 
in the larger iirr:1s, ;:·:iro.ugh 1964. As discussed earlier, this trend, at least in 
terms of employee::;, may.have beer reversed. since 1964 (see Table 2). 
2Assuming -~hat· t!~1:~ size distribution i~ relatively smooth, plants tend to be 
grouped n~aJ;ei:-: tHe-_li:>Uei:' th:m the Uf.,}cr .1..imit of any given size category, so the 
same_ pe~c;~t m.ovement ,:kwnward ~-10,1lci shift more pl:mts into the lower size category 
•.. · thal1 ·t:he correspol."'ding mo,1emen c ·1pwarci. would sh:.:.ft into the higher size category. 
3With the help of fl.i1J 7 R .1959 imd .! 969 industrial directories which give the 
names, addresses; r:tc., of p:;.ant,~ anu thei:.: si,:e category. 
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category as increasing it. It also suggests something about the "new entrant/ 
1 . 
existing plant exit" ratio. Of a sample including 247 plants existing either 
in 1959 or 1969 or both, 102 were new plants, or more precisely were not locat­
able in 1959--this is presumably an upward biased figure since the technique used 
might not catch all plants which had moved geographically, changed address and 
name, etc.; 41 plants had apparently disappeared during the decade; 41 had in­
creased employment category, 38 had decreased it and 25 remained in the same one. 
Thus of the 206 plants operating in these industries in 1969, only 104 could be 
located in 1959, and even if the implicit increase in plants is overestimated, it 
must have been substantial. A superficial reading of this information would be 
that most of the employment increase (in these industries at any rate) came from 
the new plants. Presumably a smaller share came from new firms, as branching out 
was undoubtedly occurring in some measure. 
As shown in Table 11 about one-quarter of the plants in DANE employment cate­
gories 0-62 increased employment category over the period, only about 45 percent 
increased or stayed in the same category, and almost 30 percent went out of 
business as nearly as could be ascertained. There was relatively little differ­
ence between the categories 0-33 and 4-6 in terms of tendency to grow, etc., 
except that the category 4-6 plants were less likely to go out of business. Over 
one-third of the firms in 0-3 in 1959 apparently went out of business. 4 The 
~ot random, in that three-digit industries were selected primarily with a 
view to the ease of performing the exercice. 
2Up to 50 workers. 
3up to 15 workers. 
4Note that the difficulty of location of the same firm even though it ac­
tually existed in 1959 might be greater for these small firms, so this tendency 











Size Category Grow Sar.ie Decline nate Termi- ate/ %which :, not 
in 1959 (/!) (#) (#) (#) nate Total Grow Falling 
0:-3 29 16 20 36 29/56 36/101 28.7 44.6 
4-6 9 7 17 4 9/21 4/37 24.3 45.9 
7-9 2 2 1 0 2/1 0 40 80 
, . ... 
·-•· -··-
Sources and Methodology: A selection of industrial categories was chosen, 
including preparation and· conservation of meats (201), manufacture of wood pulp, 
paper and cardboard (271), manufacture of paper articles (272), manufacture of 
bulbs (375) and manufacture of non-electrical machinery in Bogota (36). The 
objective was to match plants which existed in the two years; frequently plants 
had a different name but the owners had the same family name in 1969 as com­
pared with 1959; sometimes, the nama of the family was completely different 
but the address was the same; in either case it w~s assumed to be the same 
entity. In other cases undoubtedly a plant moved location and changed names, 
and in these cases it was counted as if a 1959 firm had gone out of business 
and a new firm had arisen by 1969. Hence the upward bias in the estimates 
of new plants and the demise of old ones. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely 
that this bias is too great, unless there is substantial movement across 
industrial categories •. Host movement between departments was probably 
captured in the survey; it is more difficult to catch the other form of 
movement. 
1 
crowth and decline are measured by movement into higher (lower) size 
categories, not simply by an increase or decrease in the number of workers. 
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number of firms in the largest size categories was too small to permit any 
conclusion~:; 
Tentative Explanations of Different Behavior by Plant (Firm) Size 
Before turning to information from other countries, it may be useful to· 
review some of the more common hypotheses as to why plants and firms differ 
by size. 
A number of facto~s probably·combine to produce the positive relation be­
tween capital/labor_and output/labor ratios and firm size and the (probable) 
negative relation between output/capital and size. One element determining 
' 
the positive output/labor relation with size is the increasing quality of 
labor; but it seems clear that even if labor could be measured in efficiency 
units, the relations would go in the same direction. Broadly speaking, the 
factors involved would seem to be 
(a) a non-homogeneous production function such that with fixed factor 
prices the optimal K/L ratio rises with the size; 
(b) a positive relation between the variable "price of labor/price of 
capital" and firm size. 
Element (a) is predictable, especially given (b), in that indivisibilities 
seem more frequently related to capital size than labor size and that if the 
price (or other costs) of labor are higher in large firms, these firms will 
push technology in a labor saving direction. The major factor which might 
work towards lower K/L and K/0 ratios for larger firms is capacity utiliza­
tion; number of turns seem ·usually to be positively associated with firm size. 
Recent information on this relation has been presented by F. Thoumi in a 
PlaEeacion study. 
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No careful study of cost and capital differentials has been unde~taken, though 
guesses have been advanced that the cost of an efficiency unit labor is 40-50 
--. 
percent higher for large firms than small ones and that small firms pay on-third 
to one-half more for capital, making overall differential to around 2:1. If 
,_ 
there is much elasticity of substitution, this would generate a quite substan-· 
tial difference in the labor capital ratio. The possibility cannot be fu).ly 
ruled out that most of the capital labor differential is, in fact, due to the 
difference in relative labor prices. 
The relative social efficiency of different sized firms depends, among 
other things, on which sizes face factor prices closest to the social opp~r-· 
tunity cost of the factors in question. To the extent that smaller firms have. 
the efficiency advantage, as seems probably in Colombia, this must:be attributed 
to the mispricing of factors to the larger firms; it is widely accept~d on 
impressionistic grounds that those firms receive credit at below equilibrium· 
interest rates and pay wages which are above equilibrium. 
Differential access to and use of credit is difficult to ascertain from· 
published information. But the evidence comes down_ clearly in stipporf of the 
generally supposed easier access of the larger firms. Using Planeacion's esti­
mates for credit received by small and medium firms (5-99) workers in 1969 
together with Feldl's calculation of total credit available (see Planeacion, 
S?.• ~., page 208) one comes to the conclusion that the ratio of "credit/value 
added" for the small and medium firms vis-a-vis the large ones is in the range 
of .25- •.37; in other words it is unlikely that the small and medium firms receive 
more than one-third as much credit per peso of value added as do the large 
firms. This in itself is difficult to interpret, since it is known that large 
firms extend net crelit to smeller firms and it is even possible that this is 
a more efficient credit dis~ribution system in some respects than direct bank 
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credit. This could be particularly true in situations where the large firms sell 
to or buy -from the small and medium ones and have thus a common interest. Lack 
of credit for small and medium -firms could be particularly damaging in the indus­
tries where they are in competition with larger ones. Without further informa-. 
tion it is difficult to ascertain the meaning of the overall ratios just referred 
to. 
Since the definition of small-medium is broad in the above comparison, the 
difficulties which the very small firms must be facing may be imagined; the small 
and medium credit recipients are probably toward the higher range of that category. 
That larger plants and firms show a somewhat greater tendency to grow and a 
definitely greater tendency to survive is not surprising. Low cost credit and 
good access to it is more important in generating and permitting growth than in 
producing high·total factor productivity.Low cost labor, on the other hand, is 
of little help in stimulating growth if capital is available. The general nature 
of this difference is too well known to _warrant much discussion. 
III. Evidence on Size Structure, Relative Efficiency of Different Sizes 2 etc. from 
Other Countries 
Even if it were possible to make much more precise and credible estimates 
of the relationship between total factor productivity and plant (firm) size in 
Colombia, this would inevitably constitute an incomplete picture in terms of 
information needed to frame policy. The relative efficiency of a given range of 
sizes (e.g., cottage-sh_op or small scale factories) would not necessarily imply 
that this form of production could be (or should be) expanded rapidly; it might 
be, for example, that given products are best produced in quite "size-specific" 
~~ ., tppt qnl:y fo:r;~.:x.e..JA~tve:ly small number of products can wide substitution 
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be practiced; in such a situation it is not possible to change size structure 
substantially without changing composition of industrial output by a correspond­
ing amount, and this may not be practical. Or it may be that, although at a 
country's stage of development it would have been better to concentrate more on 
small firms and less on large ones, there are natural and optimal trends towards 
large scale production of many items, and if the country is not already taking 
advantage of small scale production in a given line, it may be too late to re­
verse course, i.e., the past mistake may be best treated as a bygone. Cross­
country comparisons are useful in suggesting hypotheses as to how "flexible" the 
firm size structure is, how it may be expected to evolve over time with the 
process of development, and what policy tools have been used to affe~t it, and 
with what success, in other countries. 
It is useful, first, to review briefly some of the factors of importance in 
determining firm size structure; two important ones are the stage of development: 
(perhaps more precisely the stage of industrialization, although this is not 
1clear), and the size of the country. The more developed the country, the greater 
the share of employment tending to be found in factory (as opposed to non-factory) 
industry, and in large scale as opposed to small scale factory production. The 
greater the population the higher the share of factory employment in large fac­
tories; it is not clear whether the size of the economy has any impact on the 
distribution of employment between factory and non-factory production. The relation­
ship between per capita income and percent of factory employment in large scale 
factories (100 employees and up) is suggested in Diagram 5, for a selection of 
1Presumably resource endowment has an effect on size structure via differ-
ences across industries in optimal size structure, as do institutional con­
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14 countries. 1 The relationship, as can be seen, is relatively close,
2 with the 
effect of size being particularly evident and interesting in the case of New Zea­
land and Brazil. As can be seen, the importance of the small and medium (5-99 
workers) firms in Colou1bia is somewhat low relative to the other countries, given 
its industrial labor productivity. 
Information is sparser on the division between factory and non-factory manu­
facturing employment and the figures are harder to interpret since the estimate of 
non-factory employment is frequently a residual and it may in some cases pick·up 
a good deal of disguised unemployment. Diagram 6 shows the relationship between 
importance of cottage-shop (percent of manufacturing employment in plants of less 
· than 5 worl:ers or--in some cases--less than 5 employees) and importance of small 
scale factory employment within the factory sector (percent,of workers in plants 
of 5 or more workers who are in plants of 5-50 workers). Without more data work 
and careful consideration or other .variables which may bear on the relation, the 
diagram can only be sugg~stive. It is interestinc that the Latin countries with 
the exception of Salvador--a very small country--alon0 with Japan (1919-1920) and 
India lie below what would be the regression line. With the exception of Brazil, 
they were all slow growing countries. Japan, although developing fairly succes­
sfully throughout the whole of the 20th century, did not grow dramatically in 
. d r., ld •.1 3 and it is of interest to find it wellthe peri od bef ore t he Secon wor war; 
1Although average labor productivity in raanufacturing rather than average 
income in the econoiny is used as the measure of development or increase here. 
2It is interestinr; that the cross-country relationship between the importance 
of small factories in total factory employment and the level of income or develop­
ment does not seem to shou up systematically in the over time statistics available 
for a few countries, data difficulties may be involved here however, (see Staley 
and Morse, op. cit., pp. 20-21. 
3Japan's low small scale/total factory ratio 1919-1920 may reflect also the 
fact that its high share of non-factory employment was in part a conscious and 
probably efficient public policy fostering dualism, maintaining traditional con­
sumption habits, etc. It has been argued that the consur,1ption and savings habits 
of__ the Japanese allowed the large scale and modern industry to "be built on a 
solid layer of non-economic relationships and traditional patterns of life"--the 
demonstration effect was very weak. The government helped to preserve this con­
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above the "regression line 11 for the 1951 and 1960 observations, when its growth 
was very rapid. 1 There is little variation in the small factory/total factory 
employment ratio within the developed countries (the United States, Canada, 
Germany, and by 1960 Japan), but it is interesting to note that the faster 
growing countries, Japan and Germany, had a substantially higher share of their 
. 2 
m~nufacturing employees .in the small size range than did Canada and the U.S. 
Although the set of countries used may not be representative, Diagram 6 does 
suggest {whatever its implications may be), that Colombia is c..,aracterized by 
relative concentration of workers in large scale factories, given the share of 
During the earlier part of the post-restoration century, Japan focused 
considerable government support on certain large scale industries and was 
characterized by an extreme degree of industrial, banking, and other economical 
concentrations. One objective of the post 1-iorld War II occupation--assoiiated 
with the desire to leave a functioning democracy--was to decrease this level 
of concentration. As a result there was au extensive land reform, large 
industrial complexes were broken up, etc. How much this had to do with de­
creasing the observed concentration of workers in large scale factories is 
unclear since it would not, ·by itself, be expected to lead to a breakup of 
plants--as opposed to large scale firms {with more than one plant) and conglomerates. 
2It is possible, of course, that a high stage of development is essentially 
"the cause" of both the high level of concentration in the manufacturing sector 
and the slow rate of growth; since Canada and the U.S. have higher per capita 
incomes than Gennany and Japan, this could explain the observed points. Further, 
when the observation on Germany was taken it was still in the rather atypical 
postwar boom period, and Japan is, of course, something of a special case, 
so the sample may not be a good one. 
Strong Harxist leanings of many Japanese economists and the typical pessi­
mism with thich they have viewed Japan's future development have frequently 
given them a neeative tone in discussion of Japan's dual industrial structure• 
. Other economists such as Ohkawa and Rosovsky, have·felt that this.dualism was 
an important ingredient in Japan's high rate of growth. (See Seymour A. 
Broadbridge, Industrial Dualism in Japan, Aldine Publishing Co.,.Chicago 
1966, p. 5). Some students have felt that the dual structure .is deeply rooted 
in the economy and society and will not terminate naturally even when the 
economy develops at a high rate; current developments make this prediction a 
poor bet. The use of secondhand machinery has been given as one possible 
reason that the small enterprises have been able to keep pace with large ones 
so effectively. Also the saving rate of individual proprietors is very high, 
running to between 20 and 30 percent. 
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manufacturing workers in cottage·-shop production; to put it another way, it is 
characterized by a relatively high degree of dualism in the manufacturing sector 
(as are, according to the Diagra~ 7 a number of the Latin countries). 
Of equal interest with the information from other countries on size. struc­
ture of manufacturing establishments is that on the relationship between firm size 
and factor productivityj especially capital productivity. Here there are substan­
tial similarities across the countries for which information was gathered--the 
output/capital ratio is generally a decreasing function of firm size, sometimes 
decreasing rapidly, sometimes more gradually. This conclusion emerges from the 
information for Japan~ Pakistan, Mexico and India. 
It is systematically true that value added per worker and average wage rate 
are increasing functions of firm size; it is less clear whether this is uniformly 
the case within relatively narrowly defined industries, and in general little ana­
lysis has gone into ascerteining the precise reasons for the differentials. Dif­
ferentials tend to be a d~creesing function of the level of development of the 
country; they are, for exar.iple, wider in Japan than in the U.S. and wider in 
Colombia than in Japan. 
Information on value added/capital ratios is summarized in Table 12-~it 
should be noted that the measure of capital is not always the same one. The 
Japanese figures for 1956 and 1961 reveal a strikingly higher ;'output/fixed capi­
tal" ratio for the smaller firms, about 2:1 comparing the group 4-9 workers to 
1the 11over 100011 size in 1956 and 3:1 in 1961. 
1Perhaps the widening of this ratio had to do with the increasing concentra­
tion of industry, the increasing labor scarcity, etc., which made it necessary 
for smal.l firms to increase their capital productivity to remain competitive. 
During these years the wage differential diminished; the ,,alue added per person 
differential showed no genernl widening or narrowin3. 
Footnote 3 continu0d from _,Jrevi.ous page. 
and the traditional consut:pdon h::oits c1re,1 on the traditional output lines. In 
housing, furniture, food, drink c11,d clothinr, the mart~ets were varied and quite 
narrow, so they dictate~ small scale production. 
\ 
r • ;, ~. 
Table 12 
Output/Capital Ratios by Size of Firm, Selected Countries 
J.,_an~-i-ze_____l;...9_5_6__ · 1961 
(U of Index of Output/ 
~orkers) Fixed Investment 
· (1) (2) 
4-9 1.59 2.50 
10-29 1.36 2.22 
30-99 1.24 1.38 
100-299 0.98 0.94 
300-999 0.84 0.85 
..::_ 1,000 0.88 , 0.81 
Total 1.00 1.00 
l . 
Includes firms of 1-9 employees. 
India Pakistan Mexico 
1957 ·~ ~ ·•(Sj,...i_z_e--~-~19~6~5~~-· ·1960 
Output/ · Output/ Output/ (IJ of Output/ 
Total Assets Size Fixed Capita Real Capital workers) Capital 
' ((-)(3) (/♦) {5) 
2.101 I "small" 0-9 1.16 0 1.39 
(average 
3.70 I of 36 t0-19 0.33 1-5 1.17 
persons) 1.18.3.64 20-49 0.37 6-15 .63 
"medium" ,,. . 2.86 I (average 50-99 o.42 16-25 .53 \
of 311 D 
2.05 I pcroons) 0.95 > 100: 0.28 26-50 .so 0\ w 
I 
1.so I 11 larg~" 
·•. 
51-75 - .48 
(average . 
1,484 Total 0.29 76-100 •so 
1.79 I persons). o.32 ....,. ~i 
101-250 .46 
251-500 .46 




Sources: Column~ land 2 for 1956 and 1961 respectively come from Broadpridge, op. cit., P• 61. C~pital ~tock 
presunal,ly excludes inventories .arid working capital. 




Table 12 (cont.) 
enterprises of 1957. The assets were standardized in terms of the valuation used for tax purpo~.e, this being
neither a book value nor a replacement cost; since Japan had suffered severe inflation in the post-war perio4,
book values were far out of date and an attempt had been made to revise them. Since larger firMs apparently revise theifiiures upward more syste~~tically than small ones~ the data used here probably lead to some bias in cross- . · size comparisons, i.e. the downward bias in the measure of capitol is presumably r,reater for small than for larf.P firn-.s.; 
The! lntlian <lata arc fi,om Central Statistical Orr,anization (Industrial Statistics _winr,), Department of Statistics,
Covcrm::cnt of India, Calcutta, Annual Survey of Industries~ 1964: Capital, Emplovmcnt, Output Estim::ites for
F,1ctory Sector by Capital Sir.<!_, New lJclhi, Jnnuary 1968. In this report nize is clc~fined hy amount of fixed [;
capital \•:ith 11 .sr.iall" Ldng deflueJ an those of fixed capital (method of depreciation) up to and inchJ<ling RS Lakhs;
r.:cdiur:i--thosc with fixed capital depreciation over RS .SLakhs but not exceeding RS 25Lakhs, and large those with fixed
capital net of dcpreciriiton over RS 25Lakhs (page iii). Figures relating to establishments working entirely on leased 0
rer.tcd fixed assets were shown separately along with a few factories in respect of which no fixed capital details were
available. 
Column (5) is from Gustav Ranis, "Production Functio~ Market Imperfections and Economic Development," The EconomicJournal, Vol. LXXII, No. 286, June 1962, p •. 345. Here capital includes. the depreciated fixed capital stock, equipment,land and buildings as well as average inventory holding. · 
l'he !-Iexican data (Col. 6) are from Saul Trejo, Industrial Production and ManufacturinP, Employment Growth in Mexico,
Unpublished Yale PH. U. dissertation, 1971, p. 77. The definition of capital is presumably inclusive, although
it is not clear. · · 
The comparisons effected here suffer inevitably both from the difficulty of getting good capital estimates for a
single cou.~try, end the further problems of cross-country comparisons, where the capital variables differ by
country, quality of do.ta collection differs, ·etc. It is not possible here to recount even the major biases.
'Which cou1l'present in these do.ta. A few, mentioned by the ~uthors of the studies from which these figures co.me,
rn~y be worth mentioning. For Jupo.n, Shin~ara (in Hoselitz) noted that•in the relatively smaller firms the pro­
portion of lo.nd residence for personal use in the fixed assets is larger~ producing nn upward bias in the
s~nll firm figure relative to large firms. The relative shares of second-hand machinery in total fixed invest-
ment is higher in small factories. · · 
I 
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Column 3, which shows the relationship ·oetween v~lue added and a measure of 
total assets for 1957, indicates tha same general relationship except that the 
smallest size category (which includes some smaller firms than those included in 
the smallest size group in 1956 and 1961} has a lower output/capital ratio than 
the medium size categories; one hypothesis with respect to this phenomenon might 
be that inventories and working capital tend to be a larger share of total assets 
for the~e firms and are used relatively less efficiently by them than the fixed 
capital. 1 The lower output/capital ratio of the smallest firms relative to the 
next size category is a general phenomenon for all industries for which data is 
presented (see Hoselitz, EE.· cit., p. 47). The output/capital ratio reaches its 
maximum at a wide range of firm sizes, according to the industry, though most 
frequently in the range 10-99 workers. Even for firms of 1,000-2,000 workers the 
ratio is not below the overall industry average either in wood and wood products 
or in printing and publishing. So, although the general trend holds clearly 
across industries, there are substantial divergences in specified cases. 
The Indian data, while involving less categories (only 3) than others and 
being also somewhat non-comparable in that the size was defined by amount of 
fixed capital, show the usual general pattern. The decline in the output/fixed 
capital ratio between small and medium factories is not dramatic--it aµpears to 
be very similar to the decrease which the Japanese figures would show if the 
same group were isolated. The large firms, on the other hand, have an output/ 
fixed capital ratio only about one-third that of the medium ones; in this case 
they are very large indeed, ~ut it is striking that output/fixed ca~ital falls 
1uncertainty with respec~ to this data suggest one not speculate too far, 
however. 
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much more dramatically for India than for Japan over the comparable range of firm 
1 2sizes. ' 
The story told by Table 12 is unfortunately incomplete in one respect--the 
relative output/capital ratios for small firms (of, say, less thanlO workers) to 
the next higher size category. Both the Mexican and the Pakistani data indicate 
that the most important single dividing line is here, with the small firms having 
much higher output/capital ratios than all the rest; the Japanese output/fixed 
investment data sugsests that these firms have somewhat (but not greatly) higher 
output/capital ratios than the next category (though much higher than the totals) 
whereas the Japanese value added/total assets data suggests that medium size 
firms (10-99 employees) have substantially higher output/capital ratios than the 
smallest ones; even this series indicates that the smallest £inns have much higher 
output/capital ratios than the overall average. The Pakistan and Mexico data 
(Columns 5 and 6) show the usual relation with the smallest firms having an out­
put/capital ratio two or more times that of the next largest group, although 
1Since neither the Pakistani nor the Mexican data have categories isolating 
firms 1,000 and up, it is not possible to say whether they would be more akin 
to the Indian or the Japanese patterns, but at least the average value added/ 
capital figure in Mexico suggests tnat the ratio ~ould hardly decrease really 
dramatically with firm size (unless there were very few firms of very large size). 
Since the large size plants are very important in Indian manufacturing (they 
accounted for 65 percent of the value added in manufacturing in 1964--excluding 
cottage-shop undoubtedly)y this provides a hypothesis for India's stagnation-­
extreme capital intensity of a very important large scale sector. 
2Though it seems unlikely to be playing a very important role here, it should 
be noted that the classification by capital would, as pointed out earlier, be 
expected to lead,to a more dramatic decrease in output/capital over firm size 
than when the measure is number of workers. · 
3The information for Pakistan refers to four industries (textiles, light 
engineering, plastics, and leather and leather goods); the data was based on a 
sample survey of 530 industrial establishments carried out in Karachi in about 
1960. These four industries comprised about 80 percent of Karachi industrial 
capacity. 
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with remarkably little variation in the ratio for firms 6 (Mexico) and 10 (Pakistan) 
workers on up; only the very small firms have much higher capital productivity 
than the average. This result does not contradict the Japanese information (Column S) 
since the highly productive size groups in Mexico and Pakistan were smaller than 
the smallest in the Japanese case. In all of the cases presented the output/ 
capital ratio of firms of less than 10 workers is indicated to be at least 50 per­
cent greater than that of the average for the industrial sector as a whole; the 
uncertainty surrounds the relative output capital ratios of the smallest and next 
to smallest categories. 
The most common explanation of the higher output/capital ratio character­
izing small firms is the higher capital price/labor price ratio they tend to face 
1in the market. It is interesting that excess capacity is widely reported in the 
case of small scale industry~ and is usually attributed to lack of either working 
capital or of raw materials or both; lack of demand is also frequently mentioned. 
But it is interesting t:hat, despite the long array of "problems," the small scale 
firm remains apparently an efficient user of capital. 2 
In Table 13 the consistent tendency for large scale firms to have higher 
capital/labor ratios is clear. All the countries included, with the exception of 
Korea, show extreme ranges (a minimum of 4:1) between firms over 100 (300 in 
the case of the Japan "assets/labor" ratio) workers and the smallest size 
1Analysts who feel that economies of scale are important, or that larger 
firms tend to have "better" production functions, would argue that the dif­
ferent price ratio might not be a sufficient condition to generate a higher· 
output/capital ratio--the factor price ratio would have to be sufficiently 
different across firm size to offset the counteracting effect of the other 
factors mentioned. 
2tt can be argued that the difficulty of acquiring capital is, in fact, 
the cause of its high productivity in these firms. 
Table 13 
.. 
Capital Intensity by Firm Size, 
Selected Countries 
JnI?,an India:1964 Korea: 1968 Paklsten:1960 Mexico:1965 
Mining and Manufacturing 
Si7.e Index of Asncts/ Size Fixed Size Fixed As'oets/ Size Real Size Capital/
ii of Fixed Inventment/ Worker # ot Cnpital/ II of Worker H of Co.pital/ # of Worker
Worr.er::; Worker (1000 icn) Workers Worker Workers Workers Worker Workers 
(1956) (1961) (19:57) 
(1) (2) J]l J.!!.L £2.L JiL. -(7) 
0 4.3 
0-9 0.74 1-5 
, 
10.5 
14-9 0.32 0.17 69 .... .2895-9 
,, I 
•:, OI,10-29 o.46 0.28 78 10-19 .361 10-19 2.61 6-15 .31.5 CX>I. 
20-49 .381 20-49 3.23· 16-25 48.6 
26-50 57.5 
30-99 0~66 0.55 98 small 1.82 . 50-99 .391 · . 50-99 3.34 6") ,51-75 '- ·-
16-100 63.8 
' L00-299 1.21 1.06 181 ·100-199 .371 ~ 100 4.oa 100-250 8o.4 
200-499 .567 
251-500 96.2·
;,~00-5199 2.00 1.67 362 medium 3.66 ?:. .500 .729 z500 104.8 
,21000 2.18 2.40 ~625 large 15.41 
~ 
:otal · 1.00 1.00 289 na ·. 3.88 . 6·1 .9 -
,·
1Firms ot 1~9 employees 
• J ~Sources and Methodology: ·eo1s. (l)-(4.), (6) and (7) are from the s~e sources cited in..T.~~i-~ ·12~ C91UDJP 5 ·is 
from· Gustav Ranis, "Industrial. Sector Labor Absorption II Yale E"~'~tioidc :ciC>wth ·center 
Discussion Paper No. 116
1 
July 1971, page 32~ · · · ·,.?~·_,.. . ·,:"< 
·.. )· . ·------·· ';,•: ?: ·::: . ':·:::_:;_-____, ·~,;-
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1group. 
The wage differentials (see Table 14) show widely varying patterns across the 
countries included, which range from quite developed to quite poor. The U.S. and 
the U.K. clearly form one group (and apparently represent a typical pattern for 
the developed countries); differentials are quite small relative to the other 
countries. If, to facilitate cross-country comparisons, we roughly approximate 
the ratio 11wage in firms of 100-250 workers/wage in firms of five workers," the 
differential in the U.S. and the U.K. would be about 10-20 percent. Japan, India, 
and Pakistan appear to form another group with the ratio being typically a little 
less than 2:1, with a rather surprising similarity among the three countries. 
Mexico and Colombia form a third group, with a ratio on the order of 3:1. On the 
labor productivity side~ the U.S. and the U.I~. again show the smallest differ­
ential, less than or about equal to 10 percent in each case. Data are not avail­
able for India; Japan's labor productivity differential is on the order of 2.5:1 
while that of Pakistan appears to be less than the wage differential (note that 
wages were defined in hourly terms in-Pakistan), and perhaps as low as 30 percent. 
Again Colombia and Mexico stand out with the largest differentials; Mexico's is 
in this case less than 3:1, perhaps 2.5:1, while Colombia's appears to be the 
2widest of all, between 3:1 and 4:1. 
1Shinohara (££_. cit. in Hoselitz) distinguished three groups of two-digit 
industries in terms of the firm size-capital intensity relationship, with food 
and beverages, textiles, wood and wood products, printing and publishing and 
rubber products having relatively low association; paper and pulp, chemicals, 
glass and ceramics, primary metals and metai products on the other hand had a 
steep curve. Machinery, electrical machinery and transportation equipment had 
moderately steep curves--all very similar. These patterns are quite similar to 
those of the horse-power/worker ratio in Colombia, with only a few exceptions. 
(See Table A-10.) 
2This figure is somewhat deceptive, in that Colombia's labor productivity-­
firm size relationship is not monotonic, and the size category 100-199 has the 
highest labor product:!.vity, unlike the other countries. Also,·as pointed out 
elsewhere, the increase of labor prod<.1c:ivity with firm size is overestimated 
in the figures of Table~- · 
- l · --- -- ,
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Consistent with the cross-country comparison of wage differentials by size 
is the evidence of a recent dimunution in the differential for fast growing Japan; 
1according to Shinohara, the decrease has been substantial since 1951; in 1965 
the wage in category 4-9 was about 52 percent or 53 percent of the "l,000 and 
over" category, where in 1951 it was 42.3.percent.2 
Sumiya noted, with respect to 1960, that the wage differential by size of 
establishment in Japan was large only for the older workers, and was quite small 
for workers of less than 25 years of age; this hypothesis is of general interest 
¾ayohei Shinohara, Structural Changes in Japan's Economic Development, 
Kinokuniya Book Store Company, Ltd., Tokyo, Japan 1970, p. 308. 
2 .
Shinohara makes the interesting speculation, on which virtually no 
information is available, that today's LDC's may have had their large dif-
ferential only since World War II. (P. 312.) But in Japan. of 1909, when the overall 
figures showed no differential between the 5-9 and the 1,000 and above groups~ 
there was a 24.4 percent differential for males only across the same categories 
By 1914 when an overall 9.9 percent differential had appeared, the differ-
ential for males was 38.8 percent. It may have been that widening differ-
entials were occurring at this ti.~e even with most variables normalized for; 
in any case it is clear that the 1909 data does not provide evidence that 
differentials were ever absent if age, se:c, etc., had been normalized for. 
(See Shinohara, p. 311.) 
The overall differential has fluctuated considerably over time in Japan, 
and its sources have received much discussion in the literature. In 1909 
an overall finn size differential was not apparent though,as noted above, 
there was a differential for men taken separately; by 1925 it was noticeable 
and by the outbreak of the second World War still larger. The large firms 
tended to choose young and adaptable (particularly important when change 
and growth were rampant) people and pay them well--especially when the 
pattern of using rather systematic increases over the worker's career is 
taken into account; they selected the best young workers for permanent jobs-­
permanent until the comparatively early retiring age in Japan• 
.Nakamura explains the widening differentials at the end of World War I 
as due to the fact that big firms in heavy industry were obliged to employ 
skilled workers under the lifetime commitment system and when prices fell 
(1920-31) equilibrium wages feli in the smaller industries but were constrained 
by the previous comrr.itment in the larger ones. 
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1but seems to remain open to question in the Japanese context. 
Differen•tials in the Cost of Capital and in ti1e "Hage/Cost of Capital 11 Ratio 
Differentials in the cost of capital, or the price of purchase of capital 
goods--has received much less attention on a cross-industry or cross-firm size 
basis than have wag_es--the price of labor. 2 Data complexities again plague inter-
est rate comparisons, since care must be taken to include all the hidden com­
ponents of the total interest charge. One study in Japan found an interest rate 
differential of 11.5/17.4 for corporations with capital over 100 raillion yen 
compared to the ones with capital below 2 million yen. This probably understated 
the differential. 3 Putting this differential together with the wage differential 
1The ·ratio of wages in finns of more than 1,000 employees to wages in firms 
of 10-99 was 1.76, the ration was only 1.11 for people 18-20 years of age, and 
1.28 for people 25-30 years; it was 1. 77 for d1e age group with the widest dif­
ferential, 40-50 years. Sumiya conclucies that the fact that the overall dif­
ferential is as high as that of the 1\ridest differential" age means that in the 
large firms the propor::io:i. of older wor:ters (t,·ith relati,rely higher wages) .is 
greater. Thus if age were norma:izec across firms, he concludes that the 
differential would have only been 20 percent or so. Shinohara notes, however, 
that Sumiya consiC:.ered only regular wages and when bonuses are included there 
may be a much wider differential by size. (The fisures presented also apparently 
include temporaty weges.) Expenses for welfare facilities, and such items are 
apparently three times higher in large than in the smallest firms. The wage 
factor is; in any case, hard to interpret in Japan, since newly employed workers 
in large firms are primarily under a lifetime commitment with a steeply rising 
wage curve as a function of the length of their service while the workers in 
small enterprises are in a rather unstable condition as a result of the menace 
of firm bankruptcy, so the wage curve is not as steep. Even at age 18-20, the 
"permanent income" of the large firm employee may be much farther above that of 
the small firn worker than the figures indicate. 
2As has become clear already, however, the substantial attention to the 
wage differential issue has not yet thrown too great light on the extent to 
which different firms pay different amounts for the same quality labor. So in 
fact the situations are not so asymmetrical as might at first appear. 
3This study is referred to in Shinohara-Hoselitz, op. cit., p. 52. It is 
noted that the understatement may be clue to the fact that the calculation was 
made by dividing interest paid on "total borrowing plus debentures" by com­
panies; but in Japan it is customary for banks to retain a considerable part 
of a loan as a deposit, with this ratio being higher for smaller businesses. 
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found in the corporate enterprise survey, Shinohara concludes that the "by size" 
differential of the interest rate/wages ratio was 100:26. (This study refers to 
a postwar year--unspecified.) Another study indicated that the by size differ­
ence in the ratio at which loan applications were accepted was substantial, that 
ratio being over twice as high for firms of 200-299 workers as for firms with 5-29. 
I •-.--.,----•,.... 
In a study in India it was reported that small firms pay as much as three 
times what large firms pay for power, the price being particularly high in rural 
areas where they are often encouraged to establish themselves. In general there 
appears to be a raw materials problem, which leads to excess capacity in these 
firms. 
Scattered Evidence on the Growth and Change of Small Firms 
A rather comprehensive study of the development of technology in small plants 
in Japan1 indicated that the increasing use of electricity permitted small indus­
tries to employ electric motors instead of steam engines, and that the trend 
toward mechanization then became decisive. Technical progress in small plants 
was found to be more marked in the producer goods industries than in the con­
sumer goods industries, in the export industries than in domestically oriented 
ones, and in mechanized industries than handicrafts. It proceeded much more 
rapidly in the six big cities than in local or rural areas and in implanted in­
dustries rather than indigenous ones. The postwar dissolution of the zaibatsu 
and the increasing competition among big firms led to greater pressure on the 
subcontracting small and medium plants to advance their technological level. 
The persistent existence of the puttin?, out system in the prewar period had de­
terred the dissolution of petty handicrafts and stagnated technical progress 
in small-medium industry, but its weakened position after the war made capital 
accumulation and equipment improvement possible in this size range. Increasing 
labor costs were a factor and public policies toward s~all-medium enterprises 
were more comprehensive in the postwar period; from the 1920s on financial 
1Referred to by Shinohara, EE.· cit., p. 58, reference in Japanese. 
measures were introduced to save small industry puring crises and in. the postwar 
period the small-medium enterprise agency and the few small business financial 
institutions were set up. These may have contributed to the acceleration of 
technical progress. 
Relations Between Large and Small Firms 
In Japan especially, the relationships between smaller and larger firms have· 
been the object of extensive study. The prevalence of sub-contracting and its 
presumed importance in explaining the relatively large role of small-medium in­
dustry at present in Japan raises the hypothesis that the special characteristics 
of the Japanese case would make such close ties between small and large firlris···" . .. . . ·.· -· ~~. . . . . . . .. 
difficult to duplicate; and it might be difficult to duplicate the relative suc­
cess of the small firms without it. 
Many of the small firms have been and a.re complementary to the large ones 
in Japan. While the heavy reliance of big companies on sub-contracting does 
exist elsewhere, the Japanese economists have argued that it rests on different 
economic and social foundations in Japan. Many of the older workers of the. large 
·- ...·.. 
plants establish their own small enterprises when they retire; producing or pro-
cessing parts for their former employers. The large companies have always been 
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willing to give contracts to many tiny, small and medium-sized units. 
1 
The employment conditions of the temporary and sub-contracted labor are 
completely different from those of the regular labor force of the large firms-­
the only ones really characterized by the paternalistic welfare state image 
frequently drawn for Japan. There is little or no flow of labor from the small 
firm to the large--except for temporary or sub-contract employment--but a con­
siderable flow in the opposite direction. There is often heavy turnover in the 
small and medium firms, though not generally as a result of dismissals. At an 
earlier time small firm labor was more or less forced to be mobile. An important 
form of rural exodus of farm labor was into household income supplementing ac­
tivities, as in the case of femc1.le workers in textiles, etc. Such employment 
rose in prosperity and fell in depression, wi~h people then returning to the 
villages. This labor was highly mobile and lacked a permanent attachment to 
one enterprise; one result was that inter-firm or inter-industry trade unions 
could not easily be set up. It is generally agreed that there is a large enter­
prise labor market and a small enterprise labor market, with insufficient 
mobility in considerable part because of the existence of stronB enterprise 
1The story (see Broadbridge, ~·' cit., p. 69) of how a subordinate sub-
contractor producing for the large vehicle producer Isuzu got started is 
indicative. Although the company used mutual loans and bank funds for in­
vestment, one-third of its loans were guaranteed by Isuzu. The individual 
started his business on the basis of a verbal statement of the larger com­
pany that it would give him contracts. In spite of heavy borrowing the 
company remained dependent on Isuzu for the loan of some of the more expen­
sive machines, with the right to purchase after a few years. This machine-
. renting system presumably has advantages for both companies--it gives the 
assembler some control over the kind of machines used in the smaller company 
and makes technical assistance to it easier and more effective. (The accelera­
ted depreciation tax system gives the big firms a big incentive to 8et rid of 
their machinery quickly in Japan.) 
Typically a firm like this one, subcontracting for a very large one, would 
have still smaller subcontractors working for it.• The inter-firm flows are 
quite complex. 
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unions in the large enterprises. 
. .•. t. 
·shinohara says that before the Second World War, from the point of view of 
the larger firm, the purposes of using the subcontracting system were to avoid 
the dangers of economic fluctuations and to indirectly utilize cheap labor. the 
big corporations were not seriously concerned with how to reorganize or rational- · 
ize the production process of their subordinate enterprises; since the war, how­
ever, with new technology from abroad being introduced at an accelerated rate 
and interfinn and international competition intensified, this upgrading has be­
come an urgent problem and has received much attention from the large firms. 
An interesting explanation·of some subcontracting is that the very small 
scale plant does work.which is too intensive and dirty to fit into the operations 
upon which the larger plant concerttrates--the contrast of general working con­
ditions would be too great. 
Kitihara analyzed the co~petitive a11d complementary nature of small and 
large, according to T,;he·::her .there was competition, vertical interfirm hierarchy, 




He found that in the textile indus-
try technical progress in subcontracting plants tremendously surpasses that in 
non-subcontracting plants •. In the postwar period there has been a great decline 
·. -~\ .·~·-
in the position of·metchant capital in response to the increase in the supre-. .. 
macy of industrial: capital infinancing the small scale operator. 
The inter-firm size flo~8 for 1951 (see Table A-14) are interesting in 
showing the importance of the large firms as a source of inputs for the small 
ones, but the much smaller importance of the small firms as a source of inputs 
1
See Miyohei Shinohara, A Survey of .the Japanese Literature on Small Indus-
.fill in ·Bert_ F. Hoselitz,. The ~o1e of· Small Industry in the Process of Economic 
Growth, Moutont Co~, The Hag'ui:r> · 19(?~; ·P.• 17.2 . . . . 
Shinohara, £:e.· cit., p. 75. 
for the lar$e ones •.. rfuch more of ·small firm output (44.9 percent) went to final 
,· 
demand than of large firm o_utput (25.5). 
. . . .. . .. ).·~.-. . ., 
IV. Policy Lines Toward Smc1,ll Scale Producers 
The existing industrial structure, the potential of larger scale industry, 
and the ch,anging demand compos~tion qf the population all affect both the optimal 
and the actual extent and nature.of small scale industry. With respect to each 
f--:.:·.\... · _. 
type ·of prod-µct'~'tl:ie increasing· availability of capital shoulc make possible a . . . 
.gradtially,-increasing c~pital/labor ratio and this is likely to be associated (at 
least it has historically been associated) with larger scale firms; the optimal 
rate of this transition·obvio:usly depends on the nature of technological change 
as well as the i~creasing availability of capital, in particular on whether those 
changes tend to increase more·.~he potential productivity of large scale or of 
small scale firms. For many reasons, the "actual'; size distribution of firms or 
plants may not foliow th.e./s.ame path as the optimal distribution, so the displace­
ment of handicraft by factory production may la$ or lead the optimal, as may the 
decrease (if it occurs) in the im1Jortauce of the small scale factory relative to 
1the larger one. · 
. · ·Among ~he -iniportai:it trends .in the structural change in industry in Colombia 
are (a) a: ~rob~ble de.<;J';~$..e in importance of small scale plants within the fac­
tory sector; 2 (b) overall, a probable decrease in both relative and absolute 
1there is little issue:in the literature as to whether handicrafts are 
displaced in development; but specialists t1ote that small scale factories do 
• , a 
not necessarily suffer any relative decline. _see Staley and Morse,~- cit. 
2As observed earlier, the data are not yet available to ascertain whether 
there has been increasing concentration in laree firms over the post-1953 or 
post-1956 period; but it seems probable that some increase has occurred. 
... 
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terms of employment in the cottage-shop subsectorover a period including-1938-51 
(with a particularly dramatic decrease in the number of women in cottage-shop 
industry during the 40s and early 50s) followed apparently by a leveling off or 
··::;.._:.·.. . 
increase in the late SOs ·and _the ·6"0s; (c) a substantial long-run decrease in the 
importance of rural cottage-shop production and a rapid increase in urban produc-
. 
tion; finally, (d) substantial shi~ts in the two digit composition of small scale 
pr9duction, (~~_pecial;J.y ~ott~g~-shop-but also-small scale factory), sometimes 
_. ..:~~ . ..· .. ;_.,,._~~~/··:-·\·· .. -.->... ~.-- .f·'.. 1 ~·- __ :. ·- 1 
associated witn,•it~:displace¢~nt''by,;ta:rge scale producers• 
. ~ .• . . . .. ,. 
·-· ·_ .... '; ~ 
In the structuring_-o/·.i··:;61:icy toward small scale factory and cottage-shop 
... ~-- . ' 
production, one must take-into account: (1) the size of the small scale sub­
sector in a given industry in _·reiatidn to its optimal size; (2) the projected 
. : ...;' ·...·- ' •. . 
. : ,. -~ . 
future trend of the optimal shareof small.scale producers in the industry; 2 
1 
e.g., decliniri~C-i~po:r;ta#~~)9~;~lothing~footwear and rapid increases in 
transportation equipJ1ent'1 ·· wooC:~n',~lritp,iture, and other subsectors.2 .... ·. . ,·: .. ·.· .·.••.. 
Consider Diagram 10 0 represeritin·g_ the situation of a product which will, 
optimally, be incr~asingly 11rdducecl iµ large scale plants as development pro­
ceeds, either hecaus,r-~there are ecoiiomies of-scale in the "lroduction process 
itself, or because of.· the crea ter ease of organization in larger plants when the 
capital/labor.ratio is high (organizational economies of scale). The optimal 
share of prpduction in small.scale plants is given by the curve 00'. Suppose 
the actuai.productiori.in the small scale sector between t=O and t=l is 
shown by. the path AA'~ · Then the policy question at point of time t=l is how 
much (ifat all) and by what steps to move actual output closer to the long run 
optimal output. . 
Since th~. optimal path for. any such economic variable from a given point 
in time on is gen~rally, :a.:ffe.cfed by its historical path, the only unequivocal 
way of defining the· path' -of 'the optimal small scale share over time involves the as­
sumption that.no policy'mistakes are made at any point in time. And it does not 
follow from the fact tha~ the actual share is below that indicated by 00' 
(indicating that mistakes have been made) that policy should_be directed to raise 
the small scale share to the optimal_J;evel, so defined. One must consider a con­
ditional optimal path starting at t=l--conditional on what has already happened. 
(e.g., the dashed line A 1 0 ); it is·probable that this optimal curve will never 
touch 00'; especially in sftuations where the long range trend of the optimal 
path is down, and where there are substantial costs to revitalizing the small 








.... '. .:;;·.,~· ~:: :;1:.;:· ~ 
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(3) the best policy steps to move the production and employment in the small scale 
sector toward the optimal level where ·1optima1·• presumably takes into account 
whatever criteria are relevant for the ~eclsionmakers, including maximization of 
total output, improvement of income distribution, employment, etc. 
The optimal share of the small scale sector in the output of a given product 
depends both on the technologies available for small scale production and also 
those available and/or typically used in large scale production, with particular 
importance attaching to the feasible range of the capital/output ratio in the 
1large scale sector and possibly its skilled labor/ output ratio. 
If it may be assumed, as seems plausible, that the small scale sector should 
receive positive attention (to expand it or prevent encroachment by the large 
scale) then a number of points are worth making in the formulation of a strategy 
to improve its situation. First, different scales of production will be appro­
priate in different industries. It is characteristic of the clothing and foot­
wear and the textiles subsectors that a high share of all cottage-shop produc­
tion is by independent workers; a high share (perhaps around 50 percent) charac­
terizes the wooden furniture branch, and a lower share (perhaps a third) the 
food subsector, with thi~ component being smaller for most of the rest of the 
small scale industries, among which are found those with probably greatest promise 
Footnote 2 continued from p. 80 • 
. 
organizational and infrastructural expenditures inadvisable, even though they 
would have otherwise been appropriate. -And in the short-medium run, of course, 
competing large scale industry will be disposed (if forced) to sell at variable 
costs-as opposed -to the total costs which it would take into account in setting 
up production--ruaking .nrvival in the short run more difficult for a rapidly 
expanding small scale s,?ctor. 
1This is important in evaluating the potential for the natural alternative 
method of achievin~ higher output capital ratios--trying to encourage large 
scale firms to be moi:e labo~ intensive. 
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for long-run growth. 1 Polj_cy requireci to deal Hith independent workers, firms with 
a few--say three or four worl,;.ers--and thosa? with say five to twenty-five might. 
· well be quite different. 
Secondly, it is important to analyze carefully the reason for the superiority 
of small scale production in certain lines in order to assure that the impact of 
policy is not, at the same tirae that it benefits small scale producers, to make 
them less efficient from a social point of view. One reason, for example, for 
the good output/capital ratios may simply be the high price of capital; a credit 
policy which lowered this price might lower their social efficiency. 
2 
Third, policies whose primary objective is to increase the number of firms 
and those whose primary objective is growth of existing firms could be quite di£.,. 
ferent, and this is an important question of strategy. An aspect of the policy 
of increasing the number of firms involves avoitling the failure of firms which 
start out and collaps'a? for 11 artificial" reascns--artificial in the sense that 
they do not imply productive inefficiency on the part of the fim. 
1For the sectors not mentioned, taken together, the ratio of independent 
workers to all cottage-shop workers is about 30 percent. The transport 
equipment sector bas only a little over one-fifth of its cottage-shop total_ 
as independent T!orker~. It appears that the independent worker tends to be 
a creature of the production of consumer goods (although machinery is a not 
insignificant exception) and of older technologies; but more in-depth analysis 
would be necessary to defend such a relationship. 
2The issue is, of course, more complicated than this may imply but the 
general point should not be disregarded. If the capital market can be cor­
:rectly described as dualistic, improving it would involve raising the price 
of capital to large firms and lowering it to small ones; the natural result 
of this would be raised output/capital rat~os for the larger £inns and lowered 
ones for the small ones. there is likely to- be gain of overall. effiency 
of capital use. In other words, there is loss of overall efficiency wl:ien a 
small firm 0/K ratio falls towards the average as part of a redistribution 
of capital which also raises a large firms 0/K ratio towards the average. 
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Some Expert Judgments on the Role of Small Scale Industry in LDC's 
Before turning to aspects of small scale development more or less specific to 
Colombia, it is wortl1 noting briefly the general attitude of students of small 
industry to its future role, and the reasons for their beliefs. Staley and Morris
1 
observe that over time the outlook is for artisan industry to be transformed, 
2
household industry to be replaced and small but modern factories to be developed. 
Artisan opportunities will be no less in the modernized economy but they will be 
different so that government policy should stress adaptation of the artisan to 
the newly emerging conditions. Household industry has many drawbacks but some 
measures are appropriate for making use of it during a transitional period. 
There is some predictability in the kind of product which small factories are 
gradually able to undertake successfully so experience of other countries can be 
useful. 
In the latter part of the nineteenth century both liberal economists and 
1Staley and Ho_rris, op. cit. p. 23. 
2staley and Horris distinguish small industry in terms of its relatively 
low specialization and management, close personal contacts, handicaps in securing 
...'~i;...'" capital and credit, and large numbers. of such units--this latter implying 
different development techniques--and. the large group techniques especially 
used for small industry development.· ~ugene Staley and Richard Morris, Modern 
Small Industry for Developing Countries, HcGraw Hill, New York 1965.) They dis­
tinguish modern from the traditional small industry in terms of output, product 
and product design, physical technology of production, and social technology of 
organization and management." Another key distinction is that between non-factory 
and factory forms of small industry. 
The factory is distinguish~d from artisan industry by a greater division of 
labor and production and as a result the manager rather than the craftsmen or 
artisan is the_ central figure. The intermediate putting out system has consider­
able importance_ in ·newly industrializing countries and its remnants or special 
aspects exist in i1ighly industrialized countries. 
Although relations are far from close, the authors suggest that industrial 
firms with as many as 100 employees generally require a substantial amount of 
specialization within manap;ement and therefore this figure is a reasonable upper 
limit for small industry, Ir. the Colombia study carried out by the Stanford Re­
search Institute, th'? authors observed that the beginnings of specialization in 
management could be seen in a num;:,er of firms of 35-40 employees and more in 
firms of 65-75. (See Stanfr=d Research Ins ti· tute--Sinall I 1 di- anc i e um Industry in
Colombia's Development, ;Janco Popalar, 1?62, Bogoa.------..:...;;~~-==:::.:::.:..!:...,.;!::!!. 
Marxists expected progressive elimination of the artisan by factory competition; 
these predictions have proved false, with this group actually showing a long-run 
increase according to evidence from a number of industrialized countries. 
While the artisan in industrially advanced countries has been pushed out of 
the production of shoes, ceramic wares, textiles, eating utensils, furniture, and 
tools for farmers and mechanics, there have been expanded opportunities for re­
pairing these articles; installation opportunities, frequently coupled with sales, 
fall in the same category. New products and technologies and changing income 
distribution have brought new sources of employment. 
In Germany where artisanry has been well organized since the middle ages (and 
for which there are very good statistics) there has been a long range upward trend 
in the number of artisans per 1,000 inhabitants. For a long time the competitive 
struggle was _the dominant relationship between artisanry and industry, but there is 
now a basically mutual coi;uplemer.tarity. 
The optimistic predictions with r~spect to sma.L.L tactories are based to a 
large extent on the history of these in the developed countries. The share of 
small factories in manufacturing employment demonstrates a surprising stability 
since the first World War in most of the industrialized countries, including the 
U.S. 1 The authors su13gest that for present day LDC's one might expect that for 
a variety of reasons the large factories would develop ahead of small ones; at 
this stage there is an excluded middle until indigenous private enterprise itself 
turns to modern small scale manufacturing. And until. this happens the efficiency 
2of the whole industrial complex suffers. In such situations the small factories 
1 see Staley and Morris, Figure 2. 
2 .. 
It is interesting that in West German¥, U.K._and the U.S. the percent of 
manufacturing employees in firms of less than 100 employees is around26-27 and the 
percent of manufacturing output around 23; one might hypothesize that there is a 
sort of equilibrium level to which the relative labor productivity in small fac­
tories (vis a vis large ones) approaches as development proceeds. In no case is 
value added per worker much below that of larr,e industry for the particular. 
developed countries shmvn. 
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can be expected to gain an increasing share of output and employment over time and 
they should wind up with a bigger role that that currently played in the highly 
industrialized countries. 
The policy maxims of these authors a~e to promote modernization, selective 
growth, management improvement, technological improvement and complementarity, 
in the different types and sizes of industry. They argue that government policy 
should neither reward nor penalize smallness as such; special concessions should 
be approached with caution. Major types of developmental measures begin with the 
management improvement triad of (a) industrial counselling services, (b) training 
for entrepreneurial managers and supervisory personnel and (c) industrial research 
services. 
One mistake to be avoided is the introduction of obsolete crafts, as in the 
case of handloom weaving in Ceylon in the 30s. In Equador a 1953 "law for the 
defense of the artisan" shields him from taxation and in so doing discourages 
him from enlarging his enterprise or mechanizing it, either of which could cause 
him to lose the exemption. The vocational and adult training system in Ecuador 
helps to perprtuate the poverty of the artisans by producing each year hundreds 
of people to enter already depressed fields such as dress and shoe making, while 
training few or none in the expanding fields like radio repair, typing, and hair­
dressing. 
An occupational advisory service closely connected with the office responsi­
ble for general manpower planning could perform the function of steering indivi­
duals toward the expanding sectors. There is usually a real shortage of people 
to repair radios, pumps, etc., in many rural areas of developing countries. A 
counciling service should be useful with respect to these service trades. 
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Experience shows that the weakness of many artisans who work alone or operate a 
small shop is not so much in technical proficiency as in the finding and manage­
ment of their enterprises. 
A promising avenue for moderate numbers of artisans is artistic handicrafts; 
even in generally poverty stricken countries like India the increasing urban in­
comes create a substantial demand. Both artistic sense and quite good business­
especially marketing--sense are required here. Many countries have ruined pro­
mising export opportunities by things like flooding a particular market or by 
supplying poor quality goods. 
It is a moot point the extent to which traditional craft skills are help­
ful in the shift to factory production; the concensus seems to be that there is 
not much carryover for traditional artisan skills and the artisan may even be· 
worse off than the farmer since he has more to unlearn. 
The history of industrial development in England, Europe and America shows 
that artisans, especially master craftsmen who are already small entrepreneurs, 
were an important source of entrepreneurial talent in the development of the 
factory system, perhaps next in significance after merchants. There is evidence 
that this group is an important source at present in the LDC's also. 
Promising Sectors for Small Factory Growthg as Judged by Patterns in More Developed 
Countries 
Hopefully some feel for the path of optimal small scale share in various 
sectors of production is provided by the statistics from more developed countries. 
To choose likely candidates for small scale expansion, it is necessary to analyze 
at a disaggregated level, but broad patterns are still of some interest. Table 
A-15 shows the share of 8mall factories (here defined as establishments with 10-99 
employees) in total factory employment in a selection of countries; while the 
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figures include what would be more appropriately called medium sized factories in 
Colombia, they are somewhat indicative. A comparison of Colombia's small-medium 
share with that of other countries indicate a few sectors in which Colombia is 
well below the medi~rt' t:oU:ntry:;:~~}Qmbia· is at about the median level of income of 
the set- of cou11tr;,_~~·-:;tii~l~d;~~~r::~~~~e are beverages, furniture and fixtures,.·- .,,., .~ 
leathe~ and leathe; produ~ts, and textiles. The relative importance in Colombia 
..·;•.'. , . . 
of the small-medium sector is·above the ne1ian in a few industries, especially 
in tobacco products and fabricated metal products. 
In a study referring to Latin America, ECLA notes that the small scale pro­
ducers' (here m~aning plants of say 5 to 25 or 5 to SO workers) contribution to 
total factory employm~nt and value added is consistently important for food, 
wearing apparel and fooavear, wood and cork, furniture and fixtures, printing, 
publishing and allied industrie~, non-metallic minerals, and metal products.
1 
Chemical products antl ~ransp~rt material are also sometimes quantitatively im­
portant. Typically quite unimportant are tobacco, textiles, pulp and paper, 
rubber, petroleu~ products, and basic metals. Small scale industry's contribu-
. .. 
tion to employment and value added seems to remain stable or grow as development 
progresses in printing and publishing, metal products, and machinery. For 
furniture and fixtures it seems to.decline sharply in the more developed coun­
tries according to this study. Labor productivity increases notably with firm 
size in beverages, tobacco, pulµ and paper, chemicals, non-metallic minerals, and 
basic metals, while tendinB to be independent of size or in some cases diminish 
in textiles, wearing apparel and footwear, wood and cork, furniture and fixtures, 
1 . 
See "Small Scale Industry• in the Development of Latin America," Economic 
Bulletin for Latin America, Vol. 12, No. 1, Hay 1967, United Nations, New York, 
1967, p. 69. 
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leather and hides, and trans?ortation equipment. 
The similarity of the patterns in Colombia with those referred to as typical 
for Latin America as a whole are striking. The share of small-medium plants in 
factory employment is already high in Colombia in the three sectors cited as ones 
wliere :1:h~t·,·shi;f"e}typically remains stable or grows with development, i.e., print­
ing·- -~::\·;l~:ii~~i~g, metal products, and machinery. 
Alternatives for Imorovi~g _the Perspectives of Cottage-Shop and Small Scale 
Producers 
Whatpolicy initiatives would best permit the economy to take more advantage 
of underutilized potential in the small scale sectors? Among the candidates are 
the following: (1) more credit, (2) relieving problems of technology, difficulties 
of-. ascertaining the best production process and other aspects of organization, 
and adaptation, (3) improved management capacity and training, (4) improved infra-
structure, i.e., elect:ricity, etc., (5) better markets. 2 Problems of factor and 
product market conditions are frequently referred to in surveys of small scale 
industry. 
1To some extent, though not entirely, this is the reverse side of the coin 
· from 11what problems do _small scale producers have?" The two are not the same 
since some of the problems of small scale producers may in fact have no resolu­
tion. This could be the case re the frequently mentioned "lack of demand" that 
some producers face; if in fact there are not many alternative lines for small 
producers to go into, or existing lines are not growing, they may crowd heavily 
i~to:.monopolistically competitive sectors where the addition of a new producer 
reduces the demand for and output by other producers, so that all perceive a 
situation of "lack of demand." Other problems, too, may have something of this 
element in them~ e.g., "lack of credit':~' when credit is given at subsidized 
rates, many people feel that it would be better to have more but this 11 need" may 
have no meaning in·an a8gregate sense since there is simply not enough credit 
to go around without creating inflation. 
2Where a marketing probleJ11 is defined as a situation in which a potential 
market for a firm's product exists, but for some reason it is difficult to get 
access to that market, or where the raw materials.needed exist, but it is diffi­
cult to get tnem. 
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Another way of classifying approaches to the strengthening of small scale 
production is to distinguish (a) policies to promote the growth of promising 
existing firms, (b) policies to prevent firms going out of business, and (c) 
policies to promote an increasing number of small scale firms. 
Finally, one may distinguish policies which focus on weaknesses in govern­
ment policies (infrastructure, etc.), policies which focus on difficulties in the 
firm (technology~ management, etc.), and policies which focus on problems in 
markets, by which one might broadly include the problems the small firm may have 
in competing with lc1.rge scale oligopolists or near monopolists, the lack of 
1complementary relationships bet~1een small and large scale firms, etc. 
Opinions have varied with respect to which are the most important obstacles 
and potential areas of improYement in terms of benefitting the small scale pro­
ducers. In a majo~ study done for the Banco Popular in the early 60s, the 
Stanford Research Institute analyzed the potential of small and medium industry. 2 
The study classHied industries both accordj_ng to growth prospects (metal prod­
ucts, transport equipment including repairs~ chemicals and chemical products, 
• \$'..-.;:,machinery including repairs, clo~hing and footwear, and food products . ... .~ 
1iiote that, at least judging from the statistics available from 20 years ago 
in Japan, the interre:.tationship between large and small firms was sufficiently 
significant so that if large firms preferred neither to buy from nor to sell to 
small ones, this woulc. have directly affected up to 35-40 percent of the output 
of those firms (calculated crudely as the sum of inputs purchased by small firms 
from large ones and the sum of outputs sold by small firms to large ones). The 
total effect cculrl be greater or less than this, depending on whether the same· 
firms bought fro~ dnd sold to large ones, and on indirect effects. 
2stanford Research Ir1~titute and Banco Popular, Small and Medium Industry 
in Colombia's DeveJ.op~1en~, June 1962. Their definition of small industry was 
firms wi tc. 10 er n:·::ire wor1ce:cs and assets of less than 500,000 pesos--at ·that 
time the '.:>fficfal ei:change :.:-ate was between i and 9 peso3 to the U.S. dollar; 
medium industry was rlefine~ as fi:cms with less than 100 persuns and assets of 
500,000 to 2 million pesos. This particular suh-set of industry had grown 
rather rapidly :i..n the pei::;.cd 1953;..1959 but still accounted for a minority of 
all people engaged :!..n_ t!'le ind,li:;t:r:l.al ~ector at the time. 
... ·, 
came out highe:st--see·p. 39) a,nd according to "priority for development assistance" 
which allowed also for importance .i.n the develo9r:ient·process but which includes 
basically the same list of industries plus non-metallic mineral products and electrical 
machinery and apparatus, 1 The majority of the 120 firms intarviewed had quite high 
growth potential, and the study in general supported the conclusion that Colombia 
was not short of good entrepreneurial talent at this level. At the same time the 
· importance of a development assistance corporation to specialize in general and specific 
help on production and financing problems was felt to be very important. Shortage 
of finance itself was said to be the key problem for many of the firms; for.example, 
of the 70 firms judged to have great growth potential, about 60 percent were thollght· 
to be capable of expanding with financial assistance alone. Overall, the picture. 
drawn was one of great potential; many firms would be able to progress substantially 
just with credit,
2 
while at the same time some form of technological assistance would 
also be quite productive. 
In general ~t·was felt that growth prospects were a negative function of current 
size so that small e.rms with assets of less than 200,000 pesos had less potential; 
the authors noted that most of the high potential growth firms in percentage terms 
were, nevertheless, likely to be found in this category. 
This Stanford Research Institute study focussed on the small and medium factory 
sector--not on household or artisan industry (in the sense of Staley-Morris). It'·"· . ·· 
should thus be born in mind that these conclusions do not refer to firms of below say 
10 or 15 workers, the category on which we have placed much empha_sis here. 
The ILO mission felt that there were thrae chief ~bstacles to the development 
of small scale industry (by which term they referr~d to the 5-200 workers catego;y). 3 
Most important was thP. lack of access to credit, especially for working capital. 
Op. cit.: p, 41. 
2
This conclusion must be temperP.d by the fact that when 
subsidized, some inef:ficient iJ.rms woulJ be able to grow and 
get enough of it~ 
credit is sufficiently 
prosper if they could 
3
See ILO, A Program fo_~ull_ Employment, Geneva, 1971. 
l 
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Second:iwas the need for technical assistance, especially ir. 
the choice of technologies~ in management, and in organization. Finally, the need 
for assistance to help small entrepreneurs iGentify the lines of activity which 
would fit the development needs of the economy was cited. The last two points, 
they felt, could become the responsibilities of some agency specialized in·the 
problems of small industry; while SENA has contributed in the question of technical 
assistance on manage~ent techniques and organization, they felt that much more is 
needed in this respect. The mission strongly supported the idea of an institute 
of technical assistance to small industries. 
Planeacion, in its survey of small·-medium industry1 also concluded that 
credit was the most promising route to help the sector. 
A survey carried out by Acopi ascertained the felt needs of small and medium 
producers. The most frequently cited need was working capital (over 70 percent 
of the firms), but this is frequently a deceptive response, as is the second most 
frequently mentioned 1'high cost of produc.tion. •1 "Sales:i was third and each of 
"organization,u i;transportation, 11 techniques of production,n and "skilled per­
sonnel" received between 35 and 42 percent respons~ as problems. The results 
of this survey are very difficult to interpret as a result of lack of precision 
in the questioning. 
Existing Institutions of Relevance 
A number of organizations dot the scenario of small scale industry in 
Colombia, but overall there is little evidence that they have constituted much 
of a force in its favor. It is perhaps useful to classify the institutions 
i~to .(a)" basicaiiy credit givers, (b) organizations mainly involved in research 
1Planeacion Nacional, El Desarrollo ••• EE.• cit. 
\ 
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and extension, and (c) pressure groups. Vari0us combinations of these functions 
may characterize specific organizations, but most tend to fall primarily in one 
category. 
Credit Institutions 
The major sources of credit to this subsector have been discussed at length 
in Planeacion's study; in 1969 these loans were estimated to be 460-600 million, 
of which 200 million were from officialinstitutions,1 90 million was from the 
financial corporations, and 27C-460 from the private commercial banks. While the 
availability of credit remains much inferior for the small and medium industry 
to that of the large, it appears to have improved markedly in the last 5 years 
with the creation of the Fondo--now th~ biggest source of official credit for 
small and medium industry--and tae replacement of the Banco Pooular's role in 
this regard by the Corpora~.!..}'i-nanciera Popular. 
It seems safe to say that, at least up until 3 or 4 years ago, the banking 
system as a whole gave short shrift to the budding small scale producer. The 
problems are demonstrated in part in the rather abortive histories of two programs 
designed to benefit small scale industry--that of Banco Popular, and the Caja 
Agraria's small industries program. The Banco Popular was founded during the 
Rojas dictatorship, and had at that time something of a popular image--an image 
which subsequently waned. 
While the distribut.ion of its credit has been different from that of the 
1Of the 200 million of official credit in 1969, the 3 major sources were 
the Corporation Financiera Ponular (56.6 million), Fonda Financiero Industrial 
(105 million, corresponding to a total generation of new loans of 161 million 
via the 2/3-1/3 system) and the Caja Agraria (54.7 million). 
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commercial banks as a whole, the term ''popular" is misleading with respect to this 
bank, whose mentality has unfortunately never differed significantly from that of 
the regular commercial banks in terms of either function--to loan in a profit­
making way to bankable projects or individuals without taldng into consideration 
the productivity or distributional impact of the loans--or banking technology-­
essentially an accounting technology which focuses more on the insurance provided 
by the assets of the firm against any loss on the bank's part than on the pro­
ductivity which the loan may have to the individual or society, as measured by 
: the worth of the project» the quality of the manager etc. When the Rojas 
government terminated, the other large banks wished to have an end of the Banco 
Popular but Alfonso Lopez, Sr •• argued.strongly against this; the Banco de la 
Republica made a large loan to the Banco Popular and gave it such special condi­
tions (no taxes or required payment of dividends, no forced investments, etc.) 
that it could hardly fail asa bank. But, as mentioned above, its "popular" 
image has waned. 
The Caja Agraria 1 s program represents the oldest attempt of the official 
institutions' to help small and medium industry--in this case especially indus­
try related rather closely to the agricultural sector. It began in 1964, sup­
ported by AID, with the goals of improving productivity, keeping the rural worker 
in the country, and helping industrial decentralization. One condition of most 
of the loan program :!.s the acceptance of direction from the Caja in the use of 
the credit. 
The Caja program has been promising in some respects. Eleven percent of. 
all firms in the medium and small sectors were attended by it in 1969; an esti­
mated 13 percent of the :oans t·1ent to firu1s of less than 5 workers. But total 
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loans from the prcgra:.n have decreased in real terms from 1965 to 1969, a· rather 
inauspicious trend cor.sidering the founding was only in 1964. Both the number of 
1advisors and the resources allotted have apparently been limited. Yet the program 
2seemed to show promise in a number of respects. ' 
1Planeacion, ,Q,£• cit.) p. 64. The Caja program has had a problem with bad 
debts, one source of its reputation as a somewhat unsuccessful program, and presumably 
of its scaling down over the years. Some oaservers feel, however, that his relatively 
unsuccessful experience is not necessarily generalizable, due to the small range 
of types of industries (largely processing of agricultural products), and may be 
partly explained by the perhaps less than average skills of the entrepreneurs who 
go into these lines; the firms a=e freque~tly located in rural areas and small 
towns, where entreprer.eurial taJ.ent for small and medium scale industry may be more 
limited than in the larger cities. 
2An analysis of the pro3ram (see E. Do Coolige y Otros, Informe Sohre el 
Programa de Credj_to Ir..du~x:~al Dii:igido~ Caja de Credito Agrario, Industrial y Hinero, 
Bogota, fetrero, 1969) shows t:,e. typical pattern-good growth potential of many 
firms, and none for o·thers. In ..: sampl8 of 178 cou:panies very successful overall 
growth seemed to be: occur.r:.ns; the average employment growth was 9 percent, sales 19 
percent, profits 1/ pet"cent; ?ifty per:ent of the companies showed a strong growth 
potential. llut about :W perr:e·:!t d:l'.c: not grow or decreased in size. 
Sine~ they are beneficiaries of a c:-edit ?rogram it is to be expected 
that this set of fim.s perfo:!:'ro. somewhat better than appears to be the general case 
for small firms; the results ma} be interprt>.ted as suggesting that expansion of 
credit programs ~.,ould pay of:'.: very wel.i... 
A study of the Caj .i I s smalle".' ·'under 20,000 pesos11 loan program throws a little 
light on how typical or atypical the rec~pients may have been. This study (see 
Frederick C. Riebe, Analisis del Programa de Prestamos Industriales Menores de 
20,000, Caja <le Credito A~rario, Industrial y Minero, 1970) showe<l that in 1969 the 
users had an average of 2.7 obreros per firm, and average net sales of 58,000 pesos, 
total assets of approximately 63,000 and an average credit request of 7.5 thousand. 
In 1968 even the firms \lith 5-9 workers and an average of 5.25 paid workers 
(presumably almost all obreros) he.d average value of product of only 46. 7 thousand 
pesos. It appears that the typical firm with about 2:1 work~rs might have had sales 
(in 1969) of say, 30,000 pesos. In other words, the credit recipients were well 
above average in capital/worker and output/worker. 
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The Corporacion Financiera Popular and the Fondo Financiera Industrial show 
much more favorable trends in their loans but they deal with larger firms than 
·. ·-.... . .the Caja program. 
The median size of firms attended in the Caja directed-credit program 
was probably around 10 employees,(excluding the "less than 20,000 pesos program") 
and perhaps 325,000 pesos ·of total assets; for the Corporacion Financiera Popular, 
the median total assets of credit recipients was 700,000; for the Fondo Finan­
ciera Industrial it was 1.2 million. For the Fondo, the median loan was recieved 
by a firm with about 25 workers. Since the Fondo is the biggest_o~ the three 
credit institutions, it seems likely that over half of all credit from the three 
went to firms with more than 25 workers. 
Apart from the difficulty of attendinr, successfully to the needs of so many small 
firms, there have been a numbe::- of "institutional" obstacles to a successful 
program in this area to date- One d:i.rector of the Corporacion Financiera com-
mented that it is often dange~ous to give either too much credit or too little 
to the small producer, the former may lead to or imply a switch to a larger and 
different type of organizetion which may innundate the man whose experience and 
too little can fail for obvious reasons.expertise does not run alone those lines; 
Even though this manager felt that the small firms have plenty of potential, 
he noted that if traditional banking rules are followed, it often appears that 
there is no one to loan to; the Corporacion Financiera has had to go out look­
ing. The need to physically visit the small firm is fairly obvious (it parallels 
the agricultural extension workers' need to visit farms) but difficult to get 
through to people of the traditional banking mentality. 
In Colombia access to credit is a prj_vilege (and has substantial wealth 
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effects) • Typically the manager of a bank ta1'-.es care of friends and people he 
likes or feels responsible to; someone frore the other end of the social stratum 
does not expect or look for credit--his past experience with the credit institu­
tions has often been unsuccessful both from the financial point of view and from 
the social point of view (i.e., in terms of the way he is treated). He may react 
negatively as soon as he sees the typical, somewhat luxurious, office of a fairly 
large bank. 
The Corporacion Financiera Popular has recently been tryi'.9g to chanse its 
credit giving techinques, to focus more on the antec2dents and characteristics 
of the individual seeking credit-the things which should determine his potential 
as a successful producer--a~d less on the financial or accounting side. Even 
.in the range of 300,000 to one million pesos of gross assets and 20 to 100 
workers, where the Corporacion focuses its efforts, many of the firms do not 
have accounting, and lcanin3 is difficult both by old banking standards and 
newer ones. 
A further problem of the credit institution revolves around the definition 
of small scale indu~try; the definition must be a careful one--there are a 
good number of subsidiaries of larger firms in the small size categories, and 
there are firms owned by people with substantial other interests. It is most 
important to try to ascertain all such connections. No study has as yet been 
done on the lines oi control running between small firms and the rest of the 
economy. In the context of reeio~al diversification~ a serious complication 
is the possibility that giving credit in a place like Pasto may be the stimulus 
which leads the firm--ncw expanding, needing a bigger market, generating higher 
income for the mana;;er w!-:o therefore desir"'s to live in some affluence--to move 
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to a larger city like Cali. 
Institutions Primarily Fo~ussi.-,.g on Research and Extension 
In this to date relatively underdeveloped field ar.e found the Instituto de 
Investigaciones Tecnologicas,-FICITEC, SENA and several others. 
The Instituto de Investigaciones recnologicas--an autonomous public insti­
tute established to undertake investigations leading to the use of new techniques-­
was founded in 1955 as a dependency of the Caja Agraria, then made autonomous in 
1958. It has undertaken a number of research projects on technology, feasibility, 
markets, etc., including a number of studies on the possible industrial uses and 
processing of agricultur2..l, industrial, and chemical products, the use of sub­
produ~ts, etc. Some have had area~ potential usefulness to small scale industry, 
while others have not; the former probably predominate, at least in the number 
of studies doue. In 1963~ for example, the biggest research effort was on the 
technology for regional popular nutritious foods for human consumption. 1 The 
Institute has offered technical assistance to the extent of its ability, especial­
ly to those sectors rela~ed with industrial use and management of agricultural 
products and particular ·industrial products (especially chemicals, metallurgical 
and metal mechanical items). A pilot collaboration project with the Corporacion 
Financiera Popular was undertaken in 1968 to give integrated technical assistance 
to a firm producing valves 3.nd other metal products; the post-assistance evalua­
tion indicated that production had risen by about 60 percent, production per man­
hour by about 60 percent 1 yield of raw materials substantially, machine utilization 
by something like 50 percent, and profits on fixed capital by about 100 percent. 
1see Insti tuto ,!e Investigaciones 'I'ecnologicas, Realizaciones y Programas
1968, Botota, p. 6. 
The real question is th,~ feasibility of this form of extension service on a 
sizeable scale. 
FICITEC has as goals improvin6 the administration and management of Colombian 
business enterprise and providing the~ with a better storehouse of technological 
information. Over the near term, Miguel Bermudez, the director, plans to operate 
with foreign and Colombian consultants but over the long run to develop a compe­
tent staff at the Foundation itself. The first objective was to undertake in 
depth studies of five typical Colombian enterprises, with a view to making recom­
mendations for managerial and other improvements. 
SENA is already a large scale institution with secure financing and a good 
reputation for work in the technical training area. I have not seen reviews of 
its work in management training; it has the advantage of establishment, organiza­
tion, and reputation. It is planning (already is engaged in?} a large program 
to advise 4,000 firms over four years. There is some feeling: on the part of 
observers. that SENA may be suffering from cverfinancing (it receives support 
from a business payroll tav. and now manages a very large budget) leading to 
somewhat inadequate plauning and preevaluation of projects. 
Producersv Organization 
It has been a general .maxim in Colombia that people can do_ more for them­
selves than the government can do for them; this pattern raises the question of 
whether the most promising avenues for change are not via the private groups. 
The most important of these, in some_ respects at least, is Acopi (Associacion 
Colombiana Popular de Industriales). It was founded in 1951 when a group of 
small and medium producers (representing food, leather, rubber products, and 
several other industries) decided to create an association which would legally 
represent the interests of me~ium and small scale firms. Acopi is frequently 
criticized for being not.hh.g more than n pressure group; unlike some of the 
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other interest groups it has not become significantly involved in implementing 
technological change or trying to make its members more competitive. 
Firms in Acopi range from as few as 3 employees to over iOO (although very 
few are above 100). 1 
1In a sample of members in 9 cities, the average workers per firm was about 
2S. 
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Summary and Conclusions 
The electic (hodgefodge) approach to the evaluation of Colombian small scale 
industry adopted in this paper reflects the fact that information is scanty, in 
view of which itseemedrelev:Int to review (a) the historical development (with 
special emphasis on the last 20 years) of small scale production, with the idea 
that what happens in the market: may be a crude indicator of competitive potential; 
(b) analysis of single and total ~actor·proc.uctivities of plants by size with a 
view to measuring relative static efficiency; (c) consideration of the little 
evidence now available en g::o,vtb tendend..es of individual plants and firms over 
~. . . 
time according.to their size; (d) evidence from other countries on the role of 
• ~~J • 
small and mediUL", industry ove-..: time~ and f.~s- relative factor productivity compared 
-:• 
to larger indust:ry; (e)·. observations. df. .possibly knowledgeable observers and 
information on the irtstit•..:t:tc:..1.al conte~t_:-.;tn _Colombia which might bear on the 
potential success of this form ;o_f pr?cluc#ori,· -
Despite the attempt to aggregate.information from these various sources, 
·.' ; t'. 
. . .: ._. · .. 
no very persuasive ans,..,er ~an be given to the question "what role should small 
scale industry play in Colombiars industrial development from this point on, and 
how should it best be handled bf policy tools?'1 There seems relatively little 
doubt but that small a.:id ·medit.mi. plants liave oD: average higher output/capital ratios 
than larger ones, but :he di:ff icu.lty of ascer.taining appropriate shadow prices 
for unskilled :'.abor and ~,1c1:.:ious forms of skilled labor makes it difficult to judge 
in how many cases the overall social fa~tor productivity is higher. Much more 
work is required in this ~rea. Still less information is available at present 
on dynamic aspects of efficie11cy, i. c., savings tendencies out of income generated 
by firms or plants of different sizes, relative adaptation to socially productive 
technological changes 5 "!Xtf;rnal economi~s generated, and so on. 
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'Ihe other broad questions which must be analyzed in much greater depth.to 
permit serious policy,-suggestions of a ger1eral type are {a) the nature and extent 
of interaction of small and large plants (or firms) and {b) the relationship between 
plant size and firm size. The analysis in this paper has, because of the limita­
tions of the data, been restricted to the use of the variable plant size, but many 
though not all of the.arguments which would suggest differential factor produc­
tivities would seem to apply more to firm size. With respect to (a), it must be 
ascertained among other things whether the small and large firms (or plants) are in 
a complement:ary or a .c~mpetitive relationship; in the former case it makes no sense 
. ~ . 
to talk in terms of.. substituting one for another. Colombian statistics do not 
at present permit·_ analysis of these interactions althoug4 impressionistic evidence 
suggests that such·intei:'~c:tion is becoming increasingly common and is probably 
.more than meets the. eye~ 
-{<1, °'" Gt;, ..... 
'Ihe other possible limitation on extensive substitution by firm size would 
be the presence of a: nuinlier: of, i~dustries in which only large scale technology 
is feasible; it ·is clear that such industries exist, but it is not clear, without 
analysis, that they form part of the optimal set of industries. While this argu­
ment obviously implies caution, it is not necessarily an overpowering one, given 
the possibilities of trade. Needless to say, no one would argue that an economy 
can be exclusiv~ly focussed on leather products, wooden furniture, and the other 
outstanding labor int~nsive candidates, but in the tracing out of policy pertinent. 
say, for a period of 5 or 10 years~ even if new investment were focussed heavily 
on the labor intensive sectors, the overall industrial structure would not alter 
very dramatically; while the gradual structural change implied in a fairly sharp 
reorientation of the direction of :new ~nvestment was o£cu~rint ~t·would be possible 
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to evaluate t~e potential success of pushin8 the policy further. 
It is clear that in somE industries the large scale capital intensive producers 
are Vil.nefficient1and yield a low return to· capital as well .:;.s generating little 
unemployment. 2 From this observation it seems fairly safe to say that, were it 
possible to retrace stepn an~ alter policies taken in the past, an attempt should 
have been made toavoid.soin~ Jt _the: large capital intensive firms and industries 
.. ·>\ ··.: 
and to foc~s- ·me)];~ in.. industi:ies·-with higher capital producc-tvity; given the tight·,·. .. . . . 
relationship ¢:l{i$ting b~tw~e1i: larg~:··si~e and low outp:it/capital ratio it seems 
' . .. . .: ~ ., 
probable .that the al-t:eina\ive .Wt>uti,:fa~,~-involved smaller scale producers. It is . - . ;._ --~... .:·. _.r~. ·.:~: ~- ~ ·.,.-. _· ...... 
not so obvious tl1a;, ·be~f:,:-~ti:t1g'.-:.Jtft~~\~--P~l.~$:_y of heavv f.ocus on the small scale 
• . • ' ' ' •. ,. - • . ' .• . • : . ;• . .II.~ .. -~ ' ·;. .. 
se.ctor is approp'rihi~-,-·'(d1~:<£JiJ·i{\1~;~1~s.iy. must receive :serious consideration .~ .. . . . .. . . ' ~- '. . . . . : - . '. .. . 
There arises the diffi:;J.t- ~!te.sti~~--:~:,hether a s~•stem geared to aiding large scale.•. . . :· . 
firms, financing them; :and -~~kon .c::c!C. q:u:rckly learn to be an efficient complement 
to small scale produc~rs. 
The broad alternative to achieving high employment generation and high capital 
productivity by focussing on small firms is to try to make large firms more pro­
ductive in these re!:3pects than ·they have historically been. It may well be argued 
•.•a & • 
~-, .. 
l . . . . ··.<:'". -t·,.
It may not be -~h¢i:r be,iiJ:g> large scale, but their being in those industries 
which makes them-· lne-f-fi~f~2 . . . ..·.; '_'.· ·. . ' _,.. 
The only condition that I can think of in which this would not be an accurate 
(and obvious)descript:ion o:: the Colombian case would be one in which ccmplemen­
tarities between a given indust~-y and other industries--the others having much higher
social rate of return and being higher employment generators--:are 
of the sort which tJake it necessary to view the iudustry in question as part of 
a larger package, i. c., it is not meaningful to use a measure like the social rate 
of return to capital for the industj;'y in question, by itself. Arguments with re­
spect to external economtes of pemitting ,?ngineers and workers to learn complicated
technologies and so on are usually unconvincing when it is by no means clear that 
the use of those technologies ie appl'op:date in. the first plc1ce. 
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that large firms are not unproductive per se, but that this is a result of bad 
policy and the bad signals they receive in th~ market. Would they be more labor 
intensive and less capital intensive if the wage/rental ratio changed substantially? 
Could their monopolistic tendencies in a small and highly protective market be 
erroded somewhat by an effective internetional trade policy? Much more research 
into these questions; and a careful look at experience in other countries is 
necessary to come to useful conclusions. Most observers tend to be pessimistic, 
feeling that a given firm or given type of firm has relatively little technological 
flexibility; granted that engineers and businessmen invariably understate the 
medium or long run flexibility which faces them, the differences in capital in­
tensity by size are so large as to make it very doubtful that even under the most 
perfect factor markets which could be plausibly conceived in a country like Colombia 
the large firms would approach the labor intensity of the smaller ones. (It must 
be remembered, of course, that with better factor markets--including better access 
to capital--many small firms would become less labor intensive.) If a fair degree 
of labor intensity could be achieved a necessa::y prerequisite would seem to be 
very considerable innova.tive and adaptive ability on the part of entrepreneurs; 
since their major technological sources tend to be more developed countries, they 
would have to be aware of the need to and able to modify these technologies to 
more appropriate labor capital ratios. 
As is so frequently the case in policy questions like this one, the relative 
payoffs to pursuit of various possible avenues to taking greater advantage of 
small scale firms and in general to attaining higher labor intensity and higher 
capital productivity,and tl"it(op:t'lni'illmix are·not•obvious, but it seems plausible . 
that involves moving in most of the directions cited; the desirability of 
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moving in most of those directions is the more obvious, since in doing so more may 
be learned about the potential payoffs to further movement, Capital market im-
provements should have high priority in any general policy package; other 
hitiatives which would give the large firms more incentive to be labor intensive 
should also be considered; tax exemptions on investment are presumably counter­
productive and unless powerful arguments to the contrary can be generated they 
should be terminated and tax exemptions by amount of labor used instituted in 
their place; developwent organizations designed to aid the small firm in tech­
nological choice, industry choice, an~ so on, should receive high priority. 
Since one of the major permissive conditions which leads to inefficiency of 
large scale firms is tha protection they receive as import substitutors, it seems 
likely that trade policy could be a major co·atri?Jutor to improved factor pro­
portion choice and overalJ. factor productivity; it would prevent the monopolistic 
highly capital intensive firms from pursuing their present tendencies, either by 
forcing them to be more efficient or forcing them to give way to more efficient 
firms. In this context, since Colombia's comparative advantage, other things 
being equal, lies in industries which are labor intensive and which are in turn 
(as amply documented above) industries composed of small plants and firms, the 
need to focus on an efficient marketing system for potential exports coming from 
this sector, as well as a system of quality contrcl~ standardization, and so on, 
talces on particular importnnce. 
Possibly no single one of the initiatives mentioned here would,by itself, 
~ontribute greatly to the desired goals but it seem~ plausible that if all could 
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10. 233 . 57 4.647 4.684 1-Na~dalena 6.522 
Meta a 2.321 a 24
5 
12.461 -10 27.848 22.160 -20Narino 13.853 
Norte Santander 6.278 9.241 47 1.717 2.624 5
3
-6
Santander 11.282 17.519 55 6.314 5.930
5.469 3.373 -38Tolir.a 6.993 12.227 75 
17. 729 39.324 122 16.566 10.967 -34Valle del Cauca 
Intend y Comis. 1.698 3. 794 1.832 2.283 
25 
• 'fill 120.656 101.754 -16Total . ~ 169. 978 270.366 59 
aThese rlepart~ents did not exist in 1953. 
bThe figure for Bolivar includes data of Cordoba for 1964. 
49.
Source: The tahlP 5.s taken from Urrut:i.a and Villalba, on. cit., f'I, 
The oridn.:il source for the inforr-ation was sDccic1l tab1.1l2.tiori"s
 fror:: !\t\:H-: of 
the neople ernloyerl in nanufacturin~ induqtrv in the 1951 and 1
964 c~nc;uses t 
The 1951 infomr:.tion was "extrapolated" to 1953broken dmm by rural and urban. 
which was not published untilto match t_he infornation (on factory e□ployee!'l) 
that year. · 
---
. \"i 
•.' Table A-2a 
.,~: I •, 
Firm Size Structure, 1944/5-1968. 
Total < 5 . 
Year ii Firms emolozed 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-49 
6,207 544 ..... 
1944/5 * 7,853+ 1'2,sst.,_~ 3,623 ... 845 ~5 383 
7,959 849 ,,,. ....p~ ~ 
1953 11,243 "" 1,190 634 
6,338 915........ 
1956 9,835 1.,977 3,361" 1,124 ~ ,758 
1958 11,125 3,475 3,641 1,276 . 689 435 825 





1963 11,296 lf,so5 3,514 
~ 
. 1,559 .. 1 512 379 855 
1964 11,674 3,637 3,681 l,721 / 452 348 869 
1965 11,959 3,668 3,806 1,839 3.84 ,373 892 
1966 11,797 3,714 3,687 1,734 388 ·. 365 869 
1967 10,873 3,546 3,177 1,177 583 428 -910 
1968 11,062 3,566 3,312 1,339 421 410 892 
1. Less than 5 workers but above 24,000 pesos output. 















































Sources anc.l Hcthoc.lology: The figures for the years 1956-1968 inclusive are taken directly from various copies of .DA.i.'\E's . 
.. 
Table 2A-a (cont.) 
Anuario General de Estadistic:i. The 1953 figures are based on the 1953'industrial census, published in various issuesof DANI:: 1s Bole tin lfonr.ual de Eotadistica•. Figures were not presented specifically on the size breakdown, but ·percentageswere shown in ilolctin ltcnsual l{o. 77. From these the figures presented here were deduced. 1944-5 figures are basedon Controlia Gc~crnl de la Rc~ublica Primer Ccnso Industrial de Colombia--1945: Resumen General, Bogota, 1947. Sincethat ccr.sus clr.ssificd firms l.Jy the number of employees rathcr'than the total number of workers, adjustments weremade to attempt to achieve comparability :with the data for the other years. 







EaploYMnC 1• Cottage-Shop and Factor, XDdlAICl'J'
by Tvo D1jh ClnsdUcaUon
1964 I of t,,rel tora! Jnc:l\ldinaCotta1e-Shoe
1 r- Total tn CottJ«• Thou !'iot' Totel Jo.t•r•ndat w r-- .. r,rcon ,, P,o.,Ulng Provldln& Provt,!1"CZ.plorer ■ • Eaployora llbUe Collar , lluo Coller Fa■Uy lnforo.1t &oa tntllfr.D.utoa lntcr~JI &o,aVorlu:re I/bit• Collar'4· (I) lllud Vorker• Total Eaployera f, l'aoployore llhlce Collar 11... Collar "''.. , ..u, on r..,ra of on f'-ql:11 of on Fi:r_!l (If
(2)) ,,.. 
U) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
WbJte Collar (1Acl~dlng opproouc..) Vork•r•• Eapl<')'•t!'n&: l.a?lorQf'IIC Ee;11••)'1'#nC)l.~71 :1,ut 15,071 (8) (9)2,070 13,001 7,432 (12) (13) (14) (15)4l,S61 (10 
•2,795 21
(2l) •••era&•• 2,302 o, 4,600 19S 4,405 'llv 9,111 2!m /~Us 30,984 H•• 13,119 41, 11) 7),b89c:o + :11 ,..,. ♦ <. 16,420 5,808 88,..,,..,.,. 33,880 8,655 19,678 2,:6S 17,41) 4,6]7 910 5,720 10,581 u 18,722 12,296 19,21657,981 lS,U9 2,514 12,98S 41,511 891 91,ff6I 36,882 9),lvSu:> 1'(11,•cce 4,66' .749 l,80 171 1,667 1,826 246 3,80] 5)1Ull Tur:fhe 119 418· 1,216 50 1,46917,971 U,511 I, 78S 901 7,884 55,on •• 574•7,587 4,256(24) Clothl"I + 44,099 6,720 28& 6,412120.u1, 11,726 2Z,4U · S,615 16,818 37,210 149 62,070rc-or,,•ar U,116 6,262 28, 95) 61.lU31,510 S,OOl 2,090 2,913 26,109 391 152,137 19,288 15),:65U> • 2<l 118,59 ■• 91,241 ll ,248
(:~) :o · ·.!<":: 7rod\ooct• l,Hi 4,000 1,964 
,.su 24,722 S,589 10,518 75,609 11,723 • 2,378 t,]34 63,339 547 214,207 64, 70) 215,627,,\.:: .....!tni lurAUwt•. 681 1,283 2,201 SOl 6,076 929 )03 626 s, 108 )g(:!>) ac-1·~ .. ., - 'l1;n3- -24;-'j,t° - 14,742 58,784 u.e.1-10:ofi
11.nltur• 4,328 - - 5.,9, - - 21.ii1- - r..,, .- - . - 4,grJ - ill- - - - 3]7 - - - - 464 • 4,109 - ii - - -62-:-626 - -9i;1~5 - -.)~•C• -
U 1) f .a;tf'f •n• 1ro4vcte 76 l9S 1,0)7 15 1,072 •1,17) 171· S,485 1,164 61 1,301 4,111, 10 5,561 1,UJ 5,613 g•c:o rr1nu,-• 4,940 l,)IS 8,811 $66 •• 105 •5, 103 1 57 u.iu 2,869 40) 2,466 1,8H2 61 16,752 29,489 16,9)) 'I'(:,) L .. .1,hn + Prcd1,,1cte 4,926 2,277 1,791 4,482 
(),;) l.,.ht-,·T ♦ •l,SJl 
537 1,256 630 ..'226 ! 821 264 5S7 3,)96 6S t,408 52, )60 t,•U
3SI 768 6,900 1,642r,~·.!t1.-t• 124 644 -2,609 u I 41 1,601 s,2s2 6 5,)£9. •28,516 s.•u 
()!) C1,.-.1u1 ■ ,,702 l, 74Z 7,651 6,;8; • • •.;,;;l- - - -1;0 r---- -19,a"'it - ,- 7,141 - -- - - -761• 306 7,07 .(U> r:rY,,jn• of P•u·ote.,. 2,807 11,988 88 - --2S:-si1 • - ·2i:1;z- • -2;-,s,z"·0 2,5U 24 2,519 Z13 al 2,026(U) ;;;.!~~i1! of Jtoraetalllc 11,171 2,969 S7J 6 566 1.4s,. 4.83) se ,oeo 4,8t0t:111-:r.,ls 4,214 9Ja 1.n, 3,21s e60' as,49l >,au 795 ,.010 21,510 111 16,671(14) s,~.- ~~c~t• 6,601 )01 1,u1 aa >,295 2,111 :31: · )0,482 l•.~07l,640 sn 15 SOB ),116()SJ ~,,,1 Prod.cu Eacl~l"I 9,ZU S,991 l,918 1,137 2,781 l 10,241 64,451 10,175• 9RS 3n I 19,046 l,560 477 3,0Bl U,4ZS 61 28, )28 ll, 7b6CJ•> ~~~f ;;~:,cal K.chlM-rJ Tz.1'••- - ,.rao- - ),667- - -r.014 - - 4,s9l - • - ,-:,» -- - -1,i' ~ - - .4.eil - - ~ 90,- - - - no- - - 729-- - - i:946 - -· . :.. - - - - - - - - -· -28,-11 J- .()1) thctrl.c-1 Kac"laery 6,SlO 4,999 28 11.a.21 71.f.{;lj :a. 1124,544 • 9)3 3,611 •3,118 lOSj , 9,141 2,zo' 172 2,075 6,819(J6 + )7) 19,474 7,679 21 15.677 41,651 u,aaJ0,211 2,007' 8,204 1,314 270i 14,010 ),156 3S2 2,134 10,82) 49 )], 504 58,124 31.••7(ll) Tra..rortaU• '111,_C SO,SH U,S7t 11,044 4,iu u.ees 21,uo au/ 14,83) 2,686 556 2,130 U,075 12 65,429 77,llO l6,4U(Jt) Nacell.._ 1,705 1,u, 6,5ll 740 5,791 •90 10s' 7,62> 1,133 • 234 1,499
I 
s,an ll 1',]ll Sl,lU. U,914 
T.c.i ,as.11, us,u, lU,881 U,211 107,671 51,324 u,ut1
I 
213,SU 60,081 t,241 S0,842 221,616 2,142 649,)50 56,330 6)5,'61! I 
' 
--:w---~----·-··~ '. ~- .......... 4,.. ..l.. 
.• , l 
;·. .. .,. 
.• 
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Sources and Methodology -- Table A-2b 
Colu:n11 16 presents the 1964 population census f.igures on the number 
of people e::1ployed in each of the two digit sectors. Column 14 presents the 
total nu:nber of people who also reported occu;rntional position (i.e. for.n 
of eoploy7.ent). Colc::1ns 8-13 present figures from ~{E's Anuario General 
de Estadishia for the factory sector (fims with> 5 workers or> 24,000 
pesos output). Colu:nns 1-7 are based on subtractions of columns-8-13 from 
the corresponding figures in the population census from, i.e. They are 
derived as residuals, with the e:<ception of colur.m 2 "independent workers" 




. Table A-6a 
Employr.cnt in Factorv and Cottare-Shot"' ~'.mufactures By flcpart~cnt, 1953-1964 
People Occupied In 
Factory Cottar.e-~hop Total 
Depart~cnts 1953 1964 1953 1964 1953 1964 
74.050 100. 789Anticrtuia 47.278 68.811 26. 772 31.978 
45.818Atlantico 18. 31~4 25.660 14,626 20. lSR 32.970 
27.385Bolivar. 6.852 5.811 19. 899 21.574 26.751 
3.340 5.683 14.554 15.737 17. 894 21.42()Boyaca 
Caldas 12.134 13.123 . 22.084 28. 976 34.218 42.099 
Cauca 1.5so_ 1.500. 7.497 8.160 9.047 9.660 
(a) 9 .899Cordoba (a) 572 (a) 9.327 
41.857 87.696 47.~15 66.648 . 95. 774 154.344Cundinanarca 
Choco 132 143 1,361 1.755 1,493 1.898 
1.010 971 7.443 8,421 8.458 9.392Uuila 
Magdalena 1.390 1,659 11,169 14,917 12.559 16.576 
Meta (a) 702 (a) 2,566 (a) 3.268 
Narino 2. 772 3.395 41.431 34.621 44.203 38.016 
Norte de Snntander 3. 451 . 2.654 7.995 11.865 11.446 14.519 
35.572Santander 12.471 12.123 17.596 23.449 .30.067 
18.62!1Tolir,a 5.181 3.024 12,462 15,600 17,643 
Valle del Cnucn 34.729 50.045 34,295 50,291 69. ()2!1 100. 336 
Intcndcn. y CoMis. 633 269 3.530 6.077 4.163 6.346 
Total 199,126 283,841 29(). 63!¼ 372.120 489.760 655.961 
(a) These dcpnrtr-.ents had not vet been created at the tirne of the 1951 inrlu~trial 
census, 
Source: Urrutia: Villalba, on. cit., p. 47. Ori,;inallv based on 
DA}~E, Ccr!,:;ri_tn,1n,;tr.T;°1,10S'.', and 'ruc,:,;trr. Tnr'l,;,;t!'.: -=11, 1°61'!, nnt;i of the 
1964 pot'ubt:!.on ccns1~:. ,~P.re U!:t:d for t!1e tot:1]" in 1<Ji1/1 ;,nrl tlrnt of the 1951 
populati0n censu~ to oJ,t.,in_ a projection of. t!1e totnl to 1953. 
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Clothim, <l~.d Footuear; Avera~e Si?.e. o.f. Pln~i:"•" ~-~d/S-11:are 
of Paid L~:.JOr \,"i1ici1 is :-:nite Coll.:2r * ·c;, Dcnnrcr-:ents, 196 7 
Average Size Paid White Collar 
Departnent of Plant Labor Force Total Paid 
Antioquia 21.38 7,185 13:1s 
Atlantico 41.40 3,624 ll.78 
Bolivar 17.56 445 7.64 
Boyaca 4.85 160 1.88 
Caldas 11.89 582 12.20 
Cauca 3.53 41. o.o 
Cordoba 2.11 ··22. . o.o.... 
Bogota, D.E. 11;61 6,617 12.27 
Cundinan:arca 3.40 102 1.00 
El Cesar 3.67 15 o.o 
Magdalena 6.21 , 73 9·:ss 
Nariiio 4.43 202. p.so 
N. Santander 5.81 306 4.25 
Quindio 6.56 · 170. 10.59 
.-
Risaralda 33.55 2.489 7.59 
Santander· 9.65 1,162 13.60 
Sacre 3.40 12 o.o 
Tolima 4.24 107 1.87 
Valle 16.44 3,581 10.83 
All departncnts with avern~e plant size of 
< 5 4;09 661 1.36 
5-10 8.04 1,711 11.46 
> 10 20.95 24,523 11.~9 
·--. ' ... -·. 
> 25 37.81 6,113 10.08 





Fixed Assets and Inventory/Total Assets 
by Firm Size for Socicdades in Selected Secotr
s: 1963 
·tndustrv Total Assets/Firm Fixed As
sets Inventories/Total Assets 
· Food 22.61M 5
9.17
74.19
Milk products 16.60 56.24
Mills & Thrashers 12.32 
Sugar Refineries 62.82 46.42
& Trapich~s 55.78
Chocolates &·candy 30.53 71.84
Other Food Industries 18.64 
43.94
Beverages 83.87 42.32
Beer &Malt 178.89 






Yarns, etc. 65.81 64.5




Rubber Products 55.76 
Source: Data fro~ Superintendencia de Socieda
des Anonimas, Division 
de Investi?,acione-s Economic<!s, La Industria ~-f
anufacturera, 




llorse Power/Er.ployed Per!'ions: Ar.grcr.atc and Two Dir.it Lcv<>ls 
1964 
.. Firm Size (# l!orkers) 
~200 Total-<.5 5-24 25-99 100-199 
3.368 5.032 3.488Total 1.555 3.496 2.734 
2.67 3,86 · ,•• 48 5.23 3.75Food· 2.41 
4.20 5.84 7.23 6.43Bevera7.es 9.85 5,89
0,09 1.92 2.01 1.09Tobacco 0.07 0;31 
3.55 3.47 2.24 1.72 3.48 3.23Textiles
Clothinp.- and 
· Footwear 0.12 0.25 o.48 0.48 o.49 
3.79 
~ood (excluding 
o. 749 3,6R 3.60 4.20 4.49 3.93furniture) 
wood furniture
· and a esories 1.61 1.17 1.52 1.2s 2.30 
1,46 
paper and paper . 17.67 8.68
products 1.00 2.34 1. 7-1 1.94 
publishing and 
1.14 1.31 0.93 1.01rel. indus. 0.30 0.88 -
leather (excluding 3.27
footwear) 2.34 .1.80 2.49 3.21 5.35 4.:31
rubber goods 2.00 1.76 · 3.15 4.67 
chen. products 3.77 1.34 6,51 1.39 6.31
 4,48 
petrol and carbon 
11.33 9,96 33.86 9.60 29.91 26.93deriveltivc~ 
non-Mc tallic 
products 0.80 1.24 3,19 6.56 8.99 
5,48 
basic r.1ctal 
6.67 5,32 4.31 14.46 12.78 11.95industries
r.tetal proci,· excJ.ud-
inp. nach. + trans. 2.12 1.95 2.39 3,29 2,88 
2.ss 
non-electric 2,34
nachincry 2.·10 2.60 2.14 2.24 2.11 
electric r.ach.
+ articles 0,92 1.22 1.16 2,96 1.6? 
1,66 
transport 1.40 1.28
roateri~ls 1.62 0.95 1.47 1.17 
other r.mmfacture 
1.75 1.97 2.00 1.6.7 _inclus tries ·0.80 1.13 





Pa.id. La.bor Share ot Crose. V&111c .Added, 
b7 I11duatry atld Fim She, 1963-67 
llldustrr and Fir.:i Size 1.963 - 1.96' 1.9~ 1.966 1.967 
. 








































































209 r inos. 
0.28 
·o."3 













o • .c.s 
0.33 
o • .c8 
o • .co 
0 • .C7 
' 
----:--· 

















































20:> r "'.5s 
0.S1 
0.56 
0 • .C7 
0.-44 
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Table 1.-l0a (continued) -116-
.
Industry L'ld Fini the 1,963 1.961t 1.965 1,9G6 1,961 
30 lillbl>er end Product• 
5-24 0.41 0.45 o • .(6 0.43 0.57 
25:99 0.49. o.« 0.37 0.41 0.51 
100-199 0.27 
200 y mo• 0.32 o•.u 0.41 0.45 0.'8 
31 Cbc~cala 
5-24 0.24 0.22 0.25 0.26 0.2& 
25-99 0.28 0.28 0.25 0.24 0.2s 
100-199 0.22 0.28 0.27 0.2.C 0.26 
200 y mos 0.29 0.29 0.35 0.28 0.3.c 
32 Prod-.icts or Petrole11::1 
5-2.C 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.18 0.18 
25-99 .0.25 ·0.23 0.2S 0.20 0.29 
100-199 0.12 0.19 0.22 0. II-
200 ym6s 0.22 0.27 0.33 0.22 o. 15 
33 Products or Uo.i::etallic 
5-2.C 0.47 0.47 0 • .c7. o.« 0."6 
25-99 0•.(6 0.42 o • .u o.« o:.c1 
100-J99 0.36 0.-43 0.49 . 0.-43 0.52 
200 y 111G1 o.~ 0.49 o • .c.s 0."3 o. .cs- . -·-· ··--
) 31' Base •!eta.lsI s-~4 0.3-C 0;39 0.30 0.30 0.33 
25-99 0.3-4 0.35 0.39 0."3 0.22 
0.20 0.23::. 100-199 0.17 0.25 
200 y mas 0.16 0.56 o•.co 0.36-~~:-<··' 
35 t'.etel Prod-.icts
excluding :,:e.chinery 
5-24 0.44 o • .cs 0.-G 0.44 0.47 
25-99 • 0.-6 0.-44 0.-41 0.41 0.45 
0.3!>100-199 0.-46 0.-44 0.44 0.37 
200 y mo, 0."3 ·o.-46 o.« 0.45 0.50 
36 Nonelectrical ~!e.chine:ry 
!'. 
0.415-2.C 0.39 0.39 0.41 0.44 
25-99 0.53 · 0.56 0.42 _0.54 0.53 
'. ·- ·-. 100-199 0.67 0;"6 9-5? 0.42 0.6B 
200 y ma, 0.52 0.37: o.~ 0.51 0."54 
37 El.cctrlco.l. l•!nchiceey 
S-24 0.-46 . 0.-45 0.-47 0.39 0.42 
25-99 0.37 0.3$ 0.39 0.29 0.32 
100-199 0.37 0.32 0.36 o. .co 0.31 
200 y 11101 0.3l 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.49 
38 ~ri:ncport ~uip:ent 
.S-24 o.,9 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.48 
25-99 0.56 0.64 0.53 0.55 0.51 
0.55100-199 0.58 o.s~ 0.61 0.70 




5-24 0.-41 O • .C5 -42 0.40 0.38 
0.3.C25-~ 0.-0 0.34 • 0.34 0.31 
lC0-199 0.32 0.33 0.28 0.32 0.36 
7~ v r.5, ·o.Js 0.3; 0.31 0.41 0 A9---












Illustration E:iti~o.tca ot Income Earned Per tov Income Person. by Pla.11t Size, 1964 
She W88,es/ Avcrng':! Crons · Net Net Probable %of(N of Perso.'\ Net r;on- Value .Vn.lue Value 
%ot Capital %,. ot Net
Workers) Lnbor Adtlcd/ . ,fldded/ Added/ 
People with .Annual Income Goin~ to Income OenerntedI1fcome People withIncome/ re.r:;on .••:•·. Groos Coing to People,· Unpaid (.'l'hou-.. . Vnlue 
Person ~10,000 !,15,000 Incor.1.e leos thon with Income less thenpesos pesosPcr::on sunds) . Added 10.000 15,000 10,000: 15,000
(l) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
penos penos pcco!J( pcoon(6.) '; (7) (8) (9) (16).'; . (ll)
Independent
Workers - 6.3~· 6,020 ·•95 95· 95+ .· --- . ---- ~85
2-4 (All) 3.53-3.91 7,896 6~35...:.7 .is ·. 93 5,900-6,680. 90 ·' 
~90 
Reported ,:'_1\-:·:;_:~ '9o+ 50 75 --..:60 ~o 
11,500 80 i,' 85-90
<5 by DA.~E 4 •70 22.283 12:··:~f:;::;_. 92 .. 
5-9 5.98 31,039 14 •5i):.·~;:- 91.4 13,250 
..,·.,
·. ._.. ··:· . 75, 85 20 30 ::t:43' ::a:55
10-14 6.51 100,414 16 •._30 90.3 14,120 65 78 10 15 25 35
15-19 7.h3 20.00 89.3 17,860 ·5 10 I




25-49 9.32 25.84 87.3 22,560 
50-74 11.21 33.67 86.3 29,060 
75-99 11.16 31.79 85.3 27,200 
100-199 14.01 51.20 84.2 h3,110 i.s 
!_200 16.10 46.93 83.2 39,050 55 
Total 84.6 
(a) 1'huoretically these firms have less than 5 workers but more··i:han ·24,000. pesos value of output. In fact many firmsfitting that category are undoubtedly missed. 
Eources l'..l'\d Metho~olos;y: Except tor the figures on gross· vclue added per. person and weges per person,
Le., columns 1 ur.d 3--l'.J'ld the residue.]. presented in column 2, which them3elves have substa.-itial mnrgin
o:t' error (::ee Te.ble 1)--this table involves highly speculs:tive end essentie..lly illu:1tro.t1ve calculations,
in the sunnc that for no firm do we have precise informo.tion on the information presented in columno 6-11. 
.It i:. ~c:ic:ro.l.ly true, ho.....-ever, the.t the rciat_ionship b1:tween thoce fj,guros n.'ld fi:rrit rit iP. 1n rnur.h 1Pr.'I




Average Firr.i Size (U of \.:orkcrs) in the !1nnufacturing Plants 
of Different Sized Cities 
Avera.~c Pl;mt Size City Size (thousands of1 
City Actual Wcightcq inhabitants) 
Bogota, D,E.-Soacha 29 56 1.935 
Mcdcllin-It~gui-llello-
47 87 1.034Envigado 
61 730Cali-Yunbo 35 
Barranquilla 39 58 536 
19 19 243Buea r m;ianga 
28 72 199Pereira-Santa Rosa 
214Manizales 26 61 
42 242Cartagena 27 
23 24 118Palmira 
Barrancaber.::ej a 22 41 68 
Sogamoso-Nobsa 43 17 40 
14 165Cucuta 11 
12 14 142Ibague 
141-- Armenia 14 18 
Buga 12 12 73 
22 22 102Santa Harta 
73· Girardot 13 13 
San Gil 13 15 20 
Pas.to 11 19 89 
Neiva 8 12 86 
Tunja 12 14 44 
Popayan 11 i4 64 
Buenaventura 17 16 78 
Cartage 7 5 61 .-- Tulua 11 7 63 
Duitama 11 29 40 
Villavicencio 8 8 53 
7 83Monteria 9 
Valledupar 16 14 56 
~ 
Pamplo:1a 6 4 27 
Sincelcjo 6 3 49 
Socorro 5 2 14 
Riohacha 5 9 13 
Quibdo 2 6 23 
1
Weighted cvcra;;e of th~ average fiI't:1 size by industry, where weights are the rel.-
ative share of each indu:3try in naticn:ll output. 
Source: Roclrir;o H.:mriquc, "Locnlizccion Indus trial y rroccso de Urbnniza.cion en 
ColoI::bi~," in DA:;E, Boletin !~cnsual de Estndistica, #224, March, 1970, 
P• xvi. 
Table A..;]3 
Growth of 315 Socic<lndes Anonimns 
1963-67 
115 ~oc:f.P-nndcs AnonitNlR--~1 All Fttctory Sector,.rAvcrnrc Gross N~t '7:tlue Added Net V1tlue AdC-:ed Gr.oss Value· Gron::1 Vnlue nr.o~s Value r.ro!I':~ V~lue
VnluA A<l<led (r.nr:r.~nt H~.rket (1958 prices) Ad<led J\ocled fielded Per Aclclcd
Pcr Fim Prices) IJ(Current pe■ os) (1958 pesos)' Finn - - All
(Current pesos) ~ OC'.f c>cl :t<l<'!'l ~ocinct.,,lc~
Not in the Anon:f.m.ns
~ample 
1963 13.74 4105.5 2222.8 9050.0 4898.6 4.85 5115.1 
1964 4617.9 2321.7 10. 320.3 5188. 2 ....I..... 
1065 5330.2 2419.5 11,966.4 .5431~5 "°I 
]966 6184.3 252O.O 14.212.8 5792.5 
1967 20.52 6551.7 2510.3 15,661.7 6000.3 9.90 9294.2 






A. Ccmpcsition cf .\!m::,facturi:rg Output Al!oca:ior. cn:011;: Different Sectors by Laree and Sm~!/ Duerpriscs 
A.;r., I , .. :.... :-"'P ! 
Forestry, j 
.......... ,.::, ?\Iant:f:i:t;!I'ir.g j Sc~\ice ! Tot:il of ! Fi:1:il c..:r.~a:-:.d TotalII 
industry iFishcN. 1 
en- :
Smail Big Total 
l idogmo"' Io,m,stS, I1 fapor~,
' I I I sectors I etc. 
Small . 3.1
Die; 55.l 33.S2.2 I 0.2 21.3 9.2 30.5 21.4 l 11.4 I 100.00.2 26.7 30.S S1.2 14.8Total 2.6 I 0.2 23.9 19.S 43.4 18.3 14.S 20.9 4.6 100.064.S 27.3 8.2 100.0!
B. Compcsitio11 cj ,\,'a-':ufac:nr_i;:g hr;m: A!loccrion amc:ig D!_1t,rmt 
! 
Sectors by Large ar.d Small D:rcrpriscs
I !





en-. Fis!lcry j Small 13:'T Total doscnous·~ """"' I added · sectors 
I I ' I




9.S -I.6 I l 43.0 12.0 26.S I 100.010.0 31.9 ITotal ! i 41.9 15.1 68.1 7.910.8 !I 1.1 16.0 I '2S.9 24.0 I 
ICO.OI 44.9 13.S i0.3 4.4 25.3 100.0
I 
Note: The pcrccn:a:;,;:s are computed by including the amount of imports in the total.
:. 
Source: Hosditz, £E.· .£!!·, P• 73. 




S11ara of Small Factorlcs in Total Factory Employment 
by Mu;or InchstrrJ Group (Percent) 
J.:ar,.. 1••p:1l.ati1.n( Uuntriri ,.,r lnt:Jiutn roinalation MeJicthSm:1!1 f!Opuli,tion 
ISi(: )fnior int!uslr)' ~roup 1 ., 1 J I w...t 11·,.;:•l 
~ 
C'"Je n I ~r.w Routh r:,m1.. C"!o111Lh,I l'l,ilc Ari:en­ :S\\e,h•n A•~•trali~ lra11 .11•in It; ·r•i•.,ny :O:t,,h••Salv;Jor I Lcl,:m,,n Zc:iia11J 1\u,iia t1illl.:ti• liua______________ ,____,____,____ ,____,___ ,_____ ,_____ 
, All """"•l..•·turt:1.................... 40.t\ ~!).O 4G.~ •1 
so.a 47.0 37.K l :11.0 34.3 33.1 I 15.3 3U I 0.1 I ~J I I 23 4.
-------------------·--·-•--·-4'i { ao 'I'' I I 1· .'III ~•~ £3 25 52 46 4!i! 52 { 23 :i~ I :.7 41 ;J•I2,1 I 1·•,,,~t t1ru•i1:ds•••...••• , , • . . • . • • • . • . 2!• .025 L·I 27 2131 41 .... ~•I !! l'f21 1B··\•·!.1.''.PI.......................... 42 2 1t H 4•i 14 """. • . • • '2 . . • • 17 :.ly: T,.',,,n -q,~uduc!s................... 14 2i 27 IS 44 I~• 1522 20 2H 31 4-1 13 13 25 22 H•2.1 j'l',·,1 :••:;........................... 49 80 49 ~s 42 SJ M t,3 t,7 4! ... '4S (;~ 70 
25 57 5li 42 45 ~J 137 .'i4 M 4,; :lj ,.,, ,:
21 Ic:..,i,,., •. {.,,,\w•::1r. made-up tc,ti!u... 
\\', .. ,.I 11?1,l 111,rk iiri,Jach, t~ct11t {urni.. tiZ 73 s:1 47 ~-.. 
!•i,,• .......................... .,., 71 60 t-o 44 1i:J til !,., i,5 .;y
i2 41 · 411 3~ 47:n I F...-11:• ·1r,· •1:il h.\t~1:-l'1. • • • • • • • • • • • • . 70 ca 
C-t 5~ J.t3 ' 11 ;15 32 44 :: .. ,~ 
27 ; !'.. ;•·, ,,,,.: ;•.•:••·r ,.,,,.J,.et•............ 1(1;) SI 3\1 3-1 34 50 41J (j :,j 41 JI I t)·
~-, j l'r::i,,,., ,11,,11.::i·'.: ..!,i:i,;............. 6~ 67 45 SI U 
42 ,~,. ,'/
2i, I l.,-,!:,1 r :t.1,,l h;1:h1.·~ !1rv<lut·t,. e~c.,·p: 5!1 40 4n 57 4~ 
,,,; 32 
1••••1 \\l';lf••••••••••••••••••••••••• ss 77 70 70 7517 
41
13 ~2 .10 II 20 :!4 111 
~ l•I ij 
GO 43 4U 3~ 3~ ;o:,1) l:11?,!,,·r ah•I ru!•!-n :•!'"•h:•·t
:ii •...•.•••. 1(1\) 7!! 20 10 3~ :.rn 3U I!' 15 :?O :.1:.­
:n ( ·11 •11111• t!:: ~1:,I c~11:1111 1·:1I 1,r1.J'Jct:s ••••. 75 84 M 45 10 \) 12 I} 12 43 II 
12 :.,•,
32 l'•·tr,,!, 11J11 .:.11nl ,.,,,\\ 1•ro1!1:cts •••••••••• w 22 47 4S 311"··- 45 41 3~ ii,'
~11111:1, t.,!.1,: u,11t1:r...t 1,ro,hu·t!J.•..•.•.. ·sr· ar· 39 /ii 4a°' ~8 2~ !I \If,I} 32:\'.I S\ 49 It\ 1:1 t
23 
39 
17 l~s 3•) JI f.• 
3~, 2~ t.2 63 70 la1 
3 
41 40 46 i.• 21 i--fl.
3-1 H:\ :1• 11,•t.•.I:, ..•.....•...•.•..••••• llM) !>2 t.7 39 ~t:l U2 32 
. :Vi ~i•.:~~::,\;~:.-;-; :::~~:~!il':~(~.1;~\~-.:i. .· .. :::;::: GI ~s 47 00 36 till . 4ij 33• ;;-
J.t, ,·:r:,·.~I bar1,,!n·rJ, ;,.1,J111;.ua.lus o.1u.l 21 :,; I!! l!l31 . • 1()() 4S 49 C9 43 48 . 33 27 15 22 20 :3 ;, 5 '(0 I 
:N T/:?i:::~; 1:,;;1f!:.~,:-~,t_~:: ~:::::::::::: 113 n 45 G4 47 40 40 ....• 27 22 .... 
:!'J ~1v•1•:b,,· 11•1'i, iua11·1f,ictUt1::s, induUing 50• 43 ., :s• :1• N60 Ill51 64 05 ~- ....
111:,tr,::!1\·n!s ..• , , ••••••••••••••• , •• i2 SI M 
~O'!'r.: 1', :-t· •11!:11:1~ r•·;,n•y11t sh:irP. uf tht,,l factory emp1oyml'ut in t•sl:\.l1l i!"hrn,:-nt11 w
itl1 IO--'J!J f"lhJ1l11yrt•!f. 1'c,t;,t fod,,ry tii,ptuymr.nt indudc:a a\l tijtnhlintuntnt! in Now
 1"4:a\and, Att(f'otina, Au!ltt11lia. 
\\',·,t <:, 111 ""Y, ,.,.,J r,.;,.,,J ,;1,tc~. lu the other counlrh·s, t.olal fart,,ry c11111luymeui incl
utl•~ <>lahlisluncnts with 6 or more c1111,loyccs•
--·--- I 
• )'!:ti•; t•!:U ?\: s I_I'.) (" 1!'1:!11y1•1"~, 
• F,~,t .,.. :,~ i11, hub! io t• atl11•r p:-n,h~t~. 
''l':.1·;••;.,,:-t 1·•1·1ip111,·11t iu-·h:·?t•c.1 in 1:,-~rhi!l~ry. l"xr.~11t tl'.'tirica1. 
4 .•.::!•;1i1•1l,i!,•.1 "'"' 1.... ,11:~1t1\·t::1 ii,, :u,lt•1t in 111~chi11rry. e1te11t. electrical. 
•)!11•!,:,!•.:i 11,'.r:1!:wt1::1. 
S.n·w:r.. : .,r::•·11~i,,a ...•••••• llie<•c',m :<:u,·i,ma\ ,!el Scrvirio !•:,tatli.tiM. AnuMio E,t,,JC
dito Jc Id Repiiblita Arutnlina, tomo III, E•t~dt,liCG ln~uslricl, 19t,-toSO. 
\';,. -! 1 t•·rt11:,~1)' ••••• b'l 1fi•~iii,·~••, J,1.~rbuch /Ur flit lJundttrcpuUik l.ltwt&chlarul, l!J5t.· ·
(1l~,rr ,•11•111tdci:,, ,. , J.11 e:it•:J in Ta,!,!c 1~2. 
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The inforr.ntion cor.cs froM Planeacion's study of sr.all and nediun indust
ry 
,
(op. cit.), Danes inc!ustdnl surve~• inforr.aticm (presented in Industrin 'f;mu-
factucra ~;?.cicm=1l 196~ and inforl"'.ation fro:!l the ~{evi!itn <le J~ ~unerintr~n
r!cncia 
de ~ocicdndes Anankas. Dane's inforr,,ation were used to plot a series o
f points 
(the dots) correspcndin~ to different firn size categories, and showinr. 
the 
- averar,e worker/,firr. and horsero~,•er/firr. ratios for selected firn sizes.
 The 
larr.est size catcfory, with an averar.e of alMost 500 workers, had avera~e 
installed capacity of a little over 2,Soq horsepower. While the series of 
points refcrrrinr to the snaller size cate~ories was sonewhat curvelinear 
(with horseoower/workers rrndually increasing with firn size) the undashe
d 
arrm, Marked "S" reflects_ the fairly constant horserower/worl:er ratio for firT':s
 
up to 50 or nore workers. The slone of the undashed line L refers to t:he !arrest
 
size cater.cry; thus the difference between the slopes of these two lines
 reflects 
the proportionate difference between the lar~est size caterory's horsepo
wer/worker 
ratio and that of a group of the sMaller s::1.ze cntel!ories. 
The inforration on assets is probably less trustworth (thouf!h perhaps no
t as 
frc'Jucntly y,,is!'ltated as so?'le- the y,1ajor rlifficulty is placin~ an econom::l.
c inter­
pretation on it ) and the conparison between lar~c and sn1all is cornplicc1
tPd by the 
fact of different sources. The scale on the vertical axis for total assets 
(in 1%9 pesos) ~-~:is choc;en go that the fairlv typical asset/worker ratio
 found 
in the Plnncacion studv of rcc:f.picnts of er.edit from the Cnfa 1\r,raria, 
F0ncfo 
F:in~nd.cro TtH~nr.;tri.nl nn<l the Cornc-r~r.i.r.n Fin'1nci~rn ronul:lr would be co
nnected 
with the oririn hy a rilorc -of the sar,e rny ns that for the horsepo-:-rer/w
orker 
rntio of the sr-all firr.•s .1ll"t cl::lscu,;scd. (Total n~set/firn and worker/H
n:, coor­




• the SMaller fir~s. A, estinat~ wac; ~ade of cite total nsqets/worker ratio 
for a ::;ul,~;ct of.. nll lart'!e firrs for uhich inf"orration •rns av:iilahlc in the 
we have evidence on totnl assets of the Socicdndes is 1967 and the last ve~r on 
which an est,,11ate of wot"lers was ava1lahle was 1968. Past trends ~-1ere nrojectcrl 
to 1969; it is unlikely that this extrapolation would lead to any serious error. 
A comparison of the slopec; of the slashed arrows marked S and L shows hot,r di ffercnt 
the asset/worker ratio is for this set of large firl".s con!'ared to the st"nll ones. 
Since the averar,e fim size for the Socieclades Anonot'1as is r.uch sr,aller {a 
little over 200) than the averare f.irM size of the lar~el'lt size catep.ory for which 
the horsepower and worker. fi~ures are t,rescnted, and since both relationc;hips are 
presumably curviline~r, one mi~ht arrue that the total atjset/horl'lepowe!" ratio 
rises by a ~ood deal more than 10!) percent r,ovinp. fror:t fims of twenty or less 
workers to 0nes of sa.•, 400 or 5"0. A nurnher of COT"plicntions must he allowed f:or, 
however. First of all, Sociedades Anonim as are known to h:we hir:her horsepo~-1er/ 
worker ratios for a r,iven firm size tha11 do other firt11s; therefore it is plausi­
ble to nssu!"e that they also have hirher total asset/worker ratios. While about 
tuo-thircls of the 250 odd firl'ls appearing in the "larpc" firm ·ohserw1t:lon on horse­
po·N~r /worker are -Sociec!ac:les Anoniras, and therefore the firure could not be 
dr~r..a.ticallv <liffcr.cnt for Socicdacle~ Anonir-cas on1'• > .it 5.s true th:.?t i ~ the r.:1tio 
.total assct/horsenocmcr :i.s the s.ir.e at enc~ fir!" size for f-ocieclades 1'.nonir-:1s c>ncl 
for othc:rs, then the "larr-e". ohservati0n on "total assetc;/vorkers" would hrn~e 
hcen 16-11 ncrccnt less if the Socic<ladec; Anoni~nq had hnri the sare horse~a,er./ 
\1orkcr r.1tics as other f:i-rr.s-fnirly sirni..fi.car.t, Converselv, if one Pere to con-




that the ~Clcicclacles Anon5.r.as uonld have• at a r:l.•,en firn size, a hirhcr horse­
powcr/wor~:cr rntio in the 11nrer siz•c r-rou~. (T'hc cvi,foncc i,; c,uitC? o:;tronr that 
such as difference ext~t5 nt the lo~er size Prours.) One other difficulty 
is that since in the P;inc statfat:f.c,; tl,c tt!lpcr catc!"orv :f.c; clefincct in tel'T",s 
of nunber of ~•10rkers, this tends to rive _it a lower horsepm-..rc:r/la!·or ratio th~n 
it would have if defined in terns of capital, tt"'t;1l factors userl, or whatever 
other indicator. It scens unlikely· that in an oy,en-ended caterory with a wide 
ran~e, that this factor should be too inportant. 
......... ' 
-128-
Appendix B: Total Capital vs. ~hysical Capital 
Besides rea.t•-~.riv~stment ~ a r,lant' s (firms 's) capital stock consists also of 
working capital. Large firms particularly tend to have sizeable amounts ot 
working capital tied up in accounts payable, cash, etc.; for the Saciedades 
-1Z9-
Anonimas in the manufacturing_sector in 19M the three categories cash+ short 
term cred::.·:s, inventories, and fixed capital were all about equal (according to 
the official figures), although the fixed capital would probably be the largest 
after allowance for inflatton.1 To a considerable extent the "accounts payable" 
of large firms (like maJy of the Socierlades Anonima~) constitute credit extended. 
to other presumably smaller firms with less easy access to the institutional 
credit channels. In general short term·c:-redi~s of the Sociedades are quite close 
in amount to short term dehts (to banks, foreign supplie~s, etc.). Whether some 
or all of this i1orking capital should be ·created as part of a firm's capital 
stock for purposes of evclluati~g its total factor productivity raises some theore­
tical questions. If, as seems probable, working capital/total capital is higher. 
for large than for small ones, its exclusior.. in factor productivity calculations 
leads to a certain bias against the small units. 2 
1which is not taken into account in the official figures in such a way as to 
provide a measure of current value. 
2In a gorld of perfecc factor and product markets, the issues raised are not 
particularly complicated, and the way they should be handled is fairly clear. (Of 
course with all nia:cket-s perfect the object of the eltercise _g:fo'C'OI!J!>aring ·:to~al 
productivity fot different setc of firms loses meaning.) Two types of compari-
sons across producing units are possible.. One focuses on the productivity of 
"factors used" by the -producing qnit; in this case a firm which receives credit 
from another one has ttat amo•.mt included in its "capitalu--this capital not 
being a factor input to the firm advancing the credit. Outputs are measured by
the usual "value added." The alternative approach, focusing on "factors owned" 
involves deducting from the ~ebtor firm's value added the interest it must pay on 
this capital, and not including that capital in the denominator; the reverse would 
be done for the creditor. Since it is not nonnally possible to sort out interest 
payments (if any)> the latter procedure would not be practical in any case, so the 
"factors used" approach wou:t.d seem the only possible one; in it cash but not accounts 
receivable would be treated as part of a firm's capital. 
This approach involv~s a bias, howeve~> since the lending firm is normally 
repaid in the form of a lower purchase price (or higher sales price) than would 
otherwise be the case. ~'hns the fact thnt the debtor firm does not own an amount 
of capital equal to rPal capi.tal used (fixe<l + :f.nvent:o.-:ies plus cash) does affect 
the estimate of its value adc~d. by leading ~o a lowe~ sales price than would other­
wise be the case~ the opposite is true f~r the larger firm. In ~ther words, it is 
clear that the ava:C!..".bi li.:::,· o~ cc:.,pital to use in the. form of accounts receivable 
does have an impact: on e firm's ':ecorded ~'outp.1t.iot:her iorms of capital" ratio. 
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The little empirical evidence available here suggests that the total assets/ 
1
physical capital ratio rises with firm size (measured by number of workers). 
If physical capital/horsepower increases with size, and total assets/physical 
. 2 
capital increases, clearly total assets/horsepower increases. There is some more 
direct support for this proposition, adduced by comparisons of the horsepower/ 
worker and the total assets/worker ratios to size; the latter ratio rises more 
rapidly than the former. Though the information used to arrive at this con­
clusion comes from a variety of sources, the incomparabilities and/or errors 
would have to be substantial for it to be negated; as they stand, the data sug­
gest that the total assets/horsepower ratio may be twice as high or more for 
large firms (of 200 ~1orkers or more) ~han for small ones, of say less than 20 
or perhaps less than 50 workerso (See Diagram A-1.) 
Although there is substantial evidence of positive relation between the 
total asset/horsepower ratio and firm size, the fact that large firms appear to 
have a higher share of their assets in the form of accounts receivable. 
1only for the Sociedadaes Anonimas (whose special characteristics make 
them a rather unrepresentative sample) is evidence available on this ratio. 
Table A-9 indicates, in general, a positive relationship between the ratio 
"fixed capital plus inventories/ total assets': and the level of assets per 
firm. Since the observations are, once again, averages for all the Sociedades 
Anonimas in a given 2 or 3 digit sector, thE! usual "failure to normalizen prob­
lems are present, i.e., i~ may be that different industries imply different op­
timal ratios of the varia~le in question as well as different average size firms. 
Abstracting from this problem, the ratios would suggest that over the range of 
perhaps 50-600 workers, the ratio might decrease by 20-40 percent. 
Note th&t such .~conomic variables as labor productivity, the capital/labor 
ratio, and others tend to vary less by plant size for Sociedades Anonimas than 
they do fo~ other plantG. This might suggest that the calculation just cited 
underestimates the variation of the ratio in question over firm sizes in the 
universe of firms. 
2.rhere is an asyi."1llletry :~n the information available on these two ratios, 
that for the first relating to ::irm si.;e (as the Sociedades are firms, not plants) 
and the second, as explni~ed earlier, to plant size. It seems unlikely that any 
conclusions drawn here a:::-e th~ ::esult of this asymmetry, though it would be ad­
vantageous, of cours,~, to ha~·e t:-.e data in common terms. 
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Appendix C: Value Add~d/Capital and Firm (Plnut) Size with Other Definitions of 
Firm (Plant) Size 
While it is generally recognized that for many purposE::s the use of "number 
of workers" to measure a fil.,n's size is not the appropriate one, other measures 
are difficult to implement for reasons of data availability. Although it is 
not possible, for Colombia, to go through any real analysis with alternative 
measures, it is worth clarifying to some extent how results might differ if that 
were possible. For many policy purposes (e.g., with respect to credit. policy 
toward a firm planning to expand its capital) capital stock is likely to be the 
more relevant indicator of size; for many other questions some concept like 
. 1
"total factors used11 would be optimal. In the absenc.e of actuai information 
on the relationship c~ong total :f.nputs, the capital/labor ratio and total 
factor productivity, no firm predictions can be made as to how the relation­
ship between, for example, output/capital and size of firm will change when 
capital replaces labor as a measure of firm size. But it is worthwhile noting 
that if there were no relation between firm size measured by total inputs and 
either capital/labor or total factor productivity, then one would expect output/ 
capital to rise less rapidly (fall more rapidly) with firm size where firm size 
is defined in terms of capital than where it is defined in terms of labor. 2 
1statistical offices could easily classify firms by amount of output and 
this would be in some cases more closely related to total factors used, but it 
would make it impossible to analyze in ac unbiased fashion questions like the 
relationship between total factors used and total productivity. 
2Where firm size is defined by number of workers, "small" firms include 
both ones with small amounts of both factors and ones with small amounts of 
labor but substanti.al arnounts of capital; the ::.nclusion of the latter firms 
should imply a lower outp:t/capital ratio than would obtain for the firms small 
in terms of both inputs. Fi::ms with many workers include firms with a large 
amount of both factore anJ firms with only a moderate amount of capital but a 
high labor/capital ratio; the inclusion of the :~atter gt·oup implies a higher 
output/capital ratio than ~-10ulJ obtai1, for junc th~ firms with high amounts of 
both factors. How different the output/capital-finn size relation would be 
-:.32-
Footnote 2 of Appendix C con.:iniled 
for these two defitlitior.1s of firm size would depend on the dispersion of the 
capital/labor ratio for firms of given "total inputs.". If for any given size 
(define.d by total factor inputs with fixed factor prices) firms were normally 
distributed around a given capital/labor retio (a plausible expectation if the 
production function were homog~neous and factor market imperfections faced by 
firms were not related to their size) the difference would depend only on the 
standard deviation of that normal distribution (assuming that either (a) all 
firms are at the same level of technical efficiency [i.e., the output of each 
one is that predicted by a single isoquant map or production function] or (b) 
there is no relationship between total factor productivity and capital labor 
ratio). 
A third (and frequently the most relevant) output/capital-firm size rela­
tionship would appear if size were defined by 11 total inputs. u We refer to this 
as the "true" relationship. 
We know, in fact, that the capital/labor ratio is an increasing function 
of total factor inputs. (Whether this is due to a nonhomogeneity in the produc­
tion function ot to problems in factor markets -is not relevant here.)' This 
tends to imply that the use of labor as a measure of size will generate a 
greater upward bias to the output/capital-,firm size relation than in the bench­
mark case just .referred 1:0. (Firms of a given total input size normally dis­
tributed around a given K/L ratio and having no relation between technical ef­
ficiency and K/L.) Consider the relationship between L/K for finns recorded 
as being in the highe.st size class (i.e., L above a certain level) to L/K for 
firms actually in the highest class (defined by total factor inputs), and the 
·corresponding comparison for the lower size class; the percent difference between 
. these two ratios is greater in the present case than in the preceding one. Thus 
the use of Las a measure of size gives a more biased picture (relative to the 
true measure) here than in the previous case. Conversely, however, if capital 
is used as a measure of size, then the top size category will have a K/L ratio 
above that of the top si?.e category measured by total inputs by a smaller pro­
portion than i:1 the benchraark case, i.e. , the bias will be less than in·· the 
benchmark case. Whether che total difference between the output/capital-firm 
size relationship found using the two different size measures would be greater 
here than in the bencl-imark case is not clear. If it is assumed that the non­
conical (i.e., noL formin3 a sort of cone when each labor and capita'i coordinate 
is plotted on a graph) distribution of firms by amounts of labor and capital is 
due to a nonhomogeneous pro~uction function, and (perhaps in other cases as well) 
one would probably not expect a normal distribution of firms along a given factor 
price ray. But nothing is very clear in this area. 
In a more complete analysis it would be of interest to discuss the expected 
distribution of capital/labor combinations. It would also be useful to ascertain 
the typical 11growth co equilibrium" paths of :.:irms, since there may be more to 
learn from firms which are at least in some sort of equilibrium. But this is 
empirically impossibJ_e too. 
